



ADVANCE SHEET- April 30, 2021

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President's Letter

Our typical issues have contained two historical essays and a public document. Our last issue was longer than most because of the inclusion of the full text of John Morley's Essay on Compromise. In the interest of limiting length, this issue contains only one essay in addition to a rather long document.

The essay is Henry Simons' A Positive Program for Laissez Faire, published at the depth of the Depression in 1934. Simons was an economist attached to the University of Chicago Law School and is deemed by some the father of the 'Law and Economics' movement. He was, however far less doctrinaire than most of his successors. His advocacy in this essay of nationalization of railroads probably would not have survived the rise of the national highway system and the motor trucking and civil aviation industries, but several of his other causes retain their pertinence, including the advocacy of strict bank regulation, antitrust enforcement, and progressive taxation. He was essentially a man of the center, not the right, his views resembling those of John Maynard Keynes and Harold Macmillan in 1930s England.

The document is the recent 200 plus page report of a Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities appointed by the present British government which reported on March 31 of this year. It is notable for its rejection of fashionable claims of 'systemic racism' and for its granular and particularized analysis of the progress of different ethnic groups and the reasons for it. As might be expected, it has generated much controversy in Britain. The excuse for its publication in full text here is that it, and the controversy surrounding it, has been totally ignored by the American press and the New York Times, once our flagship newspaper. Baltimoreans of all persuasions will find it of interest.

George W. Liebmann



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
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
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INTRODUCTION BY THE EDITOR

Laissez faire never was a mere do-nothing policy. Historically, it developed as a vigorous attack upon entrenched social, commercial, and industrial privilege. Economic freedom (*any* freedom?) can never be absolute freedom. It must always mean freedom within a given social framework of legal standards and regulatory practices. There is no security—as John Stuart Mill's leading pupil said in his inaugural lecture in 1870—"that the economic phenomena of society, as at present constituted, will always arrange themselves spontaneously in the way which is most for the common good."

The imperative need for a positive program of economic legislation is admitted by all parties to the present controversy over public policy. The vital issues lie between those who would inflict upon the state responsibility for all sorts of detailed regulations of economic life, and those who would preserve a competitive situation and minimize the responsibility of the state. The former is the road we are now traveling. The latter would involve a recasting of the framework within which freedom is to operate.

Professor Simons' pamphlet is an original and comprehensive plea for the preservation of economic freedom as the ultimate agency of control. His main purpose is the criticism of current policy by the definition of a vitally different program in which—in his own words—the state would undertake to establish such conditions that it might avoid the necessity of regulating "the heart of the contract," that is to say, the price system itself. This essay also gives the first detailed statement of the only novel proposal concerning banking reform that has come out of our recent disastrous experience. This so-called "Chicago" or "100 Per Cent Reserve" plan is likely to figure prominently in future discussions of monetary reform.

This is the fifteenth of a series of Public Policy Pamphlets which the University of Chicago Press is publishing. Frequently the scholarly journals give no attention at all to prob-

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lems that have an acute public interest, while the ordinary magazines can print little but superficial comment. The University might well perform a valuable service by making available to the public whatever special training and information it may have at its disposal. The continuation of such a series will, of course, depend upon its reception by the public.

Perhaps it goes without saying that the authors of these pamphlets are individually responsible for their views and that they in no way involve the responsibility of the University of Chicago.

HARRY D. GIDEONSE

November 10, 1934

A POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR LAISSEZ FAIRE
SOME PROPOSALS FOR A LIBERAL
ECONOMIC POLICY

This is frankly a propagandist tract—a defense of the thesis that traditional liberalism offers, at once, the best escape from the moral confusion of current political and economic thought, and the best basis or rationale for a program of economic reconstruction. This view has been widely ridiculed of late, by communists and fascists, by most of our “liberal” reformers and politically ambitious intellectuals. Old-fashioned liberals, and the more orthodox economists especially, have responded meagerly to the attack; only their position is inadequately represented in the welter of current controversy. Consequently, one is impelled to try, humbly but uncompromisingly, to state that position, and to indicate specifically how economic reconstruction might be achieved along lines dictated by a faith in liberty.

There is in America no important disagreement as to the proper objectives of economic policy—larger real income, greater regularity of production and employment, reduction of inequality, preservation of democratic institutions. The real issues have to do merely with means, not with ends (or intentions); but the future of our civilization hangs in balance as these issues are decided; and those whom the recent crisis has brought to positions of political and intellectual leadership seem to lack insight as to the nature of our economic ills or the effects of their own prescriptions.

We have witnessed abroad the culmination of movements from constitutional government to dictatorships, from freedom back to authority. This spectacle, for most of us, is revolting; and the experience, something to be avoided at all costs. Yet, faced with the same problems, we adopt measures and accept political slogans which call explicitly for an “American compromise,” that is to say, for more authority and less freedom here and now. Thus do we justify and rationalize a

policy of accelerating movement in a direction which we overwhelmingly disapprove.

The real enemies of liberty in this country are the naïve advocates of managed economy or national planning; but with them we must agree on one vital point, namely, that there is now imperative need for a sound, positive program of economic legislation. Our economic organization is perilously near to disintegration and collapse. In earlier periods, it could be expected to become increasingly strong if only protected from undue political interference. Now, however, it has reached a condition where it can be saved only through adoption of the wisest measures by the state. Modern democracy arose under conditions which made only negligible demands for intelligence in economic legislation; it remains soon to be seen whether democracy can survive when those demands are very great.

It is the main purpose of this tract to criticize current policies, simply by defining the main elements of a vitally different program. Part I undertakes to present the minimum of general analysis or diagnosis which seems essential for exposition of the program and specific proposals presented in Part II.

PART I

Much significance has been, and should be, attached to the simultaneous development of capitalism and democracy. Indeed, it seems clear that *none of the precious "freedoms" which our generation has inherited can be extended, or even maintained, apart from an essential freedom of enterprise—apart from a genuine "division of labor" between competitive and political controls.* The existence (and preservation) of a competitive situation in private industry makes possible a minimizing of the responsibilities of the sovereign state. It frees the state from the obligation of adjudicating endless, bitter disputes among persons as participants in different industries, and among owners of different kinds of productive services. In a word, it makes possible a political policy of *laissez faire*.

This policy and the correlative political philosophy, nineteenth-century liberalism, have been subjected latterly to gross misrepresentation and to shallow satirical jibes in the "new economics." The representation of *laissez faire* as a merely do-nothing policy is unfortunate and misleading. It is an obvious responsibility of the state under this policy to maintain the kind of legal and institutional framework within which competition can function effectively as an agency of control. The policy, therefore, should be defined positively, as one under which the state seeks to establish and maintain such conditions that it may avoid the necessity of regulating "the heart of the contract"—that is to say, the necessity of regulating relative prices. Thus, the state is charged, under this "division of labor," with heavy responsibilities and large "control" functions: the maintenance of competitive conditions in industry; the control of the currency (of the quantity and value of the effective money); the definition of the institution of property (especially with reference to fiscal practices)—not to mention the many social-welfare activities.

The great errors of economic policy in the past century may be defined—and many of our present difficulties explained—in terms of excessive political interference with relative prices,

and in terms of disastrous neglect of the positive responsibilities of government under a free-enterprise system. Our governments have tinkered interminably with relative prices (witness the tariff). On the other hand, they have never really tried to maintain effectively competitive conditions in industry (witness the "rule of reason" and the absurd grants of powers to corporations). They have evaded—when they have not abused—their responsibility of controlling the currency (witness the growth of private banks which provide, and potentially can destroy, all but a small percentage of our total effective circulating media). Moreover, they have scarcely recognized the obligation, or the opportunities, of mitigating inequality through appropriate fiscal practices—that is to say, through appropriate definition of the institution of property. Consequently, the so-called failure of capitalism (of the free-enterprise system, of competition) may reasonably be interpreted as primarily a failure of the political state in the discharge of its minimum responsibilities under capitalism. This view may suggest reasons for skepticism with reference to currently popular schemes for curing our ills.

It seems clear, at all events, that there is an intimate connection between freedom of enterprise and freedom of discussion, and that political liberty can survive only within an effectively competitive economic system. Thus, *the great enemy of democracy is monopoly, in all its forms*: gigantic corporations, trade associations and other agencies for price control, trade unions—or, in general, organization and concentration of power within functional classes. Effectively organized functional groups possess tremendous power for exploiting the community at large and even for sabotaging the system. The existence of competition within such groups, on the other hand, serves to protect the community as a whole and to give an essential flexibility to the economy. The disappearance of competition would almost assure the wrecking of the system in the economic struggle of organized minorities; on the political side, it would present a hopeless dilemma. If the organized economic groups were left to exercise their monopoly powers without political restraint, the result would be a usurpation of sovereignty by these groups—and, perhaps, a domi-


nation of the state by them. On the other hand, if the state undertakes to tolerate (instead of destroying) such organizations and to regulate their regulations, it will have assumed tasks and responsibilities incompatible with its enduring in a democratic form.

Thus, for one who prizes political liberty, there can be no sanguine view as to where the proliferation of organization leads. If the state undertakes, under popular government (or perhaps under any other form), to substitute its control for competition in the determination of relative prices and relative wages, the situation must soon become chaotic. Congressional meddling with relative prices through tariff legislation has never hurt us severely, for we have had within our tariff walls an enormous free-trade area. The legislative history of the American tariff, however, does suggest most clearly the probable outcome of an experiment in the political manipulation of the whole structure of internal prices. That our political system could endure either the economic effects of such control, or its consequences for political morality, is at least highly improbable.

If popular government did for a time achieve that infinitely wise and effective control which would be necessary merely to prevent economic collapse, the system could not survive. Political determination of relative prices, of relative returns from investment in different industries, and of relative wages in different occupations, implies settlement by peaceful negotiation of conflicts too bitter and too irreconcilable for deliberate adjudication and compromise. The petty warfare of competition within groups can be kept on such a level that it protects and actually promotes the general welfare. The warfare among organized economic groups, on the other hand, is unlikely to be more controllable or less destructive than warfare among nations. Indeed, democratic governments would have hardly so good a chance of arbitrating these conflicts tolerably as have the League of Nations and the World Court in their field.

Suppression of the competitive struggle within economic groups, and their organization into collective fighting units, will create conditions such that only ruthless dictatorship can

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maintain the degree of order necessary to survival of the population in an economy of intricate division of labor. Under these circumstances, the distribution of power among nations is likely, by the way, to be altered drastically in favor of those people best disciplined to submission and least contaminated with dangerous notions about the rights of man. In the Western world, the price of short-run security under such political arrangements is likely to be greater insecurity in the long run; for Western peoples will probably insist on changing dictators occasionally, even at the expense of catastrophic upheavals, disintegration of national units, and progressive political and economic separatism.

It seems nowise fantastic, indeed, to suggest that present developments point toward a historic era which will bear close resemblance at many points to the early Middle Ages. With the disappearance of the vestiges of free trade among nations will come intensification of imperialism and increasingly bitter and irreconcilable conflicts of interest internationally. With the disappearance of free trade within national areas will come endless, destructive conflict among organized economic groups—which should suffice, without assistance from international wars, for the destruction of Western civilization and its institutional heritage.

Thus, the increasing organization of interest groups (monopoly) and the resurgence of mercantilism ('planning')¹ promise an end of elaborate economic organization (of extensive division of labor, nationally and internationally), and an end of political freedom as well. If the situation is not yet hopeless because of the technical difficulties of turning back (and I refuse to believe it is), one finds abundant reason for despair in the fact that our sophisticated generation seems simply not to care. It has become unfashionable to reveal affection for democracy; and the meager curiosity about the future of our institutions leads only to the publication of our cheapest romantic literature in the guise of economics.

Competition and laissez faire have not brought us heaven. The severe depression, regarded as resulting from competition *instead of from the lack of it*, naturally produces an impairment of our affection for the system. But the wide-

spread disposition to deprecate our institutional heritage seems explicable only in terms of general unwillingness and inability to consider seriously what the actual alternatives are—where new roads lead—or, whatever their destination, how much human suffering must be endured on the way. Few people are now interested in assessing the opportunities for remodelling the old system without destroying its foundations. Worst of all, perhaps, is the popular disposition to accept from zealous “uplifters” devices for salvaging our institutions which are, in fact, the most effective means for undermining them irreparably.

Let us consider now what circumstances are most inimical, within the old system, to production of a large social income (to economic efficiency). The effective functioning of our economic organization requires full utilization of existing resources—including labor, use of the best available technical methods, and, less obviously, economical allocation of resources among available, alternative uses. This latter aspect of the problem may well be emphasized here.

Any judgment of efficiency implies a standard or scale of values—merely physical efficiency is an absurd conception. For economic analysis, such a scale of values is available in the market values (prices) of commodities. These market values, being the result of competitive purchase by persons free to utilize purchasing power as they please, may be accepted as measuring roughly the relative importance (for the community) of physical units of different things. To be sure, these prices are the result of free disposition of purchasing power by individuals of widely different income-circumstances. But the problems of efficiency and of inequality may usefully be separated for purposes of discussion—and properly, if one accepts the view that the appropriate measures for improving efficiency and for mitigating inequality are, within fairly wide limits, distinct and independent.

Efficient utilization of resources implies an allocation such that units of every kind of productive service make equally important (valuable) contributions to the social product in all the different uses among which they are transferable. Such

allocation will be approximated if, by virtue of highly competitive conditions, resources move freely from less productive (remunerative) to more productive employments. It is an essential object of monopoly, on the other hand, to maintain an area of abnormally high yield (productivity), and to prevent such influx of resources as would bring the monopolized industry down to the common level. Any effectively organized group may be relied upon to use to this end the power which organization brings.

Monopoly thus means the exclusion of available resources from uses which, on the market-value standard, are more important, and, therefore, means diversion of resources to less important uses. Every organized group, whether of employers or of workers, possesses great power, both for exploiting consumers and for injuring other groups of producers to whose industries resources are diverted by virtue of the monopoly restrictions.

Such characterization fits best the case of the strongest and most nearly complete monopolies. For the more typical, partial monopolies (the organization basis for which the National Recovery Act has sought to establish everywhere), the situation is somewhat different, and possibly worse from the viewpoint of the community at large. The looser forms of organization for price maintenance and output control (cartels, trade associations), while able to enforce output limitation upon existing firms, are seldom able to restrict the growth of investment (to control the number and size of firms); nor does their position permit them to withhold output quotas from newcomers in the industry. Such arrangements lead to gross wastage of investment as well as to exploitation of consumers. New firms, attracted by the high returns resulting from price maintenance, will construct plants; and they will be drawn into the organization and given their appropriate quotas (presumably on the basis of "capacity"). This means reduction in the quotas of other firms, and increasingly meager utilization of plant capacity throughout the industry. Finally, producers within the organization may obtain, in spite of the price maintenance, no higher return on investment than prevails in competitive fields. But consumers will be paying heavily, in high-

er prices, for the policies of the organization; and the industry will end up with much smaller production, in spite of much larger total investment, than would have obtained under competitive conditions. In technical language, equilibrium under the cartel or trade association form of monopoly means equality between average cost and price, in spite of enormous discrepancy between marginal cost and price. This, in general terms, describes the goal toward which "planners" unwittingly direct us.

The situation is strikingly similar with respect to trade-union monopoly, which usually involves a similarly partial monopoly power. The main device of trade-union strategy is the maintenance of the standard rate of pay, through collective bargaining. The raising of rates of wages in a particular field above the competitive level, by whatever methods of coercion, serves to diminish the volume of employment available within that field—inducing economy of such labor by substitution (of machinery and of other labor) and relative contraction of the industries requiring such labor. If the organization admits newcomers freely and rations employment, the occupation may continue to grow in numbers, or fail to decline, in spite of decline in the total amount of employment available—the increased rate of pay more than offsetting, for a time, the reduction in employment available per man. As with the trade association, numbers may increase until the members are no better off than they would have been without any organization at all. Yet product prices in the industries concerned will be higher; and a large part of the community's labor resources will be wasted—a situation which roughly describes, except for the denouement, recent conditions in coal mining in the Midwest. If the union can prevent entrance into the trade, if the older members are given full employment before newcomers are employed at all, or if the demand for this kind of labor is highly elastic, the effects of the wage control in this particular field will manifest themselves largely in diversion of labor into less important *and less remunerative* occupations. In any case, the diseconomies for the community are sufficiently evident.

The gains from monopoly organization in general are likely,

of course, to accrue predominantly to the strong and to be derived at the expense of the weak. Among producers, organization is least expensive and most easily achieved, as well as most effective, within groups whose members were unusually large and prosperous at the outset. Among workers, the bias is not less striking. The most highly skilled and most highly remunerated trades are the trades where organization is least difficult and where the fighting strength of groups once organized is greatest. Little evidence, inductive or analytic, can be conjured up to support the popular conception of trade unionism as a device for raising incomes at the bottom of the scale. Its possibilities lie mainly in the improvement of the position of labor's aristocracy²—and largely at the expense of labor generally. Here as elsewhere the gains from monopoly are exploitative. The restriction of employment in the more remunerative occupations injures other laborers, both as consumers and as sellers of services rendered more abundant in other areas by the restriction.

Another major factor in the inefficient allocation of resources is to be found in government regulation and interference. Tariff legislation is again the main case in point; for the protective tariff is essentially a device for forcing resources from uses of higher to uses of lower productivity. Moreover, there are good reasons for believing that political controls will generally work out in this way. Government interference with relative prices is in the nature of arbitration of conflicts of interest between minority producer groups and consumers (the whole community); and such interference inevitably involves decisions which have regard primarily for the interests of the minorities. Producers are, from a political point of view, organized, articulate groups; and it is in the nature of the political process to conciliate such groups. Anyone may detect the notorious economic fallacies, and thus see the dictates of sound policy, if he will look at every issue from the viewpoint of consumers; but no politician can be expected to do this, or to act on his conclusions if he does, except in a world where legislators are motivated primarily by the desire to be retired at the next election. People as consumers are

directly, both the railroads and utilities, and all other industries in which it is impossible to maintain effectively competitive conditions. For industries other than the utilities, there still remains a real alternative to socialization, namely, the establishment and preservation of competition as the regulative agency.

Turning now to questions of justice, of equitable distribution, we may suggest that equitable distribution is at least as important with respect to power as with reference to economic goods or income; also, that the cause of justice, perhaps in both directions, would be better served if well-intentioned reformers would reflect seriously on what their schemes imply with respect to the distribution of power. Surely there is something unlovely, to modern as against medieval minds, about marked inequality of either kind. A substantial measure of inequality may be unavoidable or essential for motivation; but it should be recognized as evil and tolerated only so far as the dictates of expediency are clear.

If we dislike extreme inequality of power, it is appropriate to view with especial misgivings the extension of political (and monopoly) control over relative prices and incomes. Either socialization or the mongrel system of "national planning" implies and requires extreme concentration of political power, under essentially undemocratic institutions. A system of democratic socialism is admittedly an attractive ideal; but, for the significant future, such a system is merely a romantic dream. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that any planners or controllers, with the peculiar talents requisite for obtaining dictatorial power, would be able to make decisions wise enough to keep an elaborate economic organization from falling apart. Even if one regards that prospect as not unpromising, the implied division of power between controllers and controllees would seem an intolerable price for increased efficiency.

An important factor in existing inequality, both of income and of power, is the gigantic corporation. We may recognize, in the almost unlimited grants of powers to corporate bodies, one of the greatest sins of governments against the free-enter-

prise system. There is simply no excuse, except with respect to a narrow and specialized class of enterprises, for allowing corporations to hold stock in other corporations—and no reasonable excuse (the utilities apart) for hundred-million-dollar corporations, no matter what form their property may take. Even if the much-advertised economies of gigantic financial combinations were real, sound policy would wisely sacrifice these economies to preservation of more economic freedom and equality.

Another cardinal sin of government against the free-enterprise system is manifest in the kind of institution of property which the state has inflicted upon that system. It has lain within the powers of the political state, in defining rights of property and inheritance, to prevent the extreme inequality which now obtains; and the appropriate changes might still be effected without seriously impairing the efficiency of the system. In a practical sense, there is not much now wrong with the institution of property except our arrangements with respect to taxation. Instead of collecting their required revenues in such manner as to diminish the concentration of wealth and income, governments have relied on the whole upon systems of levies which actually aggravated inequality. Until recently (and the situation is not strikingly different now) governments have financed their activities largely by conglomerations of miscellaneous exactions which have drawn funds predominantly from the bottom of the income scale. Modern fiscal arrangements, like those of medieval barons, must be explained largely in terms of efforts to grab funds wherever they could be reached with least difficulty—to levy upon trade wherever tribute could most easily be exacted—and with almost no regard for consequences in terms of either economic efficiency or personal justice.³

The problem of stabilization, of maintaining reasonably full employment of resources, calls for emphasis mainly upon two factors, one of which again is monopoly. If all prices moved up and down with substantial uniformity, changes in the general level of prices would have only unimportant effects upon the volume of production or employment. A major fac-

tor in the cycle phenomenon is the quite unequal flexibility of different sets of prices and, more explicitly, the stickiness of prices which, for the bulk of industry, determine out-of-pocket, operating (marginal) costs. This stickiness of prices reflects, first, competition-restraining organization, and, second, a widespread disposition to sacrifice volume to price—which is the characteristic exercise of monopoly power. Decisively important in the total situation is the exceeding inflexibility of wages—the explanation of which would require attention to many factors, of which effective labor organization is but one. To some extent it reflects merely a subtle sort of defensive co-operation among workers to protect themselves in a market which is often only nominally competitive on the employers' side. To some extent it involves employer deference to an attitude of the public, which condemns wage cutting and yet accepts wholesale discharge of employees as unavoidable and unrepensible. More interesting than the stickiness of wages, if not more important, is the price policy in depression of those basic industries which have long since disciplined themselves along lines now widely approved, against "unfair" (!) competition. Equally significant, or more so, is the depression behavior of railroad rates and the charges in other public utilities subject to government regulation, especially freight rates. At all events, the existence of extreme inflexibility in large areas of the price structure is one of the primary factors in the phenomenon of severe depression. This inflexibility increases the economic loss and human misery accompanying a given deflation, and it causes deflation itself to proceed much farther than it otherwise would.

The major responsibility for the severity of industrial fluctuations, however, falls directly upon the state. Tolerable functioning of a free-enterprise system presupposes effective performance of a fundamental function of government, namely, regulation of the circulating medium (money). We should characterize as insane a governmental policy of alternately expanding rapidly and contracting precipitously the quantity of paper currency in circulation—as a malevolent dictator easily could do, first issuing currency to cover fiscal deficits, and then retiring currency from surplus revenues. Yet that

is essentially the kind of monetary policy which actually obtains, by virtue of usurpation by private institutions (deposit banks) of the basic state function of providing the medium of circulation (and of private "cash" reserves). It is no exaggeration to say that the major proximate factor in the present crisis is commercial banking. This is not to say that private bankers are to blame for our plight; they have only played the game (and not so unfairly, on the whole) under the preposterous rules laid down by governments—rules which mean evasion or repudiation by governments of one of their crucial responsibilities. Everywhere one hears assertions of the failure of competitive controls, of the chaos of unplanned economy, when the chaos arises from reliance by the state upon competitive controls in a field (currency) where they cannot possibly work. Laissez faire, to repeat, implies a division of tasks between competitive and political controls; and the failure of the system, if it has failed, is properly to be regarded as a result of failure of the state, especially with respect to money, to do its part.

We have reached a situation where private-bank credit represents all but a small fraction of our total effective circulating medium. This gives us an economy in which significant disturbances of equilibrium set in motion forces which operate grossly to aggravate, rather than to correct, the initial maladjustments. When for any reason business earnings become abnormally favorable, bank credit expands, driving sensitive product prices farther out of line with sticky, insensitive costs; earnings become more favorable; credit expands farther and more rapidly; and so on and on, until costs finally do catch up, or until some speculative flurry happens to reverse the initial maladjustment. When earnings prospects are unpromising, credit contracts and earnings become still smaller and more unpromising. In an economy where costs (especially wages, freight rates, and monopoly prices in basic industries) are extremely inflexible downward, the deflation might continue indefinitely (until everyone was unemployed) if governments did not intervene (inflate) to save the banks or to mitigate human suffering.

Thus, the state has forced the free-enterprise system, al-

most from the beginning, to live with a monetary system as bad as could well be devised. If, as seems possible, both capitalism and democracy are soon to be swept away forever by a resurgence of mercantilism (by the efforts of persons who know not whither they lead), then to commercial banking will belong the uncertain glory of having precipitated the transition to a new era. Such is likely to be the case, even if our institutions survive this time the attentions of their misguided, if well-meaning, guardians. Capitalism seems to retain remarkable vitality; but it can hardly survive the political rigors of another depression; and banking, with the able assistance of monopoly, seems certain to give us both bigger and better depressions hereafter—unless the state does re-assume and discharge with some wisdom its responsibility for controlling the circulating medium.

PART II

We shall now try to define, for present conditions, the main features of a genuinely liberal program, in the traditional sense of liberalism. Such a program, if it could be realized politically, would suffice to permit tolerable functioning of a free-enterprise system, and to prevent (or postpone) revolutionary change in our whole institutional framework. The time has come (some will say it has already passed) for close co-operation between those interested in making capitalism a better system and those of less liberal persuasion who merely dislike revolutions. Consequently, we hope that the proposals described below may receive consideration, both from liberals who are not naively romantic, and from conservatives who are not stupidly reactionary.

The proposals, of necessity, are rather drastic. A liberal-conservative movement must now resist and overcome long-established, cumulative trends; it must set itself against the forces of history. We are drifting rapidly toward political and economic chaos. Consequently, a political movement which is conservative in its objectives must be radical in terms of its means. Those who hope for dictatorship, whether under proletarian or fascist symbols, may rather fittingly refer to us as the impractical visionaries. It is they who may now complacently embrace the faith that what is going to be is good, merely because it so obviously is going to be—in spite of us. The cause of economic liberalism and political democracy faces distinctly unfavorable odds and, therefore, requires above all a strategy boldly and intelligently conceived.

The main elements in a sound liberal program may be defined in terms of five proposals or objectives (in a descending scale of relative importance):

1. Elimination of private monopoly in all its forms
 1. Through drastic measures for establishing and maintaining effectively competitive conditions in all industries where competition can function as a regulative agency (as a means

- for insuring effective utilization of resources and for preventing exploitation), and
2. Through gradual transition to direct government ownership and operation in the case of all industries where competition cannot be made to function effectively as an agency of control
- II. Establishment of more definite and adequate "rules of the game" with respect to money, through
1. Abolition of private deposit banking on the basis of fractional reserves⁴
 2. Establishment of a completely homogeneous, national circulating medium, and
 3. Creation of a system under which a federal monetary authority has a direct and inescapable responsibility for controlling (not with broad discretionary powers, but under simple, definite rules laid down in legislation) the quantity (or, through quantity, the value) of effective money
- III. Drastic change in our whole tax system, with regard primarily for the effects of taxation upon the distribution of wealth and income
- IV. Gradual withdrawal of the enormous differential subsidies implicit in our present tariff system
- V. Limitation upon the squandering of our resources in advertising and selling activities

The case for a liberal-conservative policy must stand or fall on the first proposal, abolition of private monopoly; for it is the *sine qua non* of any such policy. Reasonable differences of opinion may appear as to methods; but there can be no intelligent dispute, among liberals and conservatives, as to the objective.

This proposal contemplates deliberate avoidance of the regulation expedient—or, if you please, adherence to the kind of regulation which works only through the preservation of competitive controls. It implies that every industry should be either effectively competitive or socialized; that governments should plan definitely on socialization of the railroads and utilities, and of every other industry where competitive conditions cannot be preserved. On the other hand, it should be a main objective of policy to prevent the development, in

the case of other industries, of conditions which would necessitate political control of prices, or socialization. It must suffice here merely to sketch some of the requisite measures.

There must be outright dismantling of our gigantic corporations, and persistent prosecution of producers who organize, by whatever methods, for price maintenance or output limitation. There must be explicit and unqualified repudiation of the so-called "rule of reason." Legislation must prohibit, and administration effectively prevent, the acquisition by any private firm, or group of firms, of substantial monopoly power, regardless of how reasonably that power may appear to be exercised. The Federal Trade Commission must become perhaps the most powerful of our governmental agencies; and the highest standards must be maintained, both in the appointment of its members, and in the recruiting of its large technical staff. In short, restraint of trade must be treated as a major crime, and prosecuted unremittingly by a vigilant administrative body.

As a main feature of the program, *there must be a complete "new deal" with respect to the private corporation.* As many writers have pointed out, the corporation is simply running away with our economic (and political) system—by virtue merely of an absurd carelessness and extravagance on the part of the states in granting powers to these legal creatures. The following proposals, while tentative in detail and obviously inadequate in scope, will suggest the kind of reform which seems imperative:

- I. Transfer to the federal government of the exclusive power to charter ordinary, private corporations, and subsequent annulment of all charters granted by the states
- II. Enactment of federal incorporation laws, including among others the following provisions:
 1. That no corporation which engages in the manufacture or merchandising of commodities or services shall own any securities of any other such corporation
 2. Limitation upon the total amount of property which any single corporation may own
 - a) A general limitation for all corporations, *and*

- b) A limitation designed to preclude the existence in any industry of a single company large enough to dominate that industry—the principle being stated in legislation, the actual maxima for different industries to be fixed by the Federal Trade Commission⁵
3. That corporations may issue securities only in a small number of simple forms prescribed by law, and that no single corporation may employ more than two (or three) of the different forms
 4. Incorporation of investment corporations under separate laws, designed to preclude their becoming holding companies or agencies of monopoly control—with limitations on their total property, on percentage holdings of securities of any single operating company, and on total investment in any single industry (again under the immediate control of the Federal Trade Commission)
 5. That investment corporations shall hold stock in operating companies without voting rights, and shall be prohibited from exercising influence over such companies with respect to management
 6. That no person shall serve as an officer in any two corporations in the same line of business, and that no officer of an investment corporation shall serve as an officer in any operating company
 7. That corporate earnings shall be taxed to shareholders in such manner as to prevent evasion of personal-income tax with respect to undistributed earnings (see below, p. 27)

The corporation is a socially useful device for organizing the ownership and control in operating companies of size sufficient to obtain the real economies of large-scale production under unified management. It should not be made available, however, for financial consolidation of operating enterprises which are (or which, without serious loss of efficiency, might be) essentially independent as to production management. Horizontal combinations should be prohibited; and vertical combinations (integration) should be permitted only so far as clearly compatible with the maintenance of real competition. Few of our gigantic corporations can be defended on the ground that their present size is necessary to reasonably full exploitation of production economies; their existence

is to be explained in terms of opportunities for promoter profits, personal ambitions of industrial and financial "Napoleons," and advantages of monopoly power. We should look toward a situation in which the size of ownership units in every industry is limited by the minimum size of operating plant requisite to efficient, but highly specialized, production—and even more narrowly limited, if ever necessary to the maintenance of freedom of enterprise.

Only a special class of investment corporations should be permitted to hold stock in other corporations; and their powers should be circumscribed narrowly, in order to assure that they confine themselves to performing the important and legitimate functions of the investment trust. These corporations should be merely passive investors, protecting their own stockholders by diversification, rather than by exercising control over operating companies; and full precautions should be taken against their becoming, in effect, holding companies or devices of producer organization.

All corporations should be held to a Spartan simplicity in their capital structures. There should be the sharpest distinction between owners and creditors; and, where this distinction becomes impaired through financial adversity, reorganization should be compulsory and immediate. It would seem wise, indeed, to require the maintenance of a predominant residual equity, and to limit narrowly (say to 20 per cent) the percentage of contractual obligations to total assets.

The establishment and preservation of effective competition throughout the labor market is a difficult and forbidding task. Given real competition among employers, one might wisely advocate application to labor organizations of the general prohibitions upon restraint of trade. If trade unions could somehow be prevented from indulging restrictive monopolistic practices, they might become invaluable institutions. They might then assume their proper rôle as agencies for making labor articulate politically, for preventing arbitrary and oppressive treatment of individual workers, for rendering special services to their members, and for promoting consumer cooperation with respect to both commodities and the various

forms of social insurance. Such policy, however, may seem politically fantastic. The community regards unions as representing the interests of labor generally, rather than as agencies for exploitation within the ranks of labor. Even the weaker groups who largely bear the brunt of such exploitation co-operate with their organized brethren and applaud their conquests.

The best one may hope, perhaps, is that labor monopolies, if not fostered and supported by the state, will cease to grow, and even decline in power. Developments of recent years afford some grounds for this hope. Moreover, if genuinely competitive conditions were established among employers, and if we had an efficient system of public employment exchanges, labor monopoly would probably have to face a more hostile public opinion. Full publicity, through the employment exchanges, as to the numbers of qualified workers unable to obtain employment in various trades would create some pressure, in normal times, against unreasonable wage demands. Greater stabilization of production and employment, under a sound system of money and credit, should eliminate the boom periods in which organization proliferates, and also minimize the need for pressure to overcome the lag of wage rates when costs of living are rising.

One scarcely need remark that the establishment of good public employment exchanges is immensely important, on other grounds, for the strengthening and improving of our economic system.

The proposal for abandonment of the regulation expedient in the case of the railroads and utilities requires little comment here. We can worry along with existing arrangements, to be sure, for a considerable time. It seems imperative, however, that we recognize the inherent limitations of these arrangements and plan toward gradual change. Mere recognition of the ultimate difficulties should help to dissuade us from extending needlessly the range of regulation.

Much can be said for early socialization of the railroads, if only for the training of governments in the discharge of such functions, and for the light which experience would throw

upon the expediency of extending gradually the scope of public ownership. The feasibility of public ownership and operation of the other utilities will vary from locality to locality, according to the efficiency of public administration and the level of political morality. A good case can be made for extensive experimentation, however, if only because the present system of regulation is failing so completely.

The proposals with reference to banking and currency arise out of the conviction that extreme fluctuations of production and employment may be prevented by rather simple (if drastic) measures with respect to money and credit. The proposals may be defined tentatively in terms of the following measures:

1. Outright federal ownership of the Federal Reserve Banks.
2. Annulment of all existing bank charters (as of a date, say, two years in the future), and enactment of new federal legislation providing for complete separation, between different classes of corporations, of the deposit and lending functions of existing deposit banks.
3. Legislation requiring that all institutions which maintain deposit liabilities and/or provide checking facilities (or any substitute therefor) shall maintain reserves of 100 per cent in cash and deposits with the Federal Reserve Banks.
4. Provision during the transition period for gradual displacement of private-bank credit as circulating medium by credit of the Federal Reserve Banks.

(This implies enormous increase in the investments and in the demand obligations of the Reserve Banks—i.e., long continued open-market purchases which would serve to inject the substitute credit medium and also to facilitate gradual liquidation of the investments of existing deposit banks. At the end of the transition, the Reserve Banks should find themselves in possession of investments amounting to a substantial portion of the federal debt—or, perhaps, in possession of the greater part of the debt itself—thus eliminating the burden of the debt, to that extent, without taxation and without inflation.)

5. Displacement by notes and deposits of the Reserve Banks of all other forms of currency in circulation, thus giving us a completely homogeneous national circulating medium.

(This implies permanent retirement of all U.S. notes ["greenbacks"], all silver dollars and silver certificates, all gold coin and gold certificates, and all national bank notes. Subsidiary silver might be retained [though it might better be replaced by coins of a cheaper and more durable metal]. Monetary gold would be held exclusively by the Reserve Banks, in the form of bars, and utilized only for settlement of international balances.)

6. Prescription in legislation of an explicit, simple rule or principle of monetary policy, and establishment of an appointive, administrative body ("National Monetary Authority"), charged with carrying out the prescribed rule, and vested with no discretionary powers as regards fundamental policy.
7. Abolition of reserve requirements against notes and deposits of the Reserve Banks, and broad grants of powers to the "National Monetary Authority" for performance of its strictly administrative function.

(The foregoing measures contemplate an economy in which the rules of the game as to money are definite, intelligible, and inflexible. They are intended to avoid both the "rulelessness" of the present system and the establishment of any system based on discretionary management. "Managed currency," without fixed rules of management, appeals to me as among the most dangerous forms of "planning." To establish, as part of a free-enterprise economy, a monetary authority with power to alter vitally and arbitrarily the position of parties to financial contracts, would seem fantastic.)

There will be wide differences of opinion as to what the specific rule of monetary policy, within such a system, should be; but this is not the place to discuss the relative merits of different possible rules. Two observations, however, may be submitted dogmatically: (1) That the adoption of one among the several definite and unambiguous rules proposed by competent students is more important than the choice among them. (2) That rigid stabilization of exchange rates on other (gold-standard) countries is totally inadequate and undesirable as a rule of national currency policy. The various rules which merit consideration differ with respect to the amount of change in the quantity of circulating medium proposed. At one extreme is the rule of fixing the quantity (M) or the total turnover (MV); at the other is the rule of stabilizing

some index of commodity prices. The former contemplates ultimately a policy of balancing federal expenditures and federal tax revenues; the latter would require continuous financing of expenditures (or retirement of outstanding debt) to some extent by mere issue of currency. It is important to consider how different possible rules would operate, given the basic inflexibilities in the price structure; but it is equally important that the rule be chosen with regard for the political possibilities of securing adherence to it over long periods without substantial modification. (The rule must be such that strong sentiments against "tinkering with the currency" can be regimented around it.)

The proposals with reference to banking contemplate displacement of existing deposit banks by at least two distinct types of institutions. First, there would be deposit banks which, maintaining 100 per cent reserves, simply could not fail, so far as depositors were concerned, and could not create or destroy effective money. These institutions would accept deposits just as warehouses accept goods. Their income would be derived exclusively from service charges—perhaps merely from moderate charges for the transfer of funds by check or draft. Given generous co-operation on the part of the Reserve Banks, the deposit banks should be able to offer their facilities at quite reasonable cost to their customers. Incidentally, a good case could be made for extending the facilities of the Postal Savings System for the provision of something like checking accounts.

A second type of institution, substantially in the form of the investment trust, would perform the lending functions of existing banks. Such companies would obtain funds for lending by sale of their own stock; and their ability to make loans would be limited by the amount of funds so obtained. Various types of agencies, for bringing together would-be borrowers and lenders, would of course appear. In a word, short-term lending would be managed in much the same way as long-term lending; and the creation and destruction of effective circulating medium by private institutions would be impossible.⁶

These banking proposals define means for eliminating the

perverse elasticity of credit which obtains under a system of private, commercial banking, and for restoring to the central government complete control over the quantity of effective money and its value. The success of such measures, to repeat, requires the adoption of sound rules of monetary and fiscal policy, effective administration under those rules, and a high degree of stability in the rules themselves. But no monetary system, however perfectly conceived and administered, can make a free-enterprise system function effectively, in the absence of reasonable flexibility in the price structure—i.e., in the absence of effective price competition among enterprisers and among owners of productive services.⁷

Our proposal with reference to taxation is based on the view: (1) that reduction of inequality is per se immensely important; (2) that progressive taxation is both an effective means and, within the existing framework of institutions, the only effective means to that end; (3) that, in a world of competitive, invidious consumption, the gains at the bottom of the income scale can be realized without significant loss to persons of large income, so long as their rank in the income scale is unchanged; and (4) that drastic reduction of inequality through taxation is attainable without much loss of efficiency in the system, and without much impairing the attractiveness of the economic game.⁸

Taxation must affect the income distribution, whether we will it so or not. Actually, it has operated to increase inequality, except for a slight opposite effect at the upper extremes of the income scale. The proposal here is simply that tax systems be ordered in such a way as to diminish income differences all along the line; that the funds which governments require be obtained through a system of levies which is actually progressive throughout the income scale.

Such a policy requires the establishment of the personal-income tax as the predominant element in our whole fiscal system, and the rescue of inheritance taxation from its miserable failure. The following measures may be suggested as among the important steps in this direction:

1. Elimination of all exemptions of income by kind, establishment

of the tax as a purely personal levy, and clear recognition in the law that the tax is a tax upon persons according to their incomes, not a tax upon income as such.

- a) Abolition of "tax-exempt securities," and inclusion of all interest and salary items in the calculation of taxable income, whether such items are received from governmental bodies or from private persons.
- b) Elimination of all special treatment for "capital gains" (and for "capital losses"), but with introduction of rebates under a simplified averaging system, to avoid undue penalty on persons of widely fluctuating annual incomes.

(For example, rebates might be made every five years to persons whose actual tax payments had exceeded by more than 5 per cent what their total tax payments would have been if their taxable income each year had been their average income for the period.)⁹

- c) Levy upon estates under the income tax with respect to all "unrealized" appreciation of investment assets—i.e., levy of income tax upon the estate just as though the decedent had sold all his property at the time of his death at the appraised value as of that date.

(This would eliminate, except for non-rational behavior, the unfortunate, but exaggerated, effects during booms of taxes upon capital gains. There is now a strong incentive for elderly people to hold on to appreciated investments, merely because the appreciation may be realized without becoming subject to taxation as income *as soon as the owner dies*. This is the rational explanation of why stocks remain in big strong-boxes during stock-market booms—instead of being peddled out to the lower middle class! By such arrangement, moreover, we might eliminate the worst practical fault of income calculation according to the "realization criterion"—i.e., according to the anomalous, but practically useful, rule that "unrealized income is not income until it is realized through sale.")

- d) Effective provision against evasion of personal-income tax by stockholders with respect to the undistributed earnings of corporations.

(The objective here should be that of taxing shareholders in corporations in exactly the same manner as members of partnerships. This is, perhaps, altogether impractical under existing conditions; but, given the "new deal" proposed above with respect to corporation law, it would be feasible.)

- e) Provision for inclusion, in the calculation of taxable personal income, of the net use value of all real estate used by the owner for consumption purposes (residence, etc.).

(The unhappy omission of this item is peculiar to income taxes in America. Such income-in-kind must be accounted for if the income tax is to be equitable among individuals. For the best solution, we might well follow the Australian practice of measuring this item of income by taking a fixed percentage (say 5 per cent) of the capital value of the property. This would eliminate the complications of depreciation and maintenance allowances. It would be an enormous improvement over existing arrangements, even if this item of income were measured merely on the basis of existing local assessments of real property.)

2. Treatment of all inheritances, bequests, and (large) gifts *inter vivos* as personal income of the recipient for the year in which received.

(This, a cardinal feature among these proposals, is conceived as the only practicable method of securing effective application of the principle of inheritance taxation—i.e., for successfully avoiding evasion through distribution of property prior to death. Its adoption should be accompanied by repeal of existing inheritance taxes; a case could be made for retention of moderate estate taxes.)

3. Reservation of estate, inheritance, and personal-income taxes for levy exclusively by the federal government, but with provision for generous sharing of revenues with the states.

(One may suggest, tentatively, the return of 50 per cent of the revenues to the states, on the basis of collections—i.e., on the basis of the residence of the individual taxpayers. Herein lies, perhaps, the only real opportunity for eliminating antiquated and regressive elements in our state and local tax systems.)


4. Drastic alteration in the rate structure of the personal-income tax, with more rapid progression, and above all with the introduction of really substantial levies upon the so-called middle and lower income brackets.

(Something may be said for retaining the present exemptions, but in the "vanishing" form—i.e., with the exemptions expressed in terms of amounts of tax, instead of in terms of amounts of income. A good case can be made for requiring every income receiver to file a return and perhaps to pay a small fee. With present exemptions, we should have an initial rate (normal tax) of at

least 20 per cent, and the rates should rise rapidly to at least the present maximum. Whether the rates should be higher in the upper brackets than at present is of minor importance from a revenue point of view. If these heavy levies on middle-class incomes seem objectionable, one should remember that the alternative is the retention, as a major element in the system, of the drastically regressive levies on commodities of wide and general consumption. The really important question, as I see it, is whether government revenues shall be derived largely from the middle class or pumped largely out of the bottom of the income scale by excise levies.)

These proposals look toward arrangements whereby something like 10 per cent of the whole national income would pass, via personal-income taxation, into the hands of government. They contemplate abolition of all excises on commodities of wide and general consumption, and ultimately of the innumerable miscellaneous levies which have no justification in terms of broad considerations of policy. Levies like the gasoline taxes might well be retained indefinitely—being eminently defensible as charges for special services of government to a class (or to a form of consumption) which does not merit subsidy. Taxes upon real property also might properly be retained without diminution of long-established rates. These levies are largely in the nature of fixed charges, representing an established equity of the state in real property. Such property has long been bought and sold subject to the prospect of continued taxation; to reduce the levies would involve a large gift by the community (through increase in capital value) to persons who happened to be in possession at the time.

On the expenditure side, we may look forward confidently to continued augmenting of the “free income” of the masses, in the form of commodities and services made available by government, either without charge or with considerable modification of prevailing price controls. There are remarkable opportunities for extending the range of socialized consumption (medical services, recreation, education, music, drama, etc.) and, especially, for extending the range of social-welfare activities. The prospects in these directions, however, must remain somewhat unattractive so long as the expenditures in-



the fact remains that it is much more difficult to enforce price maintenance on an international scale. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a thoroughgoing political program which undertook to introduce competition and flexibility internally, while freezing the economy against competition from abroad.

The second point has to do with the general argument against public regulation of prices in private industry, and its consequences for political morality and the future of democracy. A nation which wishes to preserve democratic institutions cannot afford to allow its legislatures to become engaged on a large scale in the promiscuous distribution of special subsidies and special favors. Once this occurs, there is no protecting the interests of the community at large and, what is more important, there is no protecting the political institutions themselves. Tariff legislation is politically the first step in the degeneration of popular government into the warfare of each group against all. Its significance for political morality is, moreover, quite patent. Against the tariff, all other forms of "patronage" and "pork-barrel legislation" seem of minor importance.

The way to reduce the tariff is simply to reduce it. There is, to be sure, a decisive case in favor of gradualness. One must recognize legitimate vested interests in even the most objectionable subsidies. An ideal program would call for a continued scaling down of duties, with the announced objective of getting rid of them all, over, say, a ten-year period.¹⁰ If some reciprocal reductions can be obtained from other nations, well and good. But let us understand that, given an independent national currency administered according to sound rules, the gains to this country from reduction of its tariff are nowise conditional upon reduction of tariff duties abroad.

The fifth proposal must be dealt with briefly here, and left somewhat unprecise. It is a commonplace that our vaunted efficiency in production is dissipated extravagantly in the wastes of merchandising. This economic system is one which offers rewards, both to those who direct resources into industries where the indirect pecuniary demand is greatest, and to

those who divert pecuniary demand to commodities which they happen to be producing. Profits may be obtained, either by producing what consumers want, or by making consumers want what one is actually producing. The possibility of profitably utilizing resources to manipulate demand is, perhaps, the greatest source of diseconomy under the existing system. If present tendencies continue, we may soon reach a situation where most of our resources are utilized in persuading people to buy one thing rather than another, and only a minor fraction actually employed in creating things to be bought.

Firms must spend enormous sums on advertising, if only to counteract the expenditures of competitors; and, finally, all of them may end up with about the same volume of business as if none had advertised at all. Moreover, every producer must bribe merchants into pushing his product, by providing fantastic "mark-ups," merely because other producers are doing the same thing. Consumers must be prohibited access to wholesale markets and prices, in order to protect the "racket" of retailers whose co-operation the individual producer requires; and there follows inevitably the absurd proliferation of small retail establishments which spring up to exact on small volumes of trade the large percentage tribute which existing arrangements allow to those who can classify as dealers rather than as consumers. There appears to be no significant limit, along these lines, to the potential accumulation of economic waste; for every producer must at least keep up to the pace which others set.

In these practices of merchandising, moreover, one finds an outstanding incentive to combination and producer organization. Firms acting co-operatively may spare themselves the expense of competitive selling activities; and organization permits of profitable joint enterprise in building up demand for their common product, at the expense of other industries. Thus, organization of competing firms tends to change the form of advertising, rather than necessarily to reduce the total of such outlays; selling activities become competitive among industries instead of merely within industries; the battle of advertising becomes a battle between organized groups, instead of between competing producers of similar commodities.

ties. While organization has little or nothing to offer by way of merchandising economies for the community, it has much to offer to the individual participants. Besides, advertising intrenches monopoly by setting up a financial barrier to the competition of new and small firms. Consequently, an appropriate remodeling of the system with respect to merchandising would do more than free wasted resources for useful employment; it might remove one of the main factors working to destroy real competition in industry.

The reform of merchandising offers immense economic rewards; but, unlike the other proposals, it is not immediately indispensable for survival of our economic and political system. Moreover, there is prospect of substantial and continued improvement in merchandising, even in the absence of any deliberate political action to that end. The unfortunately wide differentiation between wholesale and retail prices, and the sharp separation between wholesale and retail markets, may be regarded as a vestigial remainder of the mercantilist system (as a colossal system of restraint upon trade) which has only recently begun to be undermined. The growth of mail-order houses and of large-scale retailing through chain stores is salutary and (given not too much foolish legislation) abundantly promising—offering great economies through increase in the size of units, and without raising any real problem of monopoly.

Enterprises like Consumers Research, Inc., may represent the beginnings of an almost revolutionary development. We may hope that such undertakings may flourish, and that their growth may be promoted through private endowment. (It is hard to imagine a more worthy philanthropy.) Perhaps we shall see the establishment of endowed, non-profit-making institutions, of unimpeachable disinterestedness, which will offer to manufacturers (freely or with moderate charges) the use of the institutions' certification or recommendation in the labeling of approved products. Ultimately, we may see the labeling and classification of the more staple goods on the basis of Bureau of Standards specifications, so that consumers may know (and insist on knowing) which brands of goods meet requirements for government purchase. Perhaps we may

still hope for substantial development of consumer co-operatives, organized for collective research and consumer education.

Early correction of merchandising evils by restrictive legislation is perhaps impossible; and one resents the conviction that many proposed remedies would prove worse than the disease. The strongest case can be made for heavy taxation of advertising, provided rates can be made much higher than revenue considerations would dictate. There are interesting possibilities in progressive taxes on manufacturers and jobbers according to the percentage of selling expenses to total expenses. The important objective, however, is that of breaking down, first, competitive advertising and, second, the artificial separation between wholesale and retail markets. Consumers should be free to purchase commodities either with or without the services offered by existing retail establishments—just as they should be free to purchase milk, at substantially different prices, with or without doorstep delivery.

Little has been said so far about the immediate problems of the depression. Our first and second proposals indicate appropriate methods for preventing the recurrence of extreme depressions. For the moment, however, attention must be focused on the task of escaping from the present affliction of extreme unemployment and underproduction. Unless the immediate crisis can be dealt with, there is no sense in talking about long-run policy.

The depression is essentially a problem (1) of relative inflexibility in those prices which largely determine costs, and (2) of contraction in the volume and velocity of effective money. The crucial characteristic of the situation is maladjustment between product prices and operating costs; and, given this condition, there is no necessary limit to the possible deflation and decline of employment. Sound policy will look, first, toward pulling the more sticky prices down and, second, toward pulling the flexible prices up, in order to create favorable prospects with respect to business earnings. Little can be accomplished quickly in the first direction; consequently, main reliance must be placed on "reflationary" government spending.

Inflationary fiscal policy is dangerous, to be sure—but not so dangerous as the alternatives. It should be undertaken with definite preliminary announcement of an objective, stated, perhaps, in terms of *moderate* increase in a specified price index. The program should be planned with an eye to maximum flexibility, for prompt attainment of the price-level objective, and to assure checking of the inflation within the limits designated. Measures of this kind must be undertaken, merely to keep running a system which banking and monopoly have brought to its present plight.

Such a program contemplates bringing the more flexible prices back into line with the prices which prove most resistant to downward change (freight rates, prices of steel rails, electrical equipment, and aluminum, wages in strongly organized trades, etc.), and it looks toward general increase in the volume of production. If the prices which have been most inflexible downward prove highly flexible in an upward direction with inflation, the whole undertaking will fail calamitously. While there may not be much which governments can do to bring the relatively high prices down, it is the supreme folly of a recovery program to facilitate their increase. If the uncompetitive prices are pushed up continually with inflation,¹¹ the effects of the stimulant will be counteracted, and more and more inflation will become politically inevitable. No diabolical ingenuity could have devised a more effective agency for retarding or preventing recovery (or for leading us away from democracy) than the National Recovery Act and its codes.

It is easy to devise phrases for denouncing the Roosevelt program and the so-called New Deal. On the other hand, one hesitates to condemn, knowing that condemnation will invoke applause from persons whose political philosophy has nothing in common with one's own. Moreover, one hesitates to alienate that now large group of earnest persons with whose general purposes and aspirations one has the deepest sympathy—whatever one may feel about their conception of means to the ends on which it is so easy to agree.

One cannot criticize the policies of the present administration without seeming to approve those of its predecessors. In

fact, one must condemn the Democrats mainly for their wholesale extension of the worst policies of the past. The N.R.A. is merely Mr. Hoover's trust policy and wage policy writ large. The agricultural measures and many other planning proposals are the logical counterpart and the natural extensions of Republican protectionism. The gold policy and the silver legislation, like the Federal Reserve System, lead from a bad monetary and banking system only into something worse.

There is little point, however, merely in condemning particular measures and proposals. Real negative criticism must be judged in terms of, and will be significant for, the critic's conception, express or implied, of sound policies. In these pages we have tried to express criticism of current trends in economic policy in terms of definite specifications for a sound liberal program. For those who accept understandingly the position here outlined, it would be gratuitous to point in detail to the dangers of the spuriously liberal proposals which receive the benediction of our political leaders and journalist-economists; and for others, it would be pointless indeed.

The program here outlined should afford adequate outlet for all the enthusiasm and genuine idealism which might now be canalized so effectively. It seems drastic enough to satisfy the most ardent reformers; and it offers abundant opportunity for real economic planning. There is the whole field of transportation and public utilities for the gradual expansion of government enterprise. Competition enforcement and the reform of merchandising call for a generous measure of government control over private business. The designing and building of a mighty engine of income and inheritance taxation is an undertaking big enough and hard enough to occupy the capable people who are really concerned about inequality. There are endless possibilities for increasing and improving the community's "free income" in the form of governmental services, especially through extension of social-welfare activities. Finally, and perhaps most difficult of all, is the task of constructing a sound monetary and banking system.

There cannot, of course, be general agreement in detail on the measures here proposed. No reader is likely to find all of

them acceptable. (I must confess to serious misgivings myself at many points.) However, it has seemed desirable, if only for conciseness, to define problems in terms of possible solutions, and to define the general objectives of a liberal policy in terms of fairly specific measures. We hope that there may be agreement, within a significant group, on these general objectives; and that, starting from such agreement, we may be able to formulate specific proposals which are less inadequate and less ambiguous.¹²

This tract is submitted in the hope of promoting a consensus of opinion within a group which might now perform an invaluable service in intellectual leadership. The precious measure of political and economic freedom which has been won through centuries may soon be lost irreparably; and it falls properly to economists, as custodians of the great liberal tradition out of which their discipline arose, to point the escape from the chaos of political and economic thought which warns of what impends.

NOTES

1. The reference here, of course, is merely to that kind of planning which, like mercantilism, implies elaborate regulation of trade, both foreign and domestic, and extensive political control of relative prices, relative wages, and investment.

2. It is, perhaps, easy, from this general viewpoint, to see both advantages and serious practical difficulties in the development of labor organization along industrial, as against occupational, lines.

3. For the disillusioned economist-liberal, a certain bitter satisfaction may be found in the spectacle of capitalism, and the whole institution of property, collapsing under the feet of distinguished propertied gentlemen addressing their brethren on the remarkable virtues of the sales tax.

4. The essential practice of modern banking is that of maintaining obligations payable on demand, or on short notice, while holding "cash" amounting to only a small fraction of those obligations.

5. It will be necessary to revise notions commonly accepted (especially by courts) as to the maximum size of firm compatible with effective competition. The general rule and ultimate objective should be that of fixing in each industry a maximum size of firm such that the results of perfect competition would be approximated even if all firms attained the maximum size. One may suggest, tentatively, that in major industries no ownership unit should produce or control more than 5 per cent of the total output. Any such rule, of course, raises the difficult question of what is "a commodity"—of how industries or significant classes of commodities should be defined. A period of several years should be allowed for orderly readjustment, the full restrictions coming into effect only gradually. Special arrangements would be necessary, of course, in the case of new industries and new products.

6. It should be clear that *the measures here proposed have no affinity whatever with schemes for socialization or nationalization of banking*. Indeed, they contemplate a financial system under which there would be the least danger and the least occasion for government control over the lending function, i.e., over the allocation of investment funds. One of the great faults of the present banking system is that it is peculiarly exposed to socialization, merely because of its instability. If we could isolate the lending and investment business from deposit banking, we might eliminate a real danger of government control or socialization in an area where it is most important to avoid it.

7. Any treatment of the problem of monetary and banking reform, within space limits appropriate to this tract, must suffer from serious omissions and oversimplification. Correction of these faults would require extended discussion of the following considerations, among others:

a) There is likely to be extreme economic instability under any financial system where *the same funds* are made to serve at once *as investment funds for industry and trade and as the liquid cash reserves of individuals*. Our financial structure has been built largely on the illusion that funds can at the same time be both available and invested—and this observation applies to our savings banks (and in lesser degree to many other financial institutions) as well as commercial, demand-deposit banking. Thus, any reform which dealt merely with demand deposits and checking accounts might largely fail to accomplish the results intended—might lead, indeed, to a merely

b) A major source of instability is also to be found in the widespread practice of borrowing at short term. Most of the capital requirements which are met by such borrowing are of a permanent, continuing character. Indeed, under modern conditions there are few types of enterprise where funds, once invested, are or can be promptly disinvested again, in the ordinary course of business. The existence of a large volume of short-term commercial debt is thus peculiarly inimical to stability, since any general demand for repayment forces industry into an effort at liquidation which cannot succeed and cannot fail to produce serious disorder. Short-term debts, moreover, are, like time deposits, closely akin to money and demand deposits, since they provide in normal times an attractive and effective substitute medium in which the liquid "cash" reserves of individuals may be held.

In the interest of economic stability, it would be desirable to bring about conversion of all investment (property) into the residual-equity form. A large volume of contractual obligations, with maturities, is inherently dangerous in an economy where orderly liquidation on a large scale is simply impossible. But the problem of long-term debt is less serious. Adequate reform of our monetary and financial system does call, however, for the sharpest separation between money and money substitutes, on the one hand, and investments, on the other—between debts which are regarded as convertible into money by demand upon the debtor (or by refusal of renewal), and debts which may be realized upon only by sale to third parties. It is the rôle of banking, and of the Federal Reserve System especially, to obscure this distinction.

c) Effective administration, through a monetary authority, of any sound rule of monetary policy would be impossible apart from the closest co-operation, on the part of the Treasury and Congress, with respect to fiscal practices. Ultimate control of the currency (and the banks) lies in the management of government expenditure, taxation, and borrowing; and the establishment of a separate monetary authority implies a division of powers which would be workable only with thoroughgoing co-ordination and co-operation. Every change in the relation between taxation and expenditure, in either the amount or form of the public debt, and even in the character of tax levies, has monetary effects of first magnitude. Thus, specifications for sound monetary and banking reform cannot be drawn without reformulation of the whole problem of government finance. Monetary policy must ultimately be implemented through fiscal arrangements.

8. Some students would justify the reduction of inequality on the ground that it is essential to the political stability of the system; others, on the ground that it is important for the reduction of unemployment and for the mitigation of industrial fluctuations. The former position, while tenable, involves an unhappy confusion of means and ends. The latter, in my opinion, is open to the same objection, and also to the characterization of completely spurious economics. Moreover, the methods proposed by exponents of this now widely accepted position (widespread unionization, reduction of hours, and increase of wage rates *in a depression*) are the immediate occasion for the assertion that progressive taxation is the only effective means for improving the distribution of income.

9. Considerations of equity clearly demand provision for further rebates in the more extreme cases, especially where persons pay large income taxes and later lose practically all their income and property.

10. It is worth noting that the recent sharp reduction in the gold value of the dollar is likely to create the ideal conditions for (and, internationally, the necessity of) gradual, continued tariff reduction—and, thereby, for raising the prices of export products, notably cotton and wheat, *relative* to other prices.

11. The recent phenomenal rise in building costs, with almost no building going on at all, is a case in point.

12. There remains one point which has not been properly emphasized, namely that genuinely liberal reform must aim primarily at explicit changes in the rules of the economic game and must minimize reliance on control or regulation through nominally administrative bodies with large discretionary, policy-determining powers. The point has already been noted with respect to monetary and banking reform; but it is of decisive importance in many other fields. There is now profound significance in the distinction between a government of men and a government of rules; and to the extent that we move toward the former we are accepting or inviting fascism. One highroad to dictatorship lies in the creation of a large number of petty, specialized authorities in particular fields. For an old-fashioned liberal, it is terrifying to reflect on the amount of arbitrary power which has recently been delegated to the President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the N.R.A., the A.A.A., the R.F.C., the S.E.C., etc. However reasonable this expedient in an acute emergency, we must face the fact that emergency measures are unlikely to prove entirely temporary, and also the fact that we were making substantial strides in this direction long before the emergency arose.

A substantial measure of administrative discretion is obviously essential to good government; but it must be economized. If large latitude must often be allowed in the administration of new reform measures, we should seek afterward to reduce the powers of the administrative authorities as rapidly as experience provides the basis for more definitive legislative rules.



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Foreword from the Chair

Last summer, the Prime Minister asked if I would be willing to chair a Commission to investigate race and ethnic disparities in the UK. He felt that the UK needed to consider important questions about the state of race relations today, and that there needed to be a thorough examination of why so many disparities persist. We needed to work out what can be done to eliminate or mitigate them. I readily agreed: I have spent all my working life as an educationalist, dedicated to this cause.

The Commission was established with 10 of us drawn from a variety of fields spanning science, education, economics, broadcasting, medicine, and policing. And, with one exception, all from ethnic minority backgrounds. Tasked to look at race and ethnic disparities in education, employment, crime and policing and health, we first met virtually in July. Like so many of you in your own family and work situations during this time of COVID-19, the Commission has never met face to face.

Our diverse group, with our different areas of expertise, enabled us to challenge conventional approaches. The debates around the table were invigorating and led to stimulating discussion. Collectively, over the past few months, we have put our shoulders to the wheel and pushed this endeavour forward.

All the while we have been supported by the Cabinet Office's Race and Disparity Unit (RDU) which was set up in 2016. It has accumulated all the important data on race and ethnicity, in one database. For the first time we have been able to use this dataset to understand the impact of ethnicity and other factors on outcomes. That also means, unlike previous reviews focused on particular issues such as the workplace or criminal justice, we have been able to look more widely and investigate the deeper underlying causes of key disparities.

Sifting through a mass of data, reading the evidence from experts and speaking to communities, we soon realised, given the time constraints or the limitations of available data, we could not address every subject and every issue. We also identified individual ethnic minority groups that have a significant presence and separate identity, though not large enough for their own categories like Sri Lankan, Somali or East African Asian. We acknowledge the work that has been done on anti-Muslim prejudice and antisemitism - even though it is beyond the scope of this report.

The word mistrust was repeated often as some witnesses from the police service, mental health, education and health services felt that the system was not on their side. Once we interrogated the data we did find some evidence of biases, but often it was a perception that the wider society could not be trusted. For some groups historic experience of racism still haunts the present and there was a reluctance to acknowledge that the UK had become open and fairer.

The data also revealed many instances of success among minority communities. These have often been ignored or have been seen to be of little interest (to the media). But we wanted to understand the reasons for the success and whether there were any lessons to be drawn.

This is also the first government-commissioned study on race that seriously engages with the family.

In many areas of investigation, including educational failure and crime, we were led upstream to family breakdown as one of the main reasons for poor outcomes. Family is also the foundation stone of success for many ethnic minorities.

Another revelation from our dive into the data was just how stuck some groups from the White majority are. As a result, we came to the view that recommendations should, wherever possible, be designed to remove obstacles for everyone, rather than specific groups.

It has been quite a journey of discovery. As we met with people in round table discussions, in our versions of the 'Moral Maze' and listened to people from all sections of society, we were taken by the distinctions being drawn between causes that were external to the individual and those that could be influenced by the actions of the individual himself or herself. As our investigations proceeded, we increasingly felt that an unexplored approach to closing disparity gaps was to examine the extent individuals and their communities could help themselves through their own agency, rather than wait for invisible external forces to assemble to do the job.

Poet and activist Linton Kwesi Johnson describes the early mass Black presence in the UK as having 2 phases or eras. The first was the 1950s Windrush arrival from the Caribbean, this he called the 'heroic' period, when literally doors were closed in the faces of the new Black settlers who heroically battled in the face of adversity. The children of those settlers, my generation, who came of age in the 1970s and 1980s he calls the 'rebel' generation, this featured running battles with police and a breakdown in community relations, which continues to have a negative legacy. The spirit of rebellion continued last summer during the Black Lives Matter (BLM) protests. This was a revolt that engulfed the world. We have to acknowledge the spirit of BLM was the original trigger for our report.

But this report speaks to a new period, which we have described as the era of 'participation'. We can only speak of 'participation' if we acknowledge that the UK has fundamentally shifted since those periods in the past and has become a more open society. We have spoken in this report about how the UK is open to all its communities. But we are acutely aware that the door may be only half open to some, including the White working class. In this regard we have pointed out how in education, employment, health and crime and policing the UK can be a more inclusive and fairer landscape.

Participation, however, is not just about fully opening the doors, we also speak to the need for communities to run through them and grasp those opportunities. We have found that some ethnic minorities have been able to 'participate' better than others. We were impressed by the 'immigrant optimism' of some of the new African communities. They are among the new high achievers in our education system. As their Caribbean peers sit in the same classrooms, it is difficult to blame racism in education for the latter's underachievement.

The new challenge of 'participation' is best illustrated in the policies that face police recruitment. The police need to demonstrate that they are truly a more welcoming organisation and Black communities need to overcome the legacy of mistrust. We have put forward recommendations that will hopefully bridge this gap. Our findings on Black youth homicide are distressing reading, with young Black men 24 times more likely to die of homicide than their White counterparts. It is this data that has led us to supporting a reconceptualised idea of stop and search.

In health, we need more Black and Asian people to participate in health trials so that medical research will be based on data that comes from the whole population. Our new Office for Health Disparities will be tasked to respond to the specific health and wellbeing of ethnic groups.

The 'Making of Modern Britain' teaching resource is our response to negative calls for 'decolonising' the curriculum. Neither the banning of White authors or token expressions of Black achievement will help to broaden young minds. We have argued against bringing down statues, instead, we want all children to reclaim their British heritage. We want to create a teaching resource that looks at the influence of the UK, particularly during the Empire period. We want to see how Britishness influenced the Commonwealth and local communities, and how the Commonwealth and local communities influenced what we now know as modern Britain. One great example would be a dictionary or lexicon of well known British words which are Indian in origin. There is a new story about the Caribbean experience which speaks to the slave period not only being about profit and suffering but how culturally African people transformed themselves into a re-modelled African/Britain.

I wanted to call one of the chapters 'The end of BAME (Black, Asian and minority ethnic)'. The term 'BAME community' feels like a group that is held together by no more than what it is not. The Commissioners were not impressed by those companies that pointed to their 'unconscious bias' training as proof of their progressive credentials. We were impressed by more conscious attempts to foster talent from a wide range of backgrounds. Put simply we no longer see a Britain where the system is deliberately rigged against ethnic minorities. The impediments and disparities do exist, they are varied, and ironically very few of them are directly to do with racism. Too often 'racism' is the catch-all explanation, and can be simply implicitly accepted rather than explicitly examined.

The evidence shows that geography, family influence, socio-economic background, culture and religion have more significant impact on life chances than the existence of racism. That said, we take the reality of racism seriously and we do not deny that it is a real force in the UK.

The Commission was keen to gain a more forensic and rigorous understanding of underlying causes of disparities. However, we have argued for the use of the term 'institutional racism' to be applied only when deep-seated racism can be proven on a systemic level and not be used as a general catch-all phrase for any microaggression, witting or unwitting.

The purpose of this report is to provide the UK with a road map for racial fairness. There are still real obstacles and there are also practical ways to surmount them, but that becomes much harder if people from ethnic minority backgrounds absorb a fatalistic narrative that says the deck is permanently stacked against them. Armed with the rich data from the RDU, we have aimed to dispel some myths and reach a more nuanced view.

Creating a successful multicultural society is hard, and racial disparities exist wherever such a society is being forged. The Commission believes that if these recommendations are implemented, it will give a further burst of momentum to the story of our country's progress to a successful multicultural community - a beacon to the rest of Europe and the world.

Introduction

This report comes at a pivotal moment for our nation's race debate. We need to place that debate on objective and democratic foundations - ones that include people of goodwill, of all races and ethnicities.

The purpose of this report is to lay the ground for a country built on the full participation and trust of all communities. We envisage a country more at ease with itself because it can recognise where progress has been made. One that is confident that, where unequal access to opportunity persists, whether among inner city ethnic minorities or the left-behind from the ethnic majority, it is being addressed.

We do not believe that the UK is yet a post-racial society which has completed the long journey to equality of opportunity. And we know, too many of us from personal experience, that prejudice and discrimination can still cast a shadow over lives. Outright racism still exists in the UK, whether it surfaces as graffiti on someone's business, violence in the street, or prejudice in the labour market. It can cause a unique and indelible pain for the individual affected and has no place in any civilised society.

But we have ensured our analysis has gone beyond these individual instances, to carefully examine the evidence and data, and the evidence reveals that ours is nevertheless a relatively open society. The country has come a long way in 50 years and the success of much of the ethnic minority population in education and, to a lesser extent, the economy, should be regarded as a model for other White-majority countries.

There is a salience and attention to race equality in the UK in policy-making, and in the media, which is seldom found in other European countries. And there is an expectation of ethnic minority voices at the top of politics - across the political parties, and in law, education, medicine, business, media and culture - that did not exist a generation ago and is still too rare elsewhere.

Yes, there are still some 'snowy white peaks' at the very top of the private and public sectors, and not all of that can be accounted for by the fact that members of the ethnic minorities have not, by definition, been embedded in the country's human networks and institutions for as long as the White majority.

But some of that snow is melting. Consider the greater presence of ethnic minorities in the current government and opposition, this time occupying top positions such as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Attorney General, Business Secretary and Home Secretary. Or the onward march of minorities into positions of power and responsibility in professions such as the law and medicine. Ethnic minorities are also now well represented in the highest social class and ethnic minority students represented nearly a quarter of those from the UK offered a place at Oxford in 2019. [\[footnote 1\]](#)

In addition, our enquiries have also underlined to us that the roots of advantage and disadvantage for different groups are complex, and often as much to do with social class, 'family' culture and geography as ethnicity. We have tried to understand the drivers of ethnic difference in the UK and, where necessary, propose ways to address them. The data collected over 5 years now by the government's Race Disparity Unit has given us a new opportunity to be led by the evidence.

Multiple reviews relating to racial and ethnic disparity have been commissioned by successive governments since 2010, covering a range of topics relevant to the areas of focus for this Commission. They have tended to look at specific problems, and sometimes have sought swift fixes. Successive governments have made - and continue to make - sincere efforts to implement those recommendations where they have been accepted. This Commission has taken a different starting point: to look at the underlying causes of disparities to better understand why they have come about, and what can be done to address them over the long run.

We have sought to build upon the detailed work that those reviews have done, and discussed the findings with each reviewer. Many we broadly agreed with, and all should be acknowledged and recognised for the significant contributions they have made to the national conversation and growing the evidence base.

These reviews, which we refer to in the relevant chapters of this report, include:

- The Timpson Review of School Exclusion

- The Children's Commissioner's 'Best beginnings in the early years' report
- The McGregor-Smith Review: Race in the Workplace
- The Parker Review: Ethnic diversity of UK boards
- The Lammy Review: An independent review into the treatment of, and outcomes for, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals in the Criminal Justice System
- The Angiolini Review: Deaths and serious incidents in police custody
- The Marmot Review: Fair Society, Healthy Lives
- The Wessely Review: Modernising the Mental Health Act

In the main chapters of this report, we look at 4 key areas:

- education and training
- employment, fairness at work and enterprise
- crime and policing
- health

We examined the intersection of some of the most pertinent causes holding back equality of opportunity, namely:

- ethnicity
- socio-economic background
- geography
- culture and degree of integration

We found that most of the disparities we examined, which some attribute to racial discrimination, often do not have their origins in racism.

Racism has become one of the most potent taboos in the UK, which was not the case 50 years ago. Some argue this has just driven it underground where it operates as powerfully as ever to deny equality to ethnic minorities.

That assumption is at odds with the stories of success that this report has found, together with survey evidence of dwindling White prejudice.

It is certainly true that the concept of racism has become much more fluid, extending from overt hostility and exclusion to unconscious bias and microaggressions. This is partly because ethnic minorities have higher expectations of equal treatment and, rightly, will not tolerate behaviour that, only a couple of generations ago, would have likely been quietly endured or shrugged off. The fact that this generation expects more is a positive aspect of integration.

However, there is also an increasingly strident form of anti-racism thinking that seeks to explain all minority disadvantage through the prism of White discrimination. This diverts attention from the other reasons for minority success and failure, including those embedded in the cultures and attitudes of those minority communities themselves.

There is much evidence to suggest, for example, that different experiences of family life and structure can explain many disparities in education outcomes and crime. Early years experiences, including stability and security at home, matters to children more than anything else. There are many different family structures that can provide a happy childhood, including millions of single parents doing a loving and effective job in difficult circumstances. It is clear, however, that there continues to be a need for more explicit public policy promotion of parental and family support. We reject both the stigmatisation of single mothers and the turning of a blind eye to the impact of family breakdown on the life chances of children.

The work of the Commission has been carried out under the shadow of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the evidence that some ethnic minority groups have faced a disproportionate impact from the virus. As the analysis of why this is the case has emerged, the significance of a wide range of interlocking factors (including geography, occupation, deprivation and pre-existing health conditions) has become clear. However, when examining the overall health of the UK population, it is also evident that there is more than one story to tell. As we report in the Health chapter, life expectancy or overall mortality shows that ethnic minorities do better overall than the White population and actually have better outcomes for many of the 25 leading causes of death.

This report seeks to approach the issues of racial and ethnic disparities in a balanced way, highlighting both the success stories that the data reveals as well as delving into what lies beneath some of the most persistent and enduring ones. As such, its findings and recommendations may be surprising to some and thought-provoking to others. Either way, we have gone as far as the available evidence and time would allow.

Full recommendations

Led by evidence, the Commission has put forward 24 recommendations that will improve the lives and experiences of individuals and communities across the UK. The Commission recognises that health, education, training and skills, justice and policing are reserved matters for the devolved administrations. Any action taken to implement them will, therefore, need to be mindful of these considerations.

These recommendations work to forward 4 overarching aims:

- to build trust between different communities and the institutions that serve them
- to promote greater fairness to improve opportunities and outcomes for individuals and communities
- to create agency so individuals can take greater control of the decisions that impact their lives
- to achieve genuine inclusivity to ensure all groups feel a part of UK society

Theme 1: Build trust

Recommendations that will help build trust and understanding for individuals and communities in public services and institutions.

Recommendation 1: Challenge racist and discriminatory actions

The Commission recommends that, to aid endeavours to drive out race-based discrimination and prejudice:

- the EHRC receives additional, ring-fenced funding from the government to use their compliance, enforcement and litigation powers to challenge policies or practices that either cause significant and unjust racial disadvantage, or arise from racial discrimination
- separately, the government should consider the complex issue of online abuse, and the platforms that are used to perpetuate such, as a public policy priority

Recommendation 2: Review the Care Quality Commission's (CQC) inspection process

The Commission recommends that the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) commission a review into the CQC's approach to scoring employee diversity and inclusion in their inspections.

The Commission recommends that this review is chaired by an expert with close knowledge of the health care system and CQC internal processes, ideally a former inspector or inspector of an alternative inspection body. The review team should work closely with the NHS Workforce Race Equality Standard team and the disciplinary bodies of the medical professionals to ensure that the views of these bodies feed into this work.

Recommendation 3: Improve the transparency and use of artificial intelligence

The Commission supports the recommendations of the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) and calls on the government to:

- place a mandatory transparency obligation on all public sector organisations applying algorithms that have an impact on significant decisions affecting individuals
- ask the Equality and Human Rights Commission to issue guidance that clarifies how to apply the Equality Act to algorithmic decision-making, which should include guidance on the collection of data to measure bias, and the lawfulness of bias mitigation techniques

Recommendation 4: Bridge divides and create partnerships between the police and communities

Noting the key concerns in relation to communication, transparency and consistency in approach for stop and search, the Commission makes a two-part recommendation:

a) The College of Policing, working alongside the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC), and National Police Chief's Council (NPCC), develop a minimum standard framework for community 'Safeguarding Trust' groups that will not only have a function to scrutinise and problem-solve alongside policing, but also to ensure there is a minimum level of engagement with communities in every police service area.

The framework for the minimum standard should include, but not be limited to:

- a requirement for stop and search data to be made more granular and publicly available for groups to scrutinise
- a requirement for groups to be independently chaired and representative of their communities
- a duty for Safeguarding Trust group minutes to be published
- an ability for groups to scrutinise and hold police services to account on policing activity and disparities in stop and search, use of force, workforce mix and internal misconduct
- and, an ability for groups to review stop and search authorisations made under section 60 (S.60) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, where police will be required to provide the Safeguarding Trust group with a rationale as to why a S.60 was authorised

Once a year, Safeguarding Trust groups should write to, and receive a response from the Chief Constable and Police and Crime Commissioner to update on progress. Police forces should also be required to demonstrate how they have responded and implemented changes as a result of scrutiny or challenge by the community.

Throughout the framework development phase, there should be engagement with independent experts in community engagement and scrutiny external to policing. Consideration should be given to how members of Safeguarding Trust groups are adequately enabled to undertake their roles.

Where required, the Home Office should also provide support in identifying the areas where trustworthiness is low and set targets to close the confidence gap, with Mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners to publish delivery plans to achieve that improvement. Progress against these delivery plans should be presented and discussed at the Safeguarding Trust group meetings.

b) Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) inspect each police service area against the minimum standard framework, reviewing police services on their efficacy, relationship building and a requirement for services to demonstrate the actions they are taking to build positive relationships with all communities within their police service area.

Recommendation 5: Improve training to provide police officers with practical skills to interact with communities

The Commission recommends that the College of Policing, working alongside the NPCC and APCC, develop a strategy to improve the efficacy and implementation of stop and search, and de-escalation training, ensuring a consistent person-centred approach is taken by all police service areas.

De-escalation training will be required for all new police officers joining the service, and upscaled to include all current serving officers who are expected to interact with the public as part of their role. This would be a requirement not just at the point of initial police training, but as a key aspect of continual professional development within different stages and levels of policing.

Theme 2: Promote fairness

Recommendations that will contribute to fairer practices and improved outcomes for individuals and communities.

Recommendation 6: Replicate the factors of educational success for all communities

The Commission recommends for the Department for Education (DfE) to invest in meaningful and substantial research to understand and replicate the underlying factors that drive the success of the high performance of pupils from different ethnicities, backgrounds and communities. For example, the level of educational success experienced by Black African, Chinese, Bangladeshi and Indian ethnic groups.

Recommendation 7: Invest in proven interventions through better targeted funding

The Commission calls for the government to deploy additional funding to systematically target the entrenched and persistent disparities in education outcomes between disadvantaged pupils and their peers. It is right that in delivering this funding, the DfE should adopt a more holistic definition of need as well as consider ethnic, gender and socio-economic status. The additional funding should support proven interventions in early years, the transition between primary to secondary school, family hubs and careers provision among other key areas listed in the chapter.

It is imperative for the funding to consider geographical variations, identifying disparities by regions or local areas including drilling down to individual school level where necessary. DfE should seek to avoid viewing disparities using national data which do not identify geographical variation in the performance of particular groups.

For example, funding allocation should consider how to best meet the needs of specific ethnic groups from low socio-economic status backgrounds who are scoring substantially below the average for all students including White British, Black Caribbean, and Mixed White and Black Caribbean.

This recommendation is not an attempt to alter the work of the recently-introduced national funding formula (NFF). The full benefits of NFF have not yet had a chance to materialise.

Recommendation 8: Advance fairness in the workplace

a) The Commission calls on organisations to now move away from funding unconscious bias training. The existing training should be replaced with new interventions that when implemented, can be measured or evaluated for their efficacy, such as:

- the use of sponsorship to ensure wider exposure of ethnic minority individuals to their peers, managers and other decision makers
- training and routine skills support for all employees in their professional and personal lives (for example on collaboration, confidence, communication, and presentation skills), which could disproportionately benefit more disadvantaged groups

b) The Commission also calls on the government to work with a panel of academics and practitioners to develop resources and evidence-based approaches of what does work to advance fairness in the workplace. The landscape of diversity training is highly mixed, and the government can play a role in guiding organisations to high quality materials and resources.

These resources should include guidance for employers, and be piloted in the Civil Service to replace the use of unconscious bias training.

Recommendation 9: Investigate what causes existing ethnic pay disparities

The Commission recommends that all employers that choose to publish their ethnicity pay figures should also publish a diagnosis and action plan to lay out the reasons for and the strategy to improve any disparities. Reported ethnicity pay data should also be disaggregated by different ethnicities to provide the best information possible to facilitate change. Account should also be taken of small sample sizes in particular regions and smaller organisations.

To support employers undertaking this exercise, the Commission recommends that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) is tasked with producing a guidance for employers to draw on.

Recommendation 10: Improve understanding of the ethnicity pay gap in NHS England

The Commission recommends that NHS England as a whole should commission a strategic review of the causes of disparate pay and, where discrimination is pinpointed, spell out the measures that might meaningfully address it. Such a review would shine a light on the barriers to in-work progression and how to overcome them - for example, in promotion, are foreign qualifications equally validated yet informally seen as inferior? It would ask how the NHS performs on pay gaps compared with international comparators and if other metrics than pay gaps reveal barriers better.

Recommendation 11: Establish an Office for Health Disparities

This Commission recommends that the government establish a new office to properly target health disparities in the UK. This Office would be an independent body which would work alongside the NHS, as part of, or in place of, the redesigned Public Health England, to improve healthy life expectancy across the UK and in all groups and reduce inequalities. As most of the causes of health inequalities (deprivation, tobacco, alcohol, unhealthy diet and physical inactivity) are not due to differences in healthcare, addressing them will involve multiple government departments and so the office would need to be cross-cutting across government.

a) Increase programmes aimed at levelling up health care and health outcomes

- Use existing data and evidence to target the most deprived communities for tailored health interventions, health education and communications. This function would work alongside existing local health workers and would utilise best practice examples from local authorities and public health regional offices and charities.

b) Improve the data, guidance and expertise in the causes and solutions for health disparities for specific groups:

- Fund further research into health conditions which adversely impact specific groups. This would include a large focus on research into health disparities relating to ethnic minorities, considering genetic and biological differences, cultural practices and social economic drivers.
- Provide best practice for the inclusion of known health disparities, including those experienced by ethnic minorities, in clinical care guidelines. Work closely with the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), and other bodies, to ensure all guidance includes information on disparities as standard.
- Provide expertise in how the health of different ethnic minority groups are affected by underlying conditions, cultural and linguistic practices, geography, and occupation. This expertise would be disaggregated to avoid unhelpful grouping of different ethnicity and to ensure proper tailoring of health services.

Recommendation 12: Prevent harm, reduce crime and divert young people away from the criminal justice system

The Commission wants to urgently address the disproportionate number of ethnic minority young people going into the criminal justice system as a result of low-level Class B drug possession. The Commission is not advocating or endorsing the legalisation of Class B drugs, however, it points to examples such as the Thames Valley and West Midlands Police drug diversion models to keep these young people away from gaining a criminal record, while trying to address the root cause of their drug use.

The Commission recommends a multi-agency approach bringing together the College of Policing, National Police Chief's Council, Home Office and Ministry of Justice to develop an evidence-based pilot to divert offences of low-level Class B drug possession into public health solutions.

It is suggested that the pilot is trialled in 4 of the 6 police force areas where almost half (48%)^[footnote 2] of all arrests for drug offences took place in the year ending March 2020: the Metropolitan Police, Merseyside, West Yorkshire, and Humberside (noting that Thames Valley and West Midlands are already undertaking police drug diversion pilots). The aim is that following evaluation of the pilot by the College of Policing, a consistent approach is adopted nationally.

Under this diversion scheme, individuals committing the offence of 'possession of a Class B drug' will automatically be considered for a drugs referral in lieu of traditional criminal justice routes. In accordance with current Out of Court Disposals guidance, individuals committing the offence must admit guilt to be eligible for this referral mechanism. The Commission also notes that information about those referred into this programme should not be disclosed to potential employers, education providers or voluntary sector organisations, in order to preserve opportunities for young people - once they have completed their course - to pursue further or higher education or employment without being held back by a criminal record.

The responsibility for developing operational guidance for the new drug diversion approach should sit with the CoP, working alongside the NPCC, Home Office and MoJ, and drawing from the evidence of what has worked from models such as the Thames Valley Police pilot approach.

Recommendation 13: Build social and cultural capital - enrichment for all

The Commission recommends that the Secretary of State for Education, in collaboration with the government's education recovery commissioner, urgently consider phasing in an extended school day. Led by evidence showing the positive impact of a longer school day for disadvantaged pupils, the phasing of the extended school day should, at first instance, prioritise the most disadvantaged areas and communities. The additional hours must provide all pupils with the opportunity to engage in physical and cultural activities, including working with local activity clubs. Participation in such activities will improve pupils' health and social capital, allowing such pursuits to be more accessible to the most disadvantaged students.

Imperative for a successful extended school day is for the Department for Education (DfE) to secure ongoing additional funding allocation that will establish this recommendation as a permanent change in the way that schools operate. In order to overcome the significant operational challenges of delivering an extended school day, advice should be sought from education practitioners, parents, pupils and key stakeholders.

This is a unique opportunity for DfE to improve current practices and ensure education practitioners are best equipped and rewarded for their time. Consideration should be taken on how the change in additional school hours can allow for the school day to be a different length for older years, support flexible working arrangements (which could make the profession more attractive to many), ensure staff are paid to teach the after-school time they currently deliver and retain their holiday period.

This includes, for example, DfE to explore working with post-16 and post-18 institutions such as UCAS to change the application submission dates for higher education institutions, as well as Ofqual to move the GCSE and A level results days from the summer holiday.

Recommendation 14: Increase legitimacy and accountability of stop and search through body-worn video

There is a strong presumption that in all police services body-worn video (BWV) cameras will be switched on if the officer is in a situation which they believe could lead to a stop and search, or as soon as it is practicable to do so during that encounter. Building on the recommendations made by HMICFRS, the Commission recommends that for instances where BWV cameras are not switched on during a stop and search, the officer is required to provide a written explanation as to why it was not switched on. Operational guidelines for this requirement should be developed by the College of Policing, and included in the authorised professional practice for stop and search.

Officers must include this written explanation on the stop and search record slip, and it must be available for the individual who was stopped and searched to access following the encounter. The written explanation should be reviewed by a supervising officer to confirm whether the explanation provided is reasonable, and appropriate action should be taken where the rationale provided is of concern. This can, for example, be through performance or misconduct procedures.

The BWV footage of stop and searches should also be scrutinised at 2 levels through dip-sampling:

- First, external scrutiny through community Safeguarding Trust groups (a recommendation for the formation of these groups is found in the crime and policing chapter) who should be able to request BWV camera footage from a specified date for review.
- Second, police services must implement an internal performance framework that includes dip-sampling review of BWV footage by supervising officers. Feedback should then be given to officers conducting stop and search, and appropriate action should be taken where interactions require improvement. For example, individual officers may be directed to further training or, in most serious instances, be referred to appropriate misconduct procedures.

Theme 3: Create agency

Recommendations that will create opportunities to empower individuals to exercise greater control over their lives and make informed choices that lead to better outcomes for themselves.

Recommendation 15: Empower pupils to make more informed choices to fulfil their future potential

The Commission proposes improvements to the quality of, and access to, careers advice for young people from disadvantaged backgrounds. Stronger guidance should be issued by the Office for Students (OfS) to higher education institutions on funding outreach programmes and placing university outreach staff in schools to help reduce disparities in applications at an earlier stage. Funding should be informed by evidence-led practice and targeted at the Gatsby benchmarks (8 elements of good careers support) to ensure that more children are able to apply to high-tariff institutions. This funding should be evaluated and monitored to assess whether it is having an impact on application rates. If guidance from OfS does not lead to strengthened funding for such initiatives, then OfS should look to regulatory or legal changes to ensure improved access and participation to higher education institutions.

Recommendation 16: Open up access to apprenticeships

The Commission recommends that the government conducts a highly-targeted apprenticeships campaign to persuade young people to do apprenticeships in growth sectors. Our view is that such a campaign could be of particular benefit to young people who face discrimination or disadvantage and currently lack access to in-depth information about the full range of career pathways.

Such a campaign could use a range of mechanisms to attract young people, such as relatable young role models, employer testimonies, data on potential earnings and career progression. It could explore the impact of factors that influence a young person's career choices such as: parental engagement, peer influence, access to information on different career routes, employer links with students, and 'people like me' and be delivered in partnership with further education colleges, Jobcentre Plus, youth hubs in community spaces, and careers hubs in schools.

A two-phased approach to roll out is proposed: first, pilots to be undertaken and evaluated in left-behind areas across England; and second, a national roll out of a well-evidenced, highly-targeted campaign which focuses on getting young people into a new job as part of an apprenticeship, and rewards providers for successfully achieving this.

DfE and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) should work in partnership with the Youth Futures Foundation to:

- co-fund the design of the campaign
- put out a call for further education colleges working in partnership with local employers and the community to apply to be considered for pilots
- commission an independent evaluation of the pilots, one which includes identifying 'what works' as part of its findings

Recommendation 17: Encourage innovation

The Commission recommends that HSBC UK works in collaboration with universities across the UK to pilot a competitive enterprise programme that will target aspiring entrepreneurs from under-represented and low-income backgrounds.

The universities that would be considered to take part in the pilot will be those who would benefit most from an increased endowment that would: 1) bolster their offer of support to aspiring entrepreneurs; and 2) further enable them to nurture entrepreneurial talent.

The programme will support participants in the development of their proposals through the provision of advice, mentorship and access to networks, and provide financial backing towards the winning entrant's enterprise. The Commission envisages that participants of the programme will form an alumni community that will act as an additional source of support.

This should act as a model for other banks and financial institutions to emulate in collaboration with universities as a way to nurture talent, encourage innovation, and offer support to aspiring entrepreneurs from underrepresented and low-income backgrounds across the UK.

Recommendation 18: Improve safety and support for children at risk

The Commission recommends that the Youth Justice Board (YJB), working with partners across government with expertise in child criminal exploitation, develops a digital solution that can be accessed and used by children and young people before or at the point of crisis.

The government will be required to secure and deploy additional resourcing to the YJB to ensure that the YJB is appropriately resourced to deliver and implement this recommendation.

The digital solution, which for example may take the form of a mobile application, text line or chatbot, will act as an entry point to signpost and refer those at risk of, or already experiencing criminal exploitation, to appropriate local organisations who can support them. The services will be driven and implemented at a local level, for example, through youth offending teams.

This recommendation will help empower young people with the agency and ability to escape criminal behaviours and exploitation without the need to go to the police. The solution, based on existing technology innovations, will need to reach young people at critical points in their journey, intervening at an early stage for those at risk of criminal exploitation and preventing those already in the criminal justice system from being drawn deeper into criminality.

Recommendation 19: Undertake a 'support for families' review

The Commission recommends that the government undertake a 'support for families' review to further investigate issues highlighted by this Commission as follows:

- collecting data about 'family strain' (the negative impact of economic and social pressure on households) in different ethnic groups
- academic research into cultural attitudes and parenting styles which may be distinct within ethnic communities and what role they play in shaping life outcomes
- the impact of employment and working practices on parenting outcomes in different ethnic groups
- more complex understandings of fatherhood in different ethnic groups that analyses similarities and differences and reasons for variance
- the role culture and religion can play in family outcomes

The review should also look to develop a series of actions on:

- education - how early years settings and schools can provide better support services for parents, and the potential role of school-parent contracts in helping build relations between schools and parents
- employment - encouraging employers to look at flexible working for single parents
- crime and policing - how parents can be involved and supported to prevent youth crime, including potential for increased interactions between police and parents during out of court disposal processes
- health - mental health services encouraging more family therapy and group support in the event of family breakdown, which may disproportionately benefit ethnic minority groups.

Theme 4: Achieve inclusivity

Recommendations that will promote genuine, positive integration between citizens and communities, and weave in the identity and cultures of all communities into everyday life in the UK.

Recommendation 20: Making of modern Britain - teaching an inclusive curriculum

The Commission recommends that DfE works with an appointed panel of independent experts to produce high-quality teaching resources to tell the multiple, nuanced stories of the contributions made by different groups that have made this country the one it is today. The resources should be embedded within subjects in the statutory curriculum. These should include lesson plans, teaching methods and reading materials to complement a knowledge-rich curriculum. Using these examples, DfE, supported by the panel of experts, should design and produce a credible, high-quality, online national library that is continually updated. This online library will be available for all schools to use, complementing and enhancing the content and quality of lessons taught, so that all children can learn about the UK and the evolution of our society.

Recommendation 21: Create police workforces that represent the communities they serve

The Commission recommends that the London policy to recruit locally is upscaled across all police force areas in England and Wales, with the College of Policing (CoP) developing guidance for police services on the implementation of the residency requirement.

The Commission notes that the residency requirement will likely drive more significant change in specific services where both the workforces and the populations are larger. For example, in September 2020 the Metropolitan Police employed around 25% of all police officers full-time equivalent in England and Wales^[footnote 3], and around 15% of the population reside there (based on the 2011 Census). This compares to police force areas such as Warwickshire or Dyfed-Powys, who employed less than 1% of all police officers and have around 1% of the population of England and Wales living there.

Therefore, the guidance produced by the College will need to take into consideration the different nuances of each police force area, including circumstances where the prospective local candidates eligible to apply for a role in policing is reduced - for example, due to the age demographic of the area's population.

The Commission also suggests that police services address the pipeline of candidates applying for policing through extensive engagement and outreach with communities, for example through cadet programmes. Due consideration should also be given to incentivise new recruits to remain with their police force for a minimum period of time, to establish their careers.

The progress and efficacy of the residency requirements should be monitored and evaluated at a national level by the Home Office, working in partnership with the CoP, APCC and NPCC. There is also a need for reporting mechanisms to be incorporated within this process, with HMICFRS inspecting forces on their progress in regular periods.

Recommendation 22: Equip the police service with skills to serve the needs of their local communities

The Commission recommends that the College of Policing (CoP) work with police services to design and evaluate recruitment pilots that match candidates' life skills with the needs of the communities they serve in their local areas.

By September 2021, the CoP working alongside services should identify a lead for the project, and outline timelines for the progression of these pilots. Following the evaluation of the pilot, the CoP should then introduce evidence-based guidance for police services about how to include questions about life skills and local understanding into the post-assessment centre recruitment process. This guidance should include the introduction of questions into the bank of post-assessment centre questions for each police force to adapt to local circumstances.

In an instance where, based on the evaluation results, the CoP is not able to progress with this recommendation, it will be required to write to the Home Secretary and the Home Office to outline the reasons why the pilots cannot be upscaled.

Recommendation 23: Use data in a responsible and informed way

The RDU should work with the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and the Office for Statistics Regulation (OSR) to develop and publish a set of ethnicity data standards, building on the existing Government Data Quality Framework and the Code of Practice for Statistics. Monitoring compliance against the Standards, for example through the OSR's programme of regulatory reviews, will improve the way that data on ethnicity is assessed to be fit for purpose.

The RDU should work with the OSR, DCMS and the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) to apply the ethnicity data standard across all media and public communications channels.

Recommendation 24: Disaggregate the term 'BAME'

The Commission recommends that the government move away from the use of the term 'BAME', to better focus on understanding disparities and outcomes for specific ethnic groups.

This recommendation is further linked to that relating to data, with the related quality improvement plans and actions necessary to make this move under a data standard or charter.

A fundamental aspect of the data standard or charter will be the harmonisation of ethnicity categories in government departments and other organisations at the most detailed level, and should be promoted for use in analyses across organisations.

The Commission agrees with advice provided by the RDU in that when reliable data for the full, harmonised set of classifications is not available, then the 5 aggregated groups (White, Black, Asian, Mixed and Other) can be used.

It is further agreed that users should note the limitations of the analysis, in particular that data for an aggregated group (the Black group, for example) can mask differences in outcomes for detailed ethnic groups (the Black Caribbean and Black African groups, for example). Users should avoid, unless it is absolutely necessary, binary analysis for example comparing White and 'Other than White' because of the lack of analytical value this gives. Furthermore, if it is possible to show data for some of the detailed groups, then the RDU encourages consideration of this, a suggestion that the Commission also supports, noting that every level of disaggregation adds analytical value providing that it remains possible to draw meaningful comparisons.

Further note - Social Mobility Commission

In December 2020 the Commission made an interim recommendation to move the sponsorship of the Social Mobility Commission (SMC) to the Cabinet Office. The rationale for doing so being that many disparities are driven by differences in age, sex, class and geography. As such, a more holistic approach to equalities policy and research in government - which united entities established to look at geography, class, race, disability, gender and so on - would ensure better outcomes in the long-term.

The government accepted this recommendation, and a machinery of government change is underway, which will now see the SMC sponsored by the Cabinet Office from 1 April 2021.

What lies behind disparity?

The idea that all ethnic minority people suffer a common fate and a shared disadvantage is an anachronism.

Yet both the reality and the perception of unfairness matter. The nationwide BLM marches last year were catalysed by a shocking case of police brutality in the USA that resulted in the death of George Floyd. Many British citizens - particularly young adults - felt compelled to protest and call for change here too. The countries are different, and face different race-related challenges. But in some places in the UK, especially in Black inner-city communities, historical wrongs by the state and police have left a deep legacy of mistrust too.

We understand the idealism of those well-intentioned young people who have held on to, and amplified, this inter-generational mistrust. However, we also have to ask whether a narrative that claims nothing has changed for the better, and that the dominant feature of our society is institutional racism and White privilege, will achieve anything beyond alienating the decent centre ground - a centre ground which is occupied by people of all races and ethnicities.

'What lies behind disparity?' is a key question to answer. We recognise the lived realities, and sometimes trauma, of racial disadvantage. Our thinking also looks hard at the evidence and the multiple causes in play, and seeks to come up with relevant measures, for example, to deal with the disproportionate effect of our Class B drug laws on young Black people or problems in mental health provision for those ethnic minority groups that struggle to access services when they need them.

This Commission finds that the big challenge of our age is not overt racial prejudice, it is building on and advancing the progress won by the struggles of the past 50 years. This requires us to take a broader, dispassionate look at what has been holding some people back. We therefore cannot accept the accusatory tone of much of the current rhetoric on race, and the pessimism about what has been and what more can be achieved.

The more recent instances where ethnic minority communities have rightly felt let down - such as the Grenfell tragedy or the Windrush scandal - sparked genuine national grief over the traumatic loss of lives, and widespread anger and remorse over the mistreatment of fellow citizens. Likewise, the disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on some ethnic minority groups is partly explained by the prevalence of ethnic minorities who work on the frontline and provide unpaid care in multi-generational households. Outcomes such as these do not come about by design, and are certainly not deliberately targeted. But, when they do occur, every step needs to be taken to ensure that the reasons why they happened are understood fully, and the causes then acted on to ensure that they are not repeated.

Open Britain

This report is not just a report card on how badly or well the UK has served its ethnic minorities. It is underpinned by an ideal for a modern UK best encapsulated by what we saw in the opening ceremony of the London 2012 Olympics. We saw an array of people and cultures from the sleepy English countryside to the frenetic music of the inner city. It not only featured British icons like James Bond and the monarchy, there was also a joyful expression of the contribution made by the Windrush generation as well as the working class contribution to the country's history and industrial might. One highlight was Dizzee Rascal belting out his hit Bonkers. Danny Boyle managed to create a vision of the UK which united all communities. He gave us an ideal of an open, optimistic UK, refreshed with new communities. On that day the whole nation was proud to be British.

But the Commission has also been keen to understand what happened when everyone went home after the Games ended. Did the UK return to its separate worlds, where we live parallel lives? A world where your talent and potential contribution are limited by which postcode you live in, your race or your socio-economic background?

We recognise that building a confident, successful multi-ethnic society is a huge and difficult endeavour. It is not an end in itself but it is a way to strengthen the whole team. When the current reality changes, so too must our approach. All the data tells us that the UK is far more open to minority advancement than 50 years ago. And while some doors at the top remain hard to lever open, people from some minority backgrounds are successfully taking up opportunities. In fact, as of 2019, the ethnicity pay gap - taking the median hourly earnings of all ethnic minority groups and the White group - is down to just 2.3% and the White Irish, Chinese and Indian ethnic groups are on average earning notably more than the White British average.[\[footnote 4\]](#) Professor Yaojun Li[\[footnote 5\]](#) undertook bespoke research for the Commission on ethnic minority social mobility. Going back 50 years he found that, while many groups experienced a first generation downward mobility, "the second generation have been making rapid progress and have caught up with and, in some cases, surpassed, White people". Additionally, there is no evidence of the blocking of ethnic minority advancement into professional-managerial positions in Britain "as was the case in the USA in the 1960s against African Americans". Much of this advance has only happened in the past 2 or 3 decades, and the story remains imperfect and mixed. Until COVID-19 struck, the vast majority of people aged under 25 from all ethnic backgrounds were in permanent employment, although those from minority groups were more likely to be unemployed and on zero-hours contracts. Additionally, it's clear that job opportunities and labour market conditions vary based on where you are in the UK. One advantage that ethnic minorities have is that they are disproportionately based in London - around 40% of the UK's ethnic minority population live in London (compared with just 9% of the White British population) and this mitigates the country's significant challenges with regional inequality.[\[footnote 6\]](#) This is one reason why we believe it is important to look beyond race to other causes of disadvantage, even when considering issues of race and ethnicity. The life chances of the child of a Harrow-raised British Indian accountant and the child of a Bradford-raised British Pakistani taxi-driver are as wide apart as they are, partly because of the UK's economic geography. Meanwhile, the numerically largest disadvantaged group is low income White boys, especially those from former industrial and coastal towns, who are failing at secondary school and are the people least likely to go to university. Unlike many other reports on race and ethnicity we have included the White group in our deliberations. For a range of outcomes, White working-class children trail behind their peers in almost all ethnic minority groups, although the extent of these disparities vary by area.

Perceptions and realities

Overt and outright racism persists in the UK. Examples of it loom larger in our minds because we witness it not just as graffiti on our walls or abuse hurled across our streets, but also in the more private setting of our phones and tablets. The rise of social media platforms mean racist incidents can go viral in hours. What is too often dismissed as 'trolling' means many prominent ethnic minority people routinely receive racist abuse from people who cannot be traced and held to account. Making anonymous abuse harder online is a complex issue but should be a public policy priority. Speech resonates long after it is heard. Being made to feel that you do not belong, that no matter how patriotic, law-abiding and hard-working you are, you can be treated differently because of your skin colour, stands against everything this country holds dear. A multi-ethnic democracy like ours cannot function properly if people can denigrate their fellow citizens in such deplorable terms on the grounds of their race. One of the most concerning side effects of social media is that it enormously amplifies racist views and online commentary. Almost every day the newspapers report racist abuse of celebrities, and polling by the British Future think tank for the Commission finds that while 13% of White people say they have been subject to racist or prejudiced insults on social media, the figure rises to 19% for people from the Pakistani ethnic group and 22% for Black people.[\[footnote 7\]](#) The gravitational force of dominant narratives tends to point our attention in negative directions, such as racist abuse on social media, and away from positive ones, the fact, for example, that 40% of NHS consultants are from ethnic minorities.[\[footnote 8\]](#) And too much of public debate is ill-informed or uninformed - hate crime being an example. It is widely believed that hate crime is worsening. Some argue that it is because of Brexit, others that it is exacerbated by the prevalence and visibility of racism online. Every case is unacceptable and a body-blow struck against a decent society, especially the small proportion of cases involving physical violence. But police-recorded hate crime figures are rising because of improved police recording processes, and a greater awareness of what constitutes a hate crime.[\[footnote 9\]](#) The total of police recorded race-related hate crime for England and Wales has leapt up in recent years, increasing by 131% in the 9 years to March 2020.[\[footnote 10\]](#) By contrast, responses to the Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW), which is considered more reliable than police-recorded crime, show that the number of racially-motivated hate crimes reduced from 149,000 (in the years ending March 2010 to March 2012) to 104,000 (in the years ending March 2018 to March 2020).[\[footnote 11\]](#)[\[footnote 12\]](#) This is still far too many incidents, and the trends are subject to change, but it does suggest that hate crime, like racist attitudes, is on the decline. Another example of overly pessimistic narratives, heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic, has been on race and health. The increased age-adjusted risk of death from COVID-19 in Black and South Asian groups has widely been reported as being due to racism - and as exacerbating existing health inequalities.[\[footnote 13\]](#) However many analyses have shown that the increased risk of dying from COVID-19 is mainly due to an increased risk of exposure to infection. This is attributed to the facts that Black and South Asian people are more likely to live in urban areas with higher population density and levels of deprivation; work in higher risk occupations such as healthcare or transport; and to live with older relatives who themselves are at higher risk due to their age or having other comorbidities such as diabetes and obesity.[\[footnote 14\]](#) Also, if it were true that Black and South Asian groups were suffering from systemic racism throughout their lives - adversely affecting their health, education, income, housing, employment (the key determinants of health) - this would be reflected in overall mortality figures across the life-course. In fact, Black and Asian groups have had lower mortality rates from all causes.[\[footnote 15\]](#) and data for Scotland suggests Asian ethnic groups have higher life expectancy than White ethnic groups.[\[footnote 16\]](#) This is particularly surprising as ethnic minority groups are more likely to live in the most overall deprived neighbourhoods in England.[\[footnote 17\]](#) Even over the course of the pandemic, despite the higher COVID-19 death rates, overall mortality in Black and South Asian groups has not been higher than for White groups. So, instead of focusing solely on race and ethnicity, we need to consider the key underlying risk factors (which are mainly socio-economic) that are causing the higher death rates, and which will therefore reduce the risk of death in all ethnic groups - including White groups. The Commission has also been particularly concerned to understand how it is that as outcomes have been improving for ethnic minority groups, and majority attitudes have become increasingly open-minded, that a more fatalistic narrative - which claims that nothing has really changed - seems to have gripped popular perception. Sunder Katwala, the head of the British Future think tank, says that "Britain is doing much better on race than on class". The reason why this does not seem more apparent is because: there is now a split between academic, media and political environments and the lived experience of the rest of the country ... the problem is that the race discourse is dominated by people who spend all their time on it, we don't hear enough from people who just get on with their everyday lives and are not defined by race.[\[footnote 18\]](#) However, he also notes that many disadvantaged Black and Muslim groups do feel defined by their race, whereas fewer middle-class professionals from Indian and Chinese ethnic groups feel the same. We suggest that pessimistic narratives about race have also been reinforced by a rise of identity politics, as old class divisions have lost traction. Well organised single-issue identity lobby groups also help to raise the volume. These organisations can do good work protecting the vulnerable, but they also tend to have a pessimism bias in their narratives to draw attention to their cause. And they tend to stress the 'lived experience' of the groups they seek to protect with less emphasis on objective data. It is not surprising therefore that mainstream public debate about race sensitises minorities to discrimination, but does less to highlight minority self-reliance and resilience.

Immigrant optimism

We commissioned new research from the University of Oxford[\[footnote 19\]](#) that explores the range of factors that combine to influence educational outcomes in ethnic groups. These factors include sex, ethnicity and socio-economic status. Our analysis defines socio-economic status as parental education, occupation and family income.

It is the Commission's belief that educational success should be celebrated, replicated and used as an exemplar to inspire all pupils across the UK. Evidence shows that certain ethnic groups such as Black African, Indian and Bangladeshi pupils perform better than White British group, once socio-economic status is taken into consideration. This outstanding performance is in part due to what is termed 'immigrant optimism': a phenomenon where recent immigrants devote themselves more to education than the native population because they lack financial capital and see education as a way out of poverty.[\[footnote 20\]](#) In practice, this means there are significant factors at play that can help groups overcome their socio-economic status and succeed. Research by the Centre for Longitudinal Studies and the Runnymede Trust also finds higher aspirations among ethnic minority children at 14 years old compared with White children.[\[footnote 21\]](#) White boys gave themselves an average probability of going to university of 60.9%, while for White girls the estimation was higher, at 68.3%. This compared starkly with the Black African (boys, 81.7%; girls 88.8%), Indian (81.3%; 85.3%), Pakistani (74.9%; 82.4%), and Bangladeshi (77.8%; 80.2%) ethnic groups. Black Caribbean boys were the only group with lower expectations than the White boys group at 58.5%, while Black Caribbean girls gave themselves a 73.3% probability of going to university.

There are conflicting views on what drives immigrant optimism, whether it is an internal drive or a response to external discrimination. However, it is evident that ethnic minority groups have agency to overcome obstacles and achieve success.

Why 'BAME' doesn't work

Use of the term BAME, which is frequently used to group all ethnic minorities together, is no longer helpful. It is demeaning to be categorised in relation to what we are not, rather than what we are: British Indian, British Caribbean and so on. The BAME acronym also disguises huge differences in outcomes between ethnic groups. This reductionist idea forces us to think that the principle cause of all disparities must be majority versus minority discrimination. It also allows our institutions and businesses to point to the success of some BAME people in their organisation and absolve themselves of responsibility for people from those minority groups that are doing less well. Like the UK's White population, ethnic minority groups are far from monolithic in their attitudes towards British social norms and their inclusion in different walks of life.

It is time we dropped the term and talked about people from particular ethnic backgrounds and if we do sometimes need to distinguish between all White and non-White populations we should use the term 'ethnic minority', 'ethnic group', or 'White ethnic minorities' where appropriate, which we have used throughout this report wherever the data enables us to do so. Indeed, the use of 'White' as a standalone term is as unhelpful as other aggregated labels, as it masks the diversity of groups within - such as White Irish, Gypsy, Roma and Travellers and Eastern Europeans - and the unique experiences and outcomes they also face.

British Future has also looked at the language of race and whether people felt, as we do, that an aggregate term like BAME has outlived its usefulness. There was no clear majority among either White or ethnic minority respondents for preserving BAME. Among ethnic minorities, 40% said it was still useful, 36% said it was out of date and 25% didn't know.[\[footnote 22\]](#) The term ethnic minority was more popular among ethnic minority respondents than either BAME or people of colour.

Recognition of the differences between groups requires a new and more granular approach to data and how it is collected and used. Too much data continues to be collected at the level of the 'big 5' ethnicity classifications: White, Black, Asian, Mixed and Other, which in some instances merges together ethnic groups with vastly different experiences and outcomes.

We also need more sensitivity to differences within racial or ethnic groups, such as urban middle-class Gujaratis vs rural Mirpuri, which are arguably bigger than most differences between ethnic groups. There is also an urgent need for individual level data, and analysis that accounts for the many factors that come together to influence outcomes, such as age, class and region. The government's new Equality Hub data project, announced in December 2020, should ensure that this new, multivariable approach becomes the standard for collecting and presenting data in a nuanced way.

The language of race

The public debate on race is sometimes hampered by the fact that there is no consensus on the meaning of even fundamental words like racism and discrimination. The word racism can apply to such a wide a range of human behaviour, from the stereotyping of a stranger to the horror of genocide. It is used so differently in debate that people will often argue at cross purposes.

We have sought to examine the practical causes of undesirable disparities between groups and put forward how to narrow them. However, we have also looked at the way disparities are discussed in mainstream discourse and have been concerned with the use of imprecise and often misleading language around race and racism.

The linguistic inflation on racism is confusing, with prefixes like institutional, structural and systemic adding to the problem. It is a sad reality that racism still exists in every country, but we cannot afford for the term to become misunderstood or trivialised.

In the call for evidence, the Commission noted a tendency to conflate discrimination and disparities; whilst they sometimes co-exist they often do not. The Commission believes this is symptomatic of a wider, repeated use and misapplication of the term 'racism' to account for every observed disparity. This matters because the more things are explained as a result of racial bias, the more it appears that society is set against ethnic minorities, which in turn can discourage ethnic minority individuals from pursuing their goals. If more precise language does not become a feature of our national conversation on race, we can expect to see tensions increase across communities - despite determined action by government and civil society to reduce discrimination.

The Commission was especially concerned with the way the term 'institutional racism' is being applied in current discourse on racial disparities. We noted the evolving definitions of institutional racism during the 18 years between the Scarman Report in 1981 and the Macpherson report of 1999.[\[footnote 23\]](#)

The late Sir William Macpherson gave the following definition, which we believe has stood the test of time:

The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.

One of the key justifications for the Macpherson report's finding of institutional racism was the under-reporting of racist crime (now known as hate crime), reflecting a lack of trust in the police on the part of ethnic minorities. The term described a set of practices and behaviours that were commonplace, sanctioned by authorities, and which unduly harmed ethnic minority groups - even if unintentionally. That is largely no longer the case, given that reporting hate crime and race-related incidents is now widely encouraged by police forces.

The term is now being liberally used, and often to describe any circumstances in which differences in outcomes between racial and ethnic groups exist in an institution, without evidence to support such claims.

The Commission therefore feels that misapplying the term racism has diluted its credibility, and thus undermined the seriousness of racism, where it does exist, in contemporary Britain. Where 'institutional racism' is used too casually as an explanatory tool, it can also lead to insufficient consideration of other factors which are also known to drive such differences in outcomes.

If accusations of 'institutional racism' are levelled against institutions, these should - like any other serious accusation - be subject to robust assessment and evidence, and show that an institution has treated an ethnic group differently to other groups because of their ethnic identity. What might such evidence look like? Imagine a world with just 2 groups in which both are equally prejudiced, but the minority forms just 10% of the population. When it comes to hiring, the potential prejudice faced by a minority applicant will be much greater than the potential prejudice against an applicant from the majority. But this structural imbalance is measurable through using surveys of individual prejudice, and tests of aggregate prejudices, such as curriculum vitae (CV) studies.

Another example could be one in which most members of an institution are not personally prejudiced, but feel social pressure to act in such a manner towards the minority, because they believe that most others are prejudiced and their workplace expects them to discriminate. Again, surveys can assess the extent to which beliefs about such expectations exist.

In the last 30 years, attitudes towards racism and hate crimes have changed dramatically, and there is a much greater awareness and willingness to record and monitor such incidents by the authorities.

Yet, the advent of social media seems to have partly undermined this apparent march of progress. The spread of mobile phone use and social media in particular has allowed the proliferation of most negative messages and attitudes. There are hundreds of millions of tweets sent every day. Less frequent occurrences in the offline world can happen numerous times a day online. This amplifies the toxic messages of a small number of hard-core racists far beyond any sort of audience they would ever have had in the past, and is likely contributing to the fear that racism is increasing, despite evidence to the contrary. We return to this issue in more detail in the crime and policing chapter.

Just as racist behaviour and racist messages are being amplified, so are accusations of racism that are harder to prove, open to interpretation, or even vexatious. The internet has also exposed the problems inherent in a subjective definition of a racist incident. We can have a situation where the exact same action can be racism or not racism - depending on how someone perceives it. This means there is no clarity or consistency in identifying examples. It is now possible for any act, including those intended to be well-meaning, to be classified as racist. Without clearer definitions, it will be harder to measure the true extent of racism.

Perceptions matter. As we see in policing, trust has to be earned and reciprocated, and this means being seen to be fair as well as having fair processes. To limit the widening charge of racism, and further dilution of its importance, we suggest assessing the intent of the perpetrator as well as the perception of the victim. Victims' voices must be heard, however to secure the justice they deserve for the pain caused and suffered, the racists' responsible need to be unequivocally identified and exposed.

To aid this we also need clear, standard definitions of the terms institutional racism, structural racism or systemic racism. Right now they are used interchangeably, which creates further confusion and reduces the likelihood of perpetrators being caught and punished.

References to 'systemic', 'institutional' or 'structural racism' may relate to specific processes which can be identified, but they can also relate to the feeling described by many ethnic minorities of "not belonging". There is certainly a class of actions, behaviours and incidents at organisational level which cause ethnic minorities to lack a sense of belonging. This is often informally expressed as feeling 'othered'. However, as with hate incidents, this can have a highly subjective dimension for those tasked with investigating the claim.

It is very difficult to measure the extent to which an organisation's culture is inclusive or biased, but we feel it is important to shift discussions about systemic or structural racism onto more objective foundations. Rooting these terms in observable metrics gives us the chance to not only measure how people feel, but also analyse both the causes and where things are getting better. Institutions need to also acknowledge improvements and use both

quantitative and qualitative evidence transparently, to show a fuller picture. Terms like 'structural racism' have roots in a critique of capitalism, which states that racism is inextricably linked to capitalism. So by that definition, until that system is abolished racism will flourish. Many are using 'structural racism' to mean deep-seated exclusion rather than the tearing down of capitalism.

These are issues that can only be partly addressed by the government, and will need cooperation in particular from business, the media, civil society and other non-state actors who influence the way in which we discuss race. The Commission therefore proposes the following framework to distinguish between different forms of racial disparity and racism:

1. Explained racial disparities: this term should be used when there are persistent ethnic differential outcomes that can demonstrably be shown to be as a result of other factors such as geography, class or sex.
2. Unexplained racial disparities: persistent differential outcomes for ethnic groups with no conclusive evidence about the causes. This applies to situations where a disparate outcome is identified, but there is no evidence as to what is causing it.
3. Institutional racism: applicable to an institution that is racist or discriminatory processes, policies, attitudes or behaviours in a single institution.
4. Systemic racism: this applies to interconnected organisations, or wider society, which exhibit racist or discriminatory processes, policies, attitudes or behaviours.
5. Structural racism: to describe a legacy of historic racist or discriminatory processes, policies, attitudes or behaviours that continue to shape organisations and societies today.

Another term that is highly controversial and contested is 'White privilege'. The phrase, coined in the USA, is undoubtedly alienating to those who do not feel especially privileged by their skin colour. Phrases like 'White privilege' and 'White fragility' imply that it is White people's attitudes and behaviours that primarily cause the disadvantage experienced by ethnic minorities. It also reinforces the perception that being an ethnic minority in the UK is to be treated unfairly by default. The evidence we have studied does not support this. The Commission rejects this approach, believes it fails to identify the real causes for disparities and that it is counterproductive and divisive. There is something, however, in the idea that even in a relatively open society like today's UK a psychological comfort can be derived from looking like the majority of people around you. A better term, which usefully captures the tendency for groups to favour their own, is the concept of 'affinity bias'.

Racism is not just about words. Bias, bigotry and unfairness based on race may be receding, but they still have the power to deny opportunity and painfully disrupt lives.

If we are to build trust in institutions and organisations, we must be willing to investigate evidence of racism, and be prepared as a society to root it out. This means using all the levers at our disposal. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), is charged with investigating breaches of the Equality Act and it is important that it has the resources to do so.

Recommendation 1: Build trust - Challenge racist and discriminatory actions

The Commission recommends that, to aid endeavours to drive out race-based discrimination and prejudice:

- the EHRC receives additional, ring-fenced funding from the government to use their compliance, enforcement and litigation powers to challenge policies or practices that either cause significant and unjust racial disadvantage, or arise from racial discrimination
- separately, the government should consider the complex issue of online abuse, and the platforms that are used to perpetuate such, as a public policy priority

Geography, class and ethnicity

The UK suffers from acute geographical inequality. That is hardly news. But the scale of the gulf in opportunity is seldom appreciated. According to Professor Philip McCann of Sheffield University about half the population in the UK live in areas where prosperity is no better than the poorest parts of the old East Germany or the poorest states in the USA, like Mississippi or West Virginia. For 30 years, says McCann, the country has been decoupling.

London and the South East plus pockets of affluence and dynamism elsewhere have been pulling away from the rest.[\[footnote 24\]](#) The core cities outside London, with the exception of Bristol, have been underperforming, but it is the ex-industrial and mining areas, and towns on the coastal periphery, which are the poorest and least productive places. Towns like Barnsley in South Yorkshire, Dudley in the West Midlands, Middlesbrough in the North East or Blackburn in the North West.[\[footnote 25\]](#)

In simple numerical terms, this is overwhelmingly a White British problem.[\[footnote 26\]](#) But it is also the case that ethnic minority Britons are more likely to live in persistent poverty and overcrowded housing..[\[footnote 27\]](#)[\[footnote 28\]](#) Geographical inequalities also afflict a significant section of the South Asian population who live in the former mill towns and ex-industrial Midlands.[\[footnote 29\]](#)

The most concentrated pockets of deprivation are found among ethnic minority groups, particularly Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Black groups.[\[footnote 30\]](#) And in many aspects related to quality of life, ethnic minorities, particularly among the latter groups, are placed below the White British group - due in part to the lack of a substantial affluent group for those minorities.

However it is the poorer White people, outside London, who are the largest group to be found in areas with multidimensional disadvantages, from income to longevity of life. The English region with the worst life expectancy is one of the Whitest - the North East. And the number of years people can expect to live in good health is generally lower in the northern parts of England compared with the south.[\[footnote 31\]](#)

The most recent Index of Multiple Deprivation for England finds that the local authorities with the highest number of deprived neighbourhoods are all in the north: Middlesbrough, Liverpool, Knowsley, Hull and Manchester. All except Manchester have a disproportionate representation of the White British population. The proportion of deprived neighbourhoods in London is falling.[\[footnote 32\]](#)

The overall percentage of White British people living in the 10% of most deprived neighbourhoods is 9.1%, which is disproportionately low and below several groups, most notably Pakistani (31.1%), Bangladeshi (19.3%), Mixed White and Black Caribbean (17.4%) and Black African (15.6%).[\[footnote 33\]](#) But it is also worth noting that the White British percentage translates into nearly 4 million people. The Pakistani ethnic group is the next highest group, with 346,000 in absolute numbers.

There is a sense of stagnation about the fate and life chances of poorer White groups, which is less the case with ethnic minority groups. Until the recent focus on the 'left behind' towns and 'levelling up', there was no national narrative encouraging the advancement for this group in the way there has been for ethnic minorities. White children on free school meals lag behind every other group in Progress 8 attainment levels at secondary school.

[\[footnote 34\]](#) They are also least likely to progress to university. Poor White groups, and especially poor White boys, do badly in the education system everywhere, whereas in some areas at least, especially London, poor ethnic minorities are improving rapidly.[\[footnote 35\]](#)

The Social Mobility Commission has a Social Mobility Index which looks at education attainment from primary level to university for those from poor backgrounds; and then adds in adult opportunity in terms of incomes, availability of professional jobs, prevalence of low pay and so on.[\[footnote 36\]](#)

Nearly 70% of all the social mobility 'hotspot' success stories are in London and the South East. There are none in the North East, Yorkshire and the Humber, and the West Midlands. The top 65 worst performing local authority areas are almost all overwhelmingly White British places. Of the worst performing local authorities, Nottingham at 15, Oldham at 31, Bradford at 48 and Wolverhampton at 62 are the only local authorities with significant ethnic minority populations.

It is a similar story with the Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI) score. The worst 5 areas with IDACI scores of around 30% are all overwhelmingly White British places: Middlesbrough, Blackpool, Knowsley, Liverpool and Hull.[\[footnote 37\]](#) And in those areas further down the list with significant ethnic minority populations the minority performance on Progress 8 attainment is in almost all cases far ahead of the White British.[\[footnote 38\]](#)

The figures on Progress 8 educational advancement are startling, and underline the significant divergence between the poor White British and poor ethnic minorities. Poor White people score between minus 0.6 and minus 0.8 in each of the 9 major regions of England. For ethnic minorities only one region, the South West, is slightly worse than minus 0.4. Most other regions are only just in minus - apart from London which is plus 0.2.[\[footnote 39\]](#)

The 'opportunity areas' announced by the Department for Education combined the Social Mobility Index with the department's own 'achieving excellence areas', aimed at those places with underperforming schools.[\[footnote 40\]](#) 12 locations came up which are, with the exception of Oldham and Bradford, overwhelmingly White places: West Somerset, Norwich, Blackpool, North Yorkshire coast, Derby, Oldham, Fenland and East Cambridgeshire, Hastings, Bradford, Stoke on Trent, Doncaster and Ipswich.

When considering this data, and noting the profound disparities that it highlighted, the Commission was even more firmly of the view that its recommendations should focus on improving outcomes for all - not centre on specific ethnic groups alone.

Ethnicity wealth gap and home ownership

People from ethnic minority backgrounds are more likely to live in households with persistent low income (after housing costs). 28% of people in Black households were on persistent low income, the highest of all groups, compared with 25% of Asian households and 12% of White households. [\[footnote 41\]](#)

Aside from that disproportionate representation of minorities among those on persistent low incomes, the income story has been largely a progressive one in recent decades with movement towards, or even an overtaking of, the White British median. It is a less encouraging story with wealth and property ownership, but one would expect wealth accumulation to take longer in generational time. According to an ONS survey (2016 to 2018), [\[footnote 42\]](#) median total wealth for all households was £286,000 with medians ranging from £34,000 for households with a Black African head to £314,000 for the White British group with the Indian ethnic group close behind. Unlike on the earned income spectrum, Pakistani households do well on household wealth at just over £200,000, while the Chinese ethnic group - despite being high income earners - lags behind all major ethnic groups on household wealth apart from the Bangladeshi and Black African groups.

In the UK property is the main, but not the only, source of wealth. Households with an Indian, Pakistani or White British head had the highest net property wealth (taking into account how much of a property is owned or still covered by a mortgage) with medians of £176,000, £115,000 and £115,000 respectively.

A total of 63% of all households own their own home with slightly more than two-thirds of White British households being home owners compared with two-fifths for all other ethnic groups combined.

There is significant variation between ethnic minority groups with the Indian ethnic group way out in front at 74%, with Mixed White and Asian on 70% and White British on 68%. Black Caribbean households have double the rate of home ownership as Black African households, at 40% compared with 20%, reflecting their longer history in the UK. Pakistani households have a rate of 58%, way ahead of Bangladeshi households on 46% and Chinese households on 45% which partly explains the latter group's lowly rating on median wealth. [\[footnote 43\]](#)

White British households are less likely to rent either privately or from a social landlord than all other households: 16% of them rent from a social landlord, compared with 22% of all other households, and a further 16% rented from a private landlord compared with 37% of others.

Overcrowding, which reflects both family sizes as well as the nature and affordability of the local housing stock, was more common among ethnic minority households in general. Overcrowding affected 30% of Bangladeshi households in the year to March 2016, 16% of Black African and 7% of Black Caribbean compared with just 2% of White British households. However White British households made up almost half of the 660,000 overcrowded households in England. Compared with all other regions, London had the highest rates of overcrowding, affecting 13% of ethnic minority households and 3% of White British households.

People in the most deprived neighbourhoods tend to be disadvantaged across multiple aspects of life. Pakistani and Bangladeshi people were overrepresented in the most deprived neighbourhoods in England: 31% or around 346,000 of the Pakistani population and 28% or around 113,000 of the Bangladeshi population lived in the most deprived 10% of neighbourhoods in England. All the Black ethnic groups were also disproportionately likely to live in the most deprived neighbourhoods. Only Indian, White British, White Irish, Chinese and White Other ethnic groups were not disproportionately likely to live in these most deprived neighbourhoods.

One quarter of Bangladeshi households' income came from benefits and tax credits (excluding the State Pension) as did 18% of Pakistani and 17% of Black people's incomes: these were larger proportions than for other ethnic groups. Over half of households in these ethnic groups were in receipt of state support, particularly Child Tax Credit. Chinese people were the least likely to be in receipt of state support with just 3 in 10 claiming any. [\[footnote 44\]](#)

Cultural traditions, family and integration

If it is possible to have racial disadvantage without racists then we need to look elsewhere for the roots of that disadvantage. Racial disadvantage often overlaps with social class disadvantage but how have some groups transcended that disadvantage more swiftly than others?

There has been a revolution over the last half century in the family structure. Much of this has been welcome; more accepting attitudes towards divorce and more autonomy for women has increased human freedom, and we know that many variations beyond the traditional nuclear family can work. However, as these freedoms have grown, there is also greater stress on families and the prevalence of breakdown has increased.

The Commission is not passing judgement about how people live their lives, nor is it saying 'two parents are always better than one'. Lone parent families may face greater strain but, if they have the right resources and support available, they can provide just as good a start in life. The support, nurture and care that family networks provide are something that no government intervention can match in practical or emotional power. But the need for support is inevitably greater amongst lone parent families. In those ethnic minority groups where family breakdown is more prevalent, the need for support from either extended family or community groups is even greater.

During the course of its work, the Commission noted with great concern the prevalence of family breakdown. In 2020, 14.7% of families in the UK were lone parent families (2.9 million). [\[footnote 45\]](#) 63% of Black Caribbean children were growing up in lone parent families, as were 62% of children in the Black Other ethnic group. High instances of lone parenthood were also experienced by Mixed ethnicity Black children. Black African people have a lower rate of single parenthood but at 43% are still well above the average. South Asian and Chinese ethnic groups are much lower than other groups with the Indian ethnic group the lowest at just 6%. [\[footnote 46\]](#)

Lone parent families have become more common since the 1970s, a result of an increase in divorces as well as an increase in never married lone mothers. [\[footnote 47\]](#) There may be a number of underlying reasons for this: cultural change relating to male responsibility, the welfare state and growing affluence making it possible to bring up children alone. The lower rate of family breakdown among Asian families is notable, pointing to different cultural values or expectations.

The academic Dr Rakib Ehsan wrote of his own upbringing:

Many of Britain's South Asian ... communities, at varying degrees of affluence, are deeply family-oriented and intergenerationally cohesive. Civic associations within such communities continue to flourish, with places of worship providing a spiritually-uplifting sense of belonging. Whether it was at the local newsagents or the Asian greengrocers, my community elders would take an interest in how I was performing at school, college, and university. Not only does this make a young person feel valued, it provides a healthy pressure where one does not want to disappoint one's own parents, but also wishes to avoid potential embarrassment in the wider local community. Personal pride and family honour are important in this context. [\[footnote 48\]](#)

It should also be pointed out that differences in socio-economic status between groups complicate the picture, with high rates of family breakdown found among poor White people too. For families with children (of all ethnicities) only 45% of those in the bottom income quintile are married compared with 84% in the top quintile, according to the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ). [\[footnote 49\]](#)

There is a wealth of evidence from the academic literature pointing to a greater likelihood of negative outcomes tied to family breakdown, although these are largely focused on the USA. A study in the USA by Sara McLanahan et al (2013) was able to show that father absence was tied to children's worse educational performance, emotional development, and adult mental health. [\[footnote 50\]](#) Research has also linked father absence to increased likelihood of youth incarceration, although this could in part be attributed to poverty. [\[footnote 51\]](#) Research for the CSJ shows that children who experience family breakdown are more likely to underperform at school. [\[footnote 52\]](#)

This 'family strain' manifests itself as adverse effects on communication, parenting, and struggles with special needs; the strain of parental breakup; and may go on to have a negative impact on children's emotional and social competence.

To repeat: this is not about allocating blame, but simply pointing out that children require both time and resources, and that is more likely to be available when both parents play active roles in their upbringing. Governments cannot remain neutral here. We would urge the government to investigate this issue further and look at initiatives that prevent family breakdown.

Another area where cultural traditions may play an important role is in attitudes to integration and mixing with other ethnic groups. Baroness Casey's 'Review into Opportunity and Integration' (2016) [\[footnote 53\]](#) looked at issues of integration and segregation, particularly through the lens of gender and language. Here, she confronted some uncomfortable truths about behaviour and attitudes among some ethnic minority groups that actively hold back integration, a theme first raised by Trevor Phillips in his lecture 'Sleepwalking into Segregation?' in 2005. Casey noted that more than half of women in the Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups are economically inactive, compared with a quarter of White women. This helps explain why Pakistani and Bangladeshi families are disproportionately represented in lower income deciles.

The Race Disparity Audit also revealed that in England, adults from a Bangladeshi and Pakistani background were the most likely not to speak English well or at all. Among 45 to 64 year olds, 17.4% of Bangladeshi women and 9.0% of Pakistani women were unable to speak English at the 2011 Census. [\[footnote 54\]](#) This clearly is an obstacle to economic advance and broader integration. One reason for this issue being most pronounced among people from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds is that they tend to live somewhat more separately from the mainstream, both physically and in terms of social norms, and are 2 of the groups most likely to bring in spouses from their ancestral homes, especially the Pakistani group. [\[footnote 55\]](#)

This produces the so-called 'first generation in every generation' issue, with full integration constantly being restrained by one parent with a foot in another country.

Recommendation 19: Create agency - Undertake a 'Support for Families' review

The Commission recommends that the government undertakes a 'Support for Families' review to further investigate issues highlighted by this Commission as follows:

- collecting data about 'family strain' in different ethnic groups
- academic research into cultural attitudes and parenting styles which may be distinct within ethnic communities and what role they play in shaping life outcomes
- the impact of employment and working practices on parenting outcomes in different ethnic groups
- more complex understandings of fatherhood in different ethnic groups that analyses similarities and differences and reasons for variance

- the role of culture and religion in family outcomes

The review should also look to develop a series of actions on:

- education - how early years settings and schools can provide better support services for parents, and the potential role of school-parent contracts in helping build relations between schools and parents
- employment - encouraging employers to look at flexible working for single parents
- crime and policing - how parents can be involved and supported to prevent youth crime, including potential for increased interactions between police and parents during out of court disposal processes
- health - mental health services encouraging more family therapy and group support in the event of family breakdown, which may disproportionately benefit ethnic minority groups

The Children's Commissioner of England should be part of the review team to ensure the experiences and interests of children and young people are taken into account. We note that the Children's Commissioner's Office has recently announced a new survey for children called 'The Big Ask'. The findings of this survey should be considered as part of this work.

I welcome the Commission's focus on the importance of supporting parents and families right from the early years so that children can get the very best start in life and the support they need to thrive as they grow up (Dame Rachel de Souza DBE, Children's Commissioner of England)

What we think about race

What has been happening to beliefs about race and racism over recent years?

There is now near universal acceptance that the UK is a multi-ethnic society and people of immigrant backgrounds can be British. Polling conducted recently (2020) by Ipsos Mori found 93% of Britons disagree that "to be truly British you have to be White", up from 82% in 2006.[\[footnote 56\]](#) Those who agree have declined from 10% to 3% over the last 14 years. Ipsos Mori also found in 2020 that 89% would be happy for their child to marry someone from another ethnic group, up from 75% in 2009.[\[footnote 57\]](#)

Despite this, people believe there remain tensions between ethnic groups. Ipsos Mori found that 69% say there is "at least a fair amount of tension" in 2020 (1 in 5 say there is a great deal), but a slight improvement is registered since 2008 when 76% felt there was a fair amount of tension. Moreover, polling from Opinium found that rather than uniting the country against racism, 55% of adults believe that BLM protests have increased racial tension, including among 44% of ethnic minority Britons.[\[footnote 58\]](#)

Polling by British Future for the Commission found encouraging consensus in attitudes between ethnic groups, with the exception of perceptions on anti-Black prejudice.[\[footnote 59\]](#) 69% of Black respondents saw "a lot" of prejudice against Black people compared with just 44% of ethnic minority respondents overall. Only 30% of Indian respondents saw "a lot" of prejudice against Black people, which was quite close to White respondents (25%). Yet when asked about specific instances of discrimination those numbers often shrink. Research by Policy Exchange based on the Citizenship Survey found that the majority of ethnic minority people considered themselves not to have been discriminated against in promotion or hiring in the last 5 years.[\[footnote 60\]](#) Overall just under 12% of ethnic minority people thought they had been discriminated against, compared with just under 6% for the White British. That figure rises to 18.2% for Black Caribbean people and 14.9% for Black African people.

Racism is both real and socially constructed. Society has 'defined racism down' to encompass attitudes and behaviours that would not have been considered racist in the past. This is one reason for the rising sensitivity, the language of microaggressions and safety, and stretching the meaning of racism without objective data to support it.

There is also the question of the relative success of different groups. Those groups, particularly Indian and Chinese ethnic groups, who have the most success in British society tend to see fewer obstacles and less prejudice. And those groups that do less well, Black people and Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims, tend to see and experience more of both, though Black African people are considerably more positive than Black Caribbean people.

76% of Black people believe there is 'White privilege' compared with 59% of all ethnic minorities and 29% of White people.[\[footnote 61\]](#) Almost as many White people are unfamiliar with the term (21%).

Almost exactly half of ethnic minority Britons do not think their race has been an obstacle to their personal advancement. Responding to the question 'Do you think your race has or has not directly prevented you from being able to succeed or pursue opportunities in your own personal life?', 40% of ethnic minority people said it has and 38% said it has not.[\[footnote 62\]](#)

Despite this, a majority of ethnic minority Britons agree that race relations have improved over the last 50 years and this view is held by 3 times as many people as those who believe race relations have got worse.[\[footnote 63\]](#)

The British Future polling suggests that there is no big divide on the things that most concern us between White and ethnic minority people, with race and class background seen as being of similar importance to life chances.[\[footnote 64\]](#)

To better assess how far the UK has become a multi-ethnic society at ease with itself, the Commission also wanted to compare developments in the UK with international experience.

The Minority Rights Group International (MRG), published a report in 2016 assessing the condition of minorities worldwide. It documented challenges and discrimination facing minorities in a broad and representative sample of countries.[\[footnote 65\]](#) Issues ranged from socio-economic inequalities, economic marginalisation, and land disputes, to cultural contestations, negative stereotyping and prejudice in these states. These tensions show treating minorities fairly is a universal challenge and one that the UK, in the view of the Commission, manages comparatively well as a democratic state with a welfare system and robust anti-discrimination laws.

Another study in 2019 by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on 'Being Black in the EU' revealed the percentage of Black respondents who experienced racial harassment in the past 5 years.[\[footnote 66\]](#) The figure was 63% in Finland, 52% in Luxembourg, 51% in Ireland, 48% in both Germany and Italy, and 41% in both Sweden and Denmark. In comparison, 21% of Black British respondents reported such harassment, the second-lowest result in the countries surveyed. The UK had the lowest figure for Black respondents who experienced discrimination in job seeking, education (either themselves or as parents), health, housing, public administration or other public or private services such as restaurants, bars or shops within the past 12 months.

Although the continued presence of discrimination gives cause for concern, it is important to see how the UK has improved race relations more rapidly than in other countries. The fact that the UK is more active in collecting data on ethnicity and discrimination suggests a willingness to address racial inequalities compared with the rest of Europe, where data-gathering is less comprehensive, ad hoc, or even illegal.

Yet despite the UK comparing well internationally there is still a powerful current of unease and even anger that bubbled up in last summer's BLM protests. Minorities, even after several generations, often feel a detachment and unease relative to majorities and tend to remain sensitive to their group's relative status in the society. Notwithstanding what we have argued about the relative openness of British society, the Commission accepts the scholarly consensus that a 'psychological asymmetry' unavoidably characterises majority-minority relations across different cultures, including in the UK.[\[footnote 67\]](#)

Younger ethnic minority people in the UK may identify more strongly with their ethnicity and heritage than older generations, reflecting a new desire to adopt multiple identities rather than 'to assimilate'. This needs to be understood and factored into ongoing British race relations strategies. Strong ethnic identities should also not be considered in and of themselves as an inherent obstacle to British nation-building. People are evidently capable of juggling multiple identities in their everyday lives. What matters is for the British identity to evoke positive emotions of trust and affection in the country's minorities.

In the UK, the best way to build trust is to emphasise to every ethnic group that we treat individuals fairly, and not on the basis of their ethnicity. We respect ethnic identities but also share a common, unifying, civic identity as British citizens.

We must continually reflect on how to reinforce the symbols of Britishness which signal to minorities that they are considered full members of the British family while retaining their own distinctive identities.

Data

This country has never been reluctant to collect data on people's self-declared ethnic, racial and national identities. It is one reason why this report is able to make with confidence the sometimes controversial arguments that it does - both about ethnic minority progress, and the highlighting of continuing areas of concern. Arguments about discrimination almost always start with data but how that data is framed and selected is crucial, and differences in outcomes need understanding and explaining. Differences - or 'disparities' - are not always sinister and do not always arise from discrimination.

Throughout the report we express various concerns about the way that data is collected and used by public authorities. One concern is the lack of precision in some data collection. The Census has gradually increased its granularity of ethnicity over recent decades and for 2021 has 19 tick-box categories for ethnic self-identification, with Roma added since 2011. Yet too much data continues to be collected at the level of the so-called 'big 5' classifications: White, Black, Asian, Mixed and Other - and this is further compounded by small sample sizes, which make meaningful analysis at lower granularity unviable.

We know that broad categories like Black or Asian hide hugely different outcomes between different sub-groups and can therefore be very misleading. This is pertinent in the crime and policing chapter where there are inconsistencies in the ethnicity categories being used. For example, where the most recent stop and search data provides a breakdown of the 2011 Census 18+1 detailed ethnicity categories, many other data sets do not - instead providing either broad categories such as 'Black' and 'Asian' or Census 2001 16+1 detailed ethnicity categories. One of the main differences between the 2001 and 2011 Census ethnic categories is the Chinese ethnic group

moved from the 'Other' ethnic group (in 2001) to the 'Asian' ethnic group (in 2011). This poses challenges in comparing disparities across different datasets, and when using broad groups only, it can hide differences between ethnic groups that fall within a broader category. So, we would urge public authorities, where practical, to use the most disaggregated categories possible.

The Race Disparity Unit (RDU) has added clarity and transparency to these debates by pulling much of the ethnicity data onto one official website, but too much of the RDU data is still, through no fault of its own, provided only in the big 5 categories.^[footnote 68]

The ONS has its own processes for determining which new categories should be included in the Census but 2 categories that could in future be helpfully sub-divided are White Other which does not distinguish between West Europeans and East Europeans, and Black African which does not distinguish between sub-Saharan African people in general and Somalis who are now a substantial group in their own right.

Then there is the broader issue of the way data is presented. We should, where possible, be reporting net disparities not gross disparities. So, for example, most ethnic minority groups are on average younger and more likely to live in inner city areas than the White population, and because crime is disproportionately committed by young people and people in big cities this needs to be adjusted for when looking at the raw data on crime.

This would use a regression analysis - meaning adjusting for relevant factors to get a more realistic comparison on a like for like basis. This is used by the ONS, for example, in its analysis of pay and wealth by ethnicity.

There is also the issue of relevant benchmarks for ethnic minority representation. The general population benchmark often presents a more negative picture of minority achievement than is justified. Different groups have different histories, periods of residence in the country, class and educational backgrounds, average ages, so there are many reasons, apart from discrimination, why you would not expect that representation in a given profession, say, should match a group's share of the general population. This is especially the case for representation in elite jobs. Around 16 per cent of the UK population belong to ethnic minorities.^[footnote 69]

We would also ask for a more responsible use of statistics in general in the sometimes emotional field of race and ethnicity. The reporting of hate crime figures, which is touched on more than once in the report, should, for example, make clear that recent increases are in incidents reported to the police and more reliable national survey evidence suggests that actual hate crime incidents are falling.

It is worth considering whether a set of ethnicity data standards might be useful to raise standards along the lines described above for all organisations in receipt of public money.

The Commission agrees with advice provided by the RDU in that when reliable data for the full, harmonised set of classifications is not available, then the 5 aggregated groups can be used. It is further agreed that users should note the limitations of the analysis, in particular that data for an aggregated group (the Black group, for example) can mask differences in outcomes for detailed ethnic groups (the Black Caribbean and Black African groups, for example). Users should avoid, unless it is absolutely necessary, binary analysis for example comparing White and 'Other than White' because of the lack of analytical value this gives.

Furthermore, if it is possible to show data for some of the detailed groups, then the RDU encourages consideration of this, a suggestion that the Commission also supports, noting that every level of disaggregation adds analytical value providing that it remains possible to draw meaningful comparisons.

Recommendation 24: Achieve inclusivity - Disaggregate the term 'BAME'

The Commission recommends that the government move away from the use of the term 'BAME', to better focus on understanding disparities and outcomes for specific ethnic groups. This recommendation is further linked to that relating to data, with the related quality improvement plans and actions necessary to make this move under a data standard or charter.

A fundamental aspect of the data standard or charter will be the harmonisation of ethnicity categories in government departments and other organisations at the most detailed level, and should be promoted for use in analyses across organisations.

Recommendation 23: Achieve inclusivity - Use data in a responsible and informed way

The RDU should work with the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and the Office for Statistics Regulation (OSR) to develop and publish a set of ethnicity data standards, building on the existing Government Data Quality Framework and the Code of Practice for Statistics. Monitoring compliance against the Standards, for example through the OSR's programme of regulatory reviews, will improve the way that data on ethnicity is assessed to be fit for purpose.

The RDU should work with the OSR, DCMS and the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) to apply the ethnicity data standard across all media and public communications channels.

Fixing the problem for everyone

Finally, a word on our approach to policy solutions. In the past, the analyses of racial disparities have tended to follow a 3-part formula:

- binary White and BAME distinction
- the idea that all racial and ethnic disparities are negative
- the idea that policy formulation should be focussed on targeting aspects of minority disadvantage

However, as previously noted, we think that, with some exceptions, the best and fairest way to address disparities is to make improvements that will benefit everyone, targeting interventions based on need, not ethnicity.

If not enough young Black people are getting the professional jobs they expected after graduating, then we need to examine the subjects they are studying and the careers advice they are receiving. If you improve the careers service for everyone then all groups will benefit. This approach is not only seen to be fair, it would be more effective than diversity training for teachers.

Similarly, if diversity and inclusion training is only focused on White discrimination this risks alienating the very people whose behaviour may need to change. The Commission wants inclusive workplaces, but training which focuses narrowly on behaviour around race can run counter to that. Far better to focus on the biases, nepotism, in-group favouritism and motivated reasoning that people of all races are susceptible to. The Commission does, however, recognise the role that diversity and inclusion training has had in moving the dial and creating a space for conversations in organisations to redress actual and perceived discrimination. It is important to build on this, whilst focusing on interventions that produce concrete outcomes.

The model for this 'aim at everyone' approach is spelled out in a paper 'Diversity is Important. Diversity-Related Training is Terrible' by Musa al-Gharbi.^[footnote 70] Diversity training, according to al-Gharbi, should not be focused on avoiding and policing misunderstandings or conflict, but on helping people build relationships and collaborate despite inevitable disagreements, and on leveraging divergent perspectives in order to advance collective goals.

The same might be said for the UK's entire race conversation.

In that vein, this report takes an 'optimisation' rather than a 'maximisation' approach to group inequality. That is, rather than judging success by how far society can maximise minority outcomes - even at the expense of discriminating against majorities - it moves to a balanced outlook that seeks to optimise outcomes across all groups and dimensions in society. This also means that an open climate of debate must be encouraged in which it is as legitimate to question explanations based on discrimination as it is to make them.

In a sporting match, we care about penalties, but we also care about referees who call too many fouls or players who claim they have been fouled when they have not been.

Equalities policy has traditionally focused on giving additional help to historically marginalised groups. This made sense when ethnic minorities were heavily disadvantaged in all spheres and virtually all prejudice came from White people. Yet times have changed, and the picture, as we show, is now more complex. Some ethnic minority groups are doing better on average than White people. Discrimination in favour of one group, as with the use of quotas, would mean discrimination against other groups. It is hard to see how this would foster a more unified and fair society that all groups could trust.

Meanwhile, new innovations like name-blind CVs, using more diverse recruitment channels to identify candidates for jobs, or family-friendly policies that enable more labour market participation for more ethnic minority women could make a practical difference that does not disadvantage any group.

Another way of looking at the idea of fixing the problem for everyone, is to look at ethnic minority 'participation' in employment, health trials or top universities as the barometer for wider policies of fairness. Put simply, if we are getting it right for marginalised groups then we are getting it right for the majority.

One of the best examples of this has been the policy changes that have impacted comprehensive schools, since the introduction of academies and schools becoming more self-managed entities. The pressure for this change came from the poor performance of London education authorities like Hackney and Southwark, where Black students were underachieving at record levels. These boroughs led the successful pilots of Academies, like Mossbourne school in Hackney, and so became the flagship for a wider UK take up. We can see the same kind of change happening in the police force as a result of The Macpherson Report. The message is clear: the ethnic minority experience is part of the whole, what works for a Black boy in Brixton will work for a White girl in Barnsley.

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Summary of recommendations

This report makes 24 recommendations. These are grouped into 4 broad themes:

- build trust
- promote fairness
- create agency
- achieve inclusivity

They cover the aspects of change that the Commission believes will catalyse the most effective way to meaningfully address disparities and inequalities for all those affected.

Build trust

Recommendation 1: Challenge racist and discriminatory actions

Fund the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) to use its compliance, enforcement and litigation enforcement powers to challenge policies or practices that either cause significant and unjust racial disadvantage, or arise from racial discrimination.

Separately, the government should consider the complex issue of online abuse as a public policy priority.

Recommendation 2: Review the Care Quality Commission's (CQC) inspection process

Review the CQC's approach to including disparities in the experiences, progression and disciplinary actions taken against ethnic minority staff in their inspections of healthcare providers.

Recommendation 3: Improve the transparency and use of artificial intelligence

Issue guidance that clarifies how to apply the Equality Act to algorithmic decision-making and require transparency for public sector bodies when such is applied to decision making concerning individuals.

Recommendation 4: Bridge divides and create partnerships between the police and communities

Develop a minimum standard framework for independently-chaired community 'Safeguarding Trust' groups that scrutinise and problem-solve alongside policing, and independently inspect forces against this minimum standard.

Recommendation 5: Improve training to provide police officers with practical skills to interact with communities

Develop a strategy to improve the efficacy and implementation of stop and search, and de-escalation training ensuring a consistent approach is taken by all police force areas.

Promote fairness

Recommendation 6: Replicate the factors of educational success for all communities

Invest in meaningful and substantial research to understand and replicate the underlying factors that drive success of high performing groups.

Recommendation 7: Invest in proven interventions through better targeted funding

Systematically target disparities in education outcomes between disadvantaged pupils and their peers through funding, considering geographical variation, ethnicity, gender and socio-economic status.

Recommendation 8: Advance fairness in the workplace

Develop resources and evidence-based approaches of what works to advance fairness in the workplace, and which are readily available to employers.

Recommendation 9: Investigate what causes existing ethnic pay disparities

Require publication of a diagnosis and action plan for organisations who choose to publish ethnicity pay figures. These should set out the reasons why any disparities exist and what will be done to address them.

Recommendation 10: Improve understanding of the ethnicity pay gap in NHS England

Undertake a strategic review of the causes of disparate pay across NHS England and spell out the measures that might meaningfully address any disparities.

Recommendation 11: Establish an Office for Health Disparities

Establish a new office to properly target health disparities in the UK, focusing on research, communications and expertise to reduce health inequalities across all groups.

Recommendation 12: Prevent harm, reduce crime and divert young people away from the criminal justice system

Develop an evidence-based pilot that diverts offences of low-level Class B drug possession into public health services.

Recommendation 13: Build social and cultural capital - enrichment for all

Phase in an extended school day prioritising disadvantaged areas to provide pupils with the opportunity to engage in physical and cultural activities that enrich lives and build social and cultural capital.

Recommendation 14: Increase legitimacy and accountability of stop and search through body-worn video

Increased scrutiny of body-worn video footage of stop and search encounters, with senior officer involvement required in cases where interactions are of concern and need improvement.

Create agency

Recommendation 15: Empower pupils to make more informed choices to fulfil their future potential

Issue guidance to higher education institutions to help reduce disparities in applications at an earlier stage and monitored for effectiveness.

Recommendation 16: Open up access to apprenticeships

Create a targeted apprenticeships campaign to inform young people facing discrimination or disadvantage of the full range of career pathways open to them and encourage them to take up apprenticeships in growth sectors.

Recommendation 17: Encourage innovation

Pilot a new enterprise programme to nurture talent and encourage innovation, targeted at aspiring entrepreneurs from underrepresented and low-income backgrounds across the UK.

Recommendation 18: Improve safety and support for children at risk

Develop a digital solution to signpost and refer children and young people at risk of, or already experiencing criminal exploitation, to local organisations who can provide support.

Recommendation 19: Undertake a 'support for families' review

Undertake a review to investigate and take action to address the underlying issues facing families. This Commission has identified this as a significant contributing factor to the experience of disparities.

Achieve inclusivity

Recommendation 20: Making of modern Britain: teaching an inclusive curriculum

Produce high-quality teaching resources, through independent experts, to tell the multiple, nuanced stories of the contributions made by different groups that have made this country the one it is today.

Recommendation 21: Create police workforces that represent the communities they serve

Introduce a local residency requirement for recruitment to each police force area, with the College of Policing developing guidance to support implementation.

Recommendation 22: Equip the police service to serve the needs of their local communities

Design and evaluate recruitment pilots that match candidates' life skills with the needs of the communities they serve in their local areas.

Recommendation 23: Use data in a responsible and informed way

Develop and publish a set of ethnicity data standards to improve understanding and information gathering, reducing the opportunity for misunderstanding and misuse.

Recommendation 24: Disaggregate the term 'BAME'

Stop using aggregated and unhelpful terms such as 'BAME', to better focus on understanding disparities and outcomes for specific ethnic groups.

Education and training

Summary

Education is the single most emphatic success story of the British ethnic minority experience. Over the last half century, new arrivals to Britain have seized on the opportunities afforded by the state school system and access to university. The story for some ethnic groups has been one of remarkable social mobility, outperforming the national average and enabling them to attain success at the highest levels within a generation. Conversely, other groups experience lower than average educational outcomes which can have a significant impact on employment rates, earnings and general wellbeing. It is important to understand why these disparities arise and what can be done to reduce them.

As already noted, the Commission found the BAME acronym unhelpfully masking a complex picture, obscuring the different educational outcomes amongst different ethnic minority groups. Statistics which present collective BAME achievement in contrast to White achievement are largely redundant in helping to explain success or failure.

The picture of educational achievement across ethnic groups is complex, and different social, economic and cultural factors contribute to this: parental income levels, parental career and educational achievement, geography, family structure, and attitudes towards education within the family and wider community.

What is clear, however, is that strong early years support, good schools and evidence-based interventions can also improve educational outcomes across all groups and partly overcome other factors. Additionally, according to many respondents to our call for evidence, it is clear that all pupils should be equipped with a wider understanding of the UK which encompasses the contributions made by different groups, cultures and regions.

Taking the threshold of strong GCSE passes in English and maths, the White British group ranks 10th in attainment.^[footnote 1] The Chinese and Indian ethnic groups outperform the White British group on this measure by wide margins. New evidence indicates that attainment is closely related to socio-economic status - once this is controlled for, all major ethnic groups perform better than White British pupils except for Black Caribbean pupils (with the Pakistani ethnic group at about the same level).^[footnote 2]

A higher percentage of ethnic minority young people attend university compared with White British young people, but the latter have the best outcomes at top universities. This is partly a selection effect thanks to a smaller, and better qualified, percentage of White British young people going to university compared with other ethnicities. Of the main ethnic groups, the Black Caribbean group is the least likely to attend university after the White British group, while the Chinese and Indian ethnic groups are mostly likely.^[footnote 3]

Too many people are dropping out of university or not getting graduate jobs several years after graduating. Better guidance is needed on course selection and we need to promote a wider range of attractive and rewarding alternatives to higher education.

Raising the status of technical and vocational education, providing more school-leaver apprenticeships and offering second chances for those who do not get on the academic ladder at 16, or who fall off it at or after university, is not only a key social support net but also essential for providing the vocational skills of the future. They can provide alternative routes to success for all ethnicities. The Commission acknowledges the impact that COVID-19 will have on widening educational disparities and the efforts underway from the government, schools, pupils and education practitioners to counteract this. Despite their best efforts, we know the educational impact of COVID-19 is significant. In the Education Policy Institute's (EPI) annual report in 2020 they stated that the attainment gap between disadvantaged pupils and their peers had stopped closing for the first time in a decade. [\[footnote 4\]](#) The disruption school closure has caused in learning will require a sustained effort throughout children's remaining school years to repair. This chapter will establish the necessary action to tackle existing educational disparities and will set out the agenda for change to ensure all pupils have the opportunity to reach their full potential.

The journey of the child

Patterns in educational and social attainment by ethnic groups vary throughout the journey through schooling:

- at early years, the White British group ranks joint 5th out of 18 ethnic groups alongside Mixed Other ethnic groups by the percentage of 4 to 5 year olds meeting expected development standards [\[footnote 5\]](#)
- at key stage 2, the White British group ranks 10th [\[footnote 6\]](#)
- at GCSE, the White British group ranks 10th in attainment (gaining a strong pass in English and Maths), closely following Black African and Other ethnic groups [\[footnote 7\]](#)
- at A level, the White British group ranks 8th in the percentage of 18 year olds attaining at least 3 A grades [\[footnote 8\]](#)
- attainment is highest for the Chinese and Indian ethnic groups up to and including A levels, while it is lowest among the White Gypsy and Roma and Irish Traveller groups

Figure 1: Percentage of pupils meeting attainment goals in early years, key stage 2, GCSEs and A levels, by ethnicity (18 ethnic groups)




Figure 2: Percentage of pupils meeting attainment goals in early years, key stage 2, GCSEs, A levels and degree, by ethnicity (5 aggregated ethnic groups)




Table 1: Percentage reaching attainment thresholds by ethnic group, 2018 to 2019 school year

	4 to 5 year olds meeting expected development standards (%)	10 to 11 year olds meeting expected standard, reading, writing, and maths (%)	16 year olds getting a strong pass (grade 5 or higher) in GCSE English and maths (%)	18 year olds getting at least 3 As at A level (%)
Chinese	76 (3)	80 (3)	76.3 (2)	25.7 (1)
Indian	78 (20)	77 (19)	64.1 (15)	15.5 (8)
Asian Other	69 (11)	71 (12)	60.1 (9)	11.8 (5)
Mixed White and Asian	75 (10)	73 (9)	55.5 (6)	15.3 (3)
White Irish	74 (2)	73 (2)	54.9 (2)	13.8 (1)
Bangladeshi	67 (10)	70 (11)	50.3 (10)	7.8 (4)
Mixed Other	73 (16)	68 (14)	47 (10)	11.8 (4)
Other	63 (12)	61 (13)	43.4 (10)	10.2 (4)
All	71 (639)	65 (644)	43.2 (543)	13 (218)

Black African	68 (21)	67 (26)	42.9 (20)	6.1 (8)
White British	73 (410)	65 (426)	42.5 (375)	11 (122)
Mixed White and Black African	71 (6)	67 (5)	41.5 (3)	8.3 (1)
White Other	66 (45)	63 (43)	41.5 (28)	11.5 (10)
Pakistani	64 (27)	62 (29)	41.3 (24)	7.3 (8)
Black Other	66 (4)	60 (5)	33.7 (4)	5.4 (1)
Mixed White and Black Caribbean	69 (10)	59 (10)	31 (8)	6.2 (2)
Black Caribbean	68 (5)	56 (7)	26.5 (7)	3.4 (2)
Irish Traveller	39 (0.7)	26 (0.5)	13.9 (0.2)	0 (<0.1)
Gypsy and Roma	34 (2)	19 (2)	6 (1)	0 (<0.1)

Note: Publication of GCSE attainment in the 2019 to 2020 school year was cancelled due to COVID-19. Table ranked by GCSE attainment (number in cohort, thousands). Source: Ethnicity facts and figures.

Early years and primary education

Early years and primary school provide a foundation for the rest of a child's life. On average, 40% of the overall development gap between disadvantaged 16 year olds, using eligibility for free school meals (FSM) as the measure, and their peers emerges by the age of 5.[\[footnote 9\]](#) By 16 years old, disadvantaged children are 18 months behind their peers.[\[footnote 10\]](#) In 2018, 18% of school leavers left education at age 18 without reaching Level 2 attainment, with poor children twice as likely to do so.[\[footnote 11\]](#) These attainment gaps form early on and tend to widen throughout the course of a child's life. This widening matters as success in education at 16 years old is strongly predictive of later occupational, economic, health and well-being outcomes and to future social mobility.

The evidence on early years points to 3 major sources of disparity that runs throughout this report: family, geography and poverty. A child who is doing less well at 5 years old is nearly twice as likely to end up being excluded by the end of primary school, even after adjusting for socio-economic status and other factors.[\[footnote 12\]](#)

Between 2007 and 2016, the gap between disadvantaged students and their peers by the end of primary school narrowed by 2.8 months, and the gap by age 5 narrowed by 1.2 months. It is estimated that at these rates it would take around 50 years for the disadvantage gap to close completely by the time pupils take their GCSEs.[\[footnote 13\]](#)

The former Children's Commissioner, Anne Longfield OBE, explains:

Last year 71% of 5 year olds were at the expected level of development for all those goals, which means that 29% were not - and this rises to 45% of children who are eligible for Free School Meals (FSM).[\[footnote 14\]](#) In total, that means there are 185,000 children each year who are not starting school ready to learn. There is significant regional disparity in the development levels of young children eligible for FSM; our research has found that a child qualifying for FSM in London is 30% more likely to be at the expected standard at the end of reception than a child in the Leeds City Region, Greater Manchester or in Merseyside.

There are significant differences between ethnic groups, with 34% of 5 year olds from Gypsy and Roma ethnic groups meeting the expected standard in development, followed by the Other ethnic group (63%) and children from the Pakistani ethnic group at 64%. The groups with the highest percentage of children meeting the expected standard are the Indian ethnic group (78%) and the Chinese ethnic group (76%).[\[footnote 15\]](#)

There is a large gulf between pupils eligible for FSM (55%) and the rest (73%). Typically, the biggest gap between FSM and non-FSM pupils within an ethnic group is among White Irish pupils (49% and 78%), with White British pupils close behind (53% and 76%).[\[footnote 16\]](#)

Taking into account the evidence, the Commission recognises the need for change in early years provision and reiterates that all 7 recommendations from the Children's Commissioner report, 'Best Beginnings in the early years report' (July 2020) should be enacted by the government.

The evidence on early years highlights the significant role that family and parental background have on the attainment gap. A research report, based on data from the Second Longitudinal Study of Young People in England, showed there are differences in attainment by family composition, although these are not broken down by ethnicity.[\[footnote 17\]](#) Without controlling for other factors, young people living with one parent (either in a single parent household or with an additional step parent)[\[footnote 18\]](#) achieved lower average scores at key stage 4 in 2015 than those living with both parents. However, once other factors such as deprivation were controlled for, this difference became negligible. The evidence suggests that although school interventions may be easier to deliver than those targeted at home, the relative contribution of schools is smaller than that of parental, family and student factors.[\[footnote 19\]](#) The contribution of parents to supporting a child's learning is significant and a stable home provides a supportive context for children to complete homework, ask for assistance and develop their confidence and wellbeing. There are many types of family units which can provide this type of support, but key is the need for stability and resilience.

The former Children's Commissioner, Anne Longfield OBE, reiterated in her report 5 essential measures for a supportive family environment:[\[footnote 20\]](#)

- loving, nurturing relationships with parents and carers
- a safe home free from stress and adversity
- the right help to develop good language and other cognitive skills
- support to manage behaviour and regulate emotions
- good physical and mental health and access to healthcare

The Commission acknowledges the need for more imaginative support for families: investing in community support, expanding Family Hubs and providing services to improve family resilience[\[footnote 21\]](#) and good parenting.[\[footnote 22\]](#)

Secondary education

In 2019, the average GCSE Attainment 8 score for Black Caribbean (39.4) and Mixed White and Black Caribbean (41.0) pupils was over 5 points lower than the average for White British pupils (46.2), or over half a grade lower in each of the 8 subjects included.[\[footnote 23\]](#) At the same time, the average scores for Indian, Pakistani, and Black African pupils were above the White British average.[\[footnote 24\]](#)

In terms of the percentage of students achieving a strong pass in Maths and English at GCSE, the White British group ranks 10th in attainment, closely following Black African and Other ethnic groups.[\[footnote 25\]](#)

These statistics illustrate the limitations of the term BAME when examining educational outcomes, and challenge the perception that children from all ethnic minority groups are equally disadvantaged in the education system.

Ethnic minority achievement is a more complex picture than is often realised. In light of this, the Commission looked at other factors that might be able to explain differences in attainment.

Professor Steve Strand's analysis for the Commission of the Second Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE2) has provided valuable insights into attainment in relation to ethnicity, socio-economic status, and sex.[\[footnote 26\]](#) His analysis of this nationally representative sample of students who took their GCSE exams in 2015 show the remaining ethnic disparities in attainment once differences in socio-economic status are taken into account.

The purpose in taking the socio-economic factors into account is not to 'explain away' any ethnic achievement gaps, but to better understand the root causes and therefore identify relevant policy interventions and action. (Strand, 2021)

Levels of socio-economic disadvantage are higher among some minority groups than the White British ethnic group. In England in 2016, 14% of White British pupils were eligible for FSM. This rose to 19% of Pakistani, 23% of Bangladeshi, and 25% of Black African pupils, and doubled to 29% of Mixed White and Black Caribbean, and 28% of Black Caribbean pupils.[\[footnote 27\]](#)

Coming from a struggling, low income family has an influence on life chances, both directly and indirectly. For example, those in low income households may face an increased risk of health and developmental problems, limited financial resources in the home, low parental education, reduced ability to help with homework and remote learning, and other stresses such as higher crime rates in more deprived neighbourhoods.[\[footnote 28\]](#)

Strand's paper combines 3 factors - family income, parental education level and parental occupational status - to attain a socio-economic status score. The variation in attainment by these individual factors can be seen in Table 2, which also shows the differences by sex and ethnic group for the sample of students sitting their GCSE exams in 2015. For example, the gap in the percentage of students attaining a strong pass in GCSE English and Maths between children of parents with no qualifications (35.1%) and of those with a degree (73.5%), is much larger than the gap between the highest performing ethnic group (Indian, 72.1%) and the lowest (Black Caribbean, and Mixed White and Black Caribbean, 49.7%). [\[footnote 29\]](#)

On the combined socio-economic status measure, the White British, Indian, and Asian Other ethnic groups had mean socio-economic scores above average. Black Caribbean, Black African and White Other ethnic groups were closely grouped just below the average. The Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups had the lowest average socio-economic status by some way.

Table 2: Key stage 4 results by ethnicity, sex and parental socio-economic classification from Professor Strand's submission

#Variable	Value	Group sample size	Best 8 score (Mean)	Level 2 English and maths %
Ethnic group (aggregated) White		7,534	0.05	59.8
Ethnic group (aggregated) Mixed		413	0.09	59.9
Ethnic group (aggregated) Asian		937	0.20	62.5
Black		743	-0.06	55.0
Ethnic group (aggregated) Other		77	0.02	58.7
Ethnic group White British		7,250	0.05	59.8
Ethnic group White Other		284	0.15	59.2
Ethnic group Black Caribbean and Mixed White and Black Caribbean		438	-0.24	49.7
Ethnic group Black African and Mixed White and Black African		489	0.06	60.6
Ethnic group Indian		221	0.42	72.1
Ethnic group Pakistani		337	-0.07	53.9
Ethnic group Bangladeshi		230	0.13	61.1
Ethnic group Other Asian and Mixed White and Asian		254	0.40	64.4
Ethnic group Any other group		201	0.08	59.5
Sex Boy		4,851	-0.08	54.7
Sex Girl		4,853	0.21	65.2
SEC3 LTU, Routine and Semi-routine		2,658	-0.43	42.1
SEC3 Intermediate		2,832	-0.07	55.7
SEC3 Managerial and Professional		4,181	0.38	70.9
Parent education No qualifications		819	-0.60	35.1
Parent education Other qualifications		145	-0.42	42.6
Parent education Some GCSE passes or equiv.		1,536	-0.33	45.8
Parent education 5+ GCSEs at A*-C or equiv.		1,670	-0.19	52.7
Parent education A/AS levels or equiv.		1,384	0.02	60.8
Parent education HE below degree (e.g. HND)		1,489	0.14	65.1
Parent education Degree (for example, BA, BSc, MA)		2,634	0.54	73.5
Family income Lowest 20%		1,846	-0.41	42.9
Family income next 20%		1,684	-0.27	48.2
Family income Middle 20%		1,912	-0.11	56.5
Family income next 20%		1,998	0.17	65.5
Family income Highest 20%		2,263	0.52	73.0
All pupils		9,704	0.06	61.8

Tables 3 and 4 summarise the headline results from Strand's findings, looking at socio-economic status, sex and ethnicity.

Table 3 compares the mean Best 8 scores [\[footnote 30\]](#) for all combinations of ethnic groups, socio-economic status, and sex. Overall, the 2 lowest achieving groups were Black Caribbean and White British boys of low socio-economic status, and girls from these 2 groups were also the lowest achieving groups of girls. Pakistani boys and White Other boys from low socio-economic backgrounds also had below average scores.

Although Gypsy and Roma and Irish Traveller groups were not included as separate ethnic groups in this analysis due to their small sample size, we know that they are frequent outliers in attainment. In 2018 to 2019, the average Attainment 8 score for students from the Gypsy and Roma Traveller ethnic group was 19.1, while for the Irish Traveller group it was 26.6, compared with 46.2 for the White British group. [\[footnote 31\]](#)

Table 3: Mean Best 8 score by ethnic group, socio-economic status and sex compared with the mean for all pupils

Sex	Ethnic group	Socio-economic status: low (-1SD)	Socio-economic status: average	Socio-economic status: high (+1SD)
Boys	Black Caribbean, and Mixed White and Black Caribbean	-0.77	-0.41	-0.06
Boys	White British	-0.68	-0.22	0.24
Boys	Any other ethnic group	-0.36	-0.08	0.21
Boys	Black African, and Mixed White and Black African	-0.08	-0.03	0.03
Boys	Pakistani	-0.44	0.12	0.68
Boys	White Other	-0.35	0.06	0.46
Boys	Asian Other, and Mixed White and Asian	-0.11	0.2	0.51
Boys	Indian	0.03	0.18	0.33
Boys	Bangladeshi	0.07	0.25	0.45
Girls	Black Caribbean, and Mixed White and Black Caribbean	-0.54	0.01	0.56
Girls	White British	-0.39	0.09	0.58

Girls Any other ethnic group	-0.12	0.30	0.71
Girls Black African, and Mixed White and Black African	0.12	0.27	0.43
Girls Pakistani	-0.04	0.16	0.36
Girls White Other	-0.20	0.33	0.86
Girls Asian Other, and Mixed White and Asian	0.17	0.49	0.81
Girls Indian	0.18	0.60	1.01
Girls Bangladeshi	0.23	0.62	1.00

Notes: (a) Mean Best 8 score: These figures show the difference between the mean score for the group and the grand mean score across all pupils (which is set to 0). Ethnic groups are sorted in order of the mean Best8 score for pupils of average SES.

Strand also compares groups by ethnicity and socio-economic status to the White British average of the same sex and socio-economic status, and finds the following headline result:

Overall, pupils from ethnic minorities perform better than White British pupils when accounting for socio-economic status.

Table 4: Mean Best 8 score compared with the mean for White British pupils, by ethnic group, socio-economic status and sex

Sex	Ethnic group	Socio-economic status: low (-1SD)	Socio-economic status: average	Socio-economic status: high (+1SD)
Boys	Black Caribbean, and Mixed White and Black Caribbean	-0.09	-0.19	-0.30
Boys	White British	-	-	-
Boys	Any other ethnic group	0.32	0.15	-0.03
Boys	Black African, and Mixed White and Black African	0.60	0.19	-0.21
Boys	Pakistani	0.23	0.34	0.45
Boys	White Other	0.33	0.28	0.22
Boys	Asian Other, and Mixed White and Asian	0.57	0.42	0.27
Boys	Indian	0.70	0.40	0.10
Boys	Bangladeshi	0.75	0.47	0.21
Girls	Black Caribbean, and Mixed White and Black Caribbean	-0.15	-0.09	-0.02
Girls	White British	-	-	-
Girls	Any other ethnic group	0.27	0.20	0.13
Girls	Black African, and Mixed White and Black African	0.52	0.18	-0.15
Girls	Pakistani	0.35	0.07	-0.22
Girls	White Other	0.19	0.24	0.29
Girls	Asian Other, and Mixed White and Asian	0.56	0.40	0.23
Girls	Indian	0.58	0.51	0.43
Girls	Bangladeshi	0.63	0.53	0.42

Notes: These figures show the difference in the mean score between the ethnic minority and White British students of the same sex and SES. Ethnic groups are sorted in order of the mean Best8 score for pupils of average SES.

There are only 2 exceptions to this rule: Black boys of high socio-economic status, and Pakistani girls of high socio-economic status. Both of these groups have significantly lower achievement than White British pupils of the same socio-economic background and sex. Strand's discussion of potential causes of these differences can be found in his report, published as an additional paper.

These educational benchmarks should be shared with educational practitioners to ensure they are helping every child to reach their potential.

Understanding disparities

What leads to success for some groups, and not for others? Professor Strand discusses the possible reasons for the success of some ethnic minority groups in his submission to the Commission, referencing the theory of the 'immigrant paradigm'.

The 'immigrant paradigm' (Kao and Thompson, 2003) suggests that recent immigrants devote themselves more to education than the native population because they lack financial capital and see education as a way out of poverty. [\[footnote 32\]](#)

(Professor Steve Strand, University of Oxford, 2021)

This theory may account for the differences in attainment between Black pupils of Caribbean heritage and Black pupils of African heritage, despite similar levels of risk in terms of low socio-economic status, neighbourhood deprivation, prejudice, and poverty. The theory has been shown as responsible for better progression rates for ethnic minorities into post-compulsory education in England. [\[footnote 33\]](#)

Most Black Caribbean, and Mixed White and Black Caribbean, pupils are third generation UK born, while many Black African pupils are more recent immigrants. The 2011 national population Census indicates that two-thirds of the Black African population were born outside of the UK, compared with 39.8% of the Black Caribbean population. [\[footnote 34\]](#) Those from the Black Caribbean ethnic group are from one of the longer-standing migrant groups in the UK, many from the Windrush generation arriving in the 1950s and early 1960s. It is suggested that minorities who have been long established in a country, particularly in a context of racial and socio-economic disadvantage, may be the least likely to be optimistic about the possibilities of social mobility and education to transform their lives. [\[footnote 35\]](#)

Although Indian and Pakistani migration was also high during the 1950s and 1960s, Strand suggests that 'selective assimilation theory' can explain why their attainment does not mirror the Black Caribbean and Mixed White and Black Caribbean group.

While Black Caribbean migrants in the 1960s predominantly moved into poor urban and inner city areas populated by the White British working class, Pakistani and Indian migrants of the same period had different patterns of migration. Indian migrants were more likely to be of high socio-economic status in their countries or origin, and migrated to a more diverse selection of geographical areas. Other groups such as Pakistani migrants, while tending to move predominantly to poor areas of inner cities where housing was cheap (like the Black Caribbean group), tended to have higher levels of ethnic segregation, retaining greater cultural homogeneity.

These findings demonstrate there is a 'newcomer optimism' at play, which suggests it is not just the immigrant status that is responsible for the relative success of Black African groups.

It is also important to highlight the lack of optimism seen in Black Caribbean and low socio-economic status White British groups is largely due to their circumstances and context of disadvantage - and that education initiatives need to focus on how to improve the motivation around education for these groups.

Despite the success of Black pupils of African heritage in the school system, some educationalists who gave evidence to the Commission argued that schools, teachers and the curriculum may display racial biases which can impact on students and their motivation to learn.

A large part of this depends on the underlying bias of teachers and those entrusted with delivering education to these children. If they do not challenge themselves to believe every child has the potential to be great, this comes across in how they teach, assess and grade the children, which also has a direct impact on how the children see themselves and view their own abilities. This has to be a concerted effort to challenge the possibility of teachers exhibiting unconscious bias in dealing with children from backgrounds different to their own, and being able to recognise and correct this.

(call for evidence respondent)

It is very difficult to judge on a national level the extent to which racism could be a determining factor in educational outcomes amongst ethnic minority groups. However, the fact that ethnic groups within the same system can have quite divergent educational outcomes, and that even within the major ethnic groups there are quite distinct trends, suggests that other factors may be more influential. Indeed, if there is racial bias within schools or the teaching profession, it has limited effect and other factors such as family structure, cultural aspirations and geography may offset this disadvantage.

Other research indicates that a range of factors outside of the school day can influence success in education, including pupils' educational aspirations, parents' educational aspirations for their child, pupils' academic self-concept (their perception about their own ability) and frequency of completing homework. [\[footnote 36\]](#) Previous research from Steve Strand has found that Indian students are the ethnic group most likely to complete homework five evenings a week (32% vs. 19% White British). [\[footnote 37\]](#)

A study by Strand and Joe Winston looking into the educational aspirations of 12 to 14 year olds in inner city comprehensive schools found that Black African, Asian Other and Pakistani children expressed higher aspirations than White British children in the study, who expressed the lowest aspirations. [\[footnote 38\]](#) According to Strand and Winston, the lower educational aspirations of White British pupils are tied to a lack of academic self-belief and low educational aspirations in the home. In addition, White parents were less likely to have paid for private tuition for their children compared to Asian and Black parents. 25% of White pupils had private tuition outside of school compared to 56% and 42% of Asian and Black pupils respectively. [\[footnote 39\]](#)

As we have seen, not all ethnic minority groups are succeeding. In particular, the Commission acknowledges the need to support Black Caribbean, Mixed White and Black Caribbean, Traveller of Irish Heritage, Gypsy and Roma, and Pakistani boys from low socio-economic backgrounds, and lower socio-economic status White British pupils. Nevertheless the level of success experienced by many ethnic minorities in the UK is outstanding and should be recognised as such.

Recommendation 6: Promote fairness - Replicate the factors of educational success for all communities

To this end, the Commission recommends that the government invests in research to understand what factors drive the success of high performing pupils' communities including Black African, Chinese, Bangladeshi and Indian ethnic groups, and how it can be replicated to support all pupils.

Geography is also an important factor. In some parts of the country, poorer pupils are over 2 full years of education behind their peers by the time they take their GCSEs, including in almost exclusively White places like Blackpool (26.3 months), Knowsley (24.7 months) and Plymouth (24.5 months). [\[footnote 40\]](#)

In contrast, there are very low GCSE disadvantage gaps concentrated in London, including in Ealing (4.6 months), Redbridge (2.7 months) and Westminster (0.5 months), all of which have high levels of ethnic minority representation. For White pupils on free school meals in London, the entry rate to university is now nearly 9 percentage points higher than any other region. [\[footnote 41\]](#) Progression to high tariff universities is also higher in London than other regions, for free school meal children as well as non-free school meal children. [\[footnote 42\]](#)

Yet despite these many positive developments, the attainment gap between disadvantaged pupils and their peers has stopped closing for the first time in a decade. [\[footnote 43\]](#) As already highlighted, according to the Education Policy Institute disadvantaged pupils in England are now 18.1 months of learning behind their peers by the time they finish their GCSEs, the same gap as 5 years ago. [\[footnote 44\]](#) The national gap in primary school attainment increased for the first time since 2007, which may signal that the gap is set to widen in the future. The next section looks at various ideas for closing the gap.

Is the UK the same as the USA when it comes to attainment and ethnicity?

In short: no. In terms of the difference in attainment between Black pupils and White pupils, Strand finds the mean Best 8 score [\[footnote 45\]](#) was 0.05 for White students and -0.06 for Black students, giving a difference of -0.11 standard deviations. This gap is statistically significant but small (approximately the difference between one grade in one subject). [\[footnote 46\]](#)

These results indicate an attainment gap approximately 8 times smaller than that found in the US. In the 2017 National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), Black students scored -0.81, -0.83 and -0.89 standard deviations below the mean for White students in maths at age 10, 14 and 18 respectively. They also scored approximately -0.72 standard deviations below the mean average for White students for reading at the same ages. [\[footnote 47\]](#)

Issues of race disparity in attainment from the USA can not be presumed to be identical in the UK.

Closing the gap

This section will consider further explanations for the outcome gaps alongside the main ones pinpointed already (family and culture, geography and socio-economic status), and proposals to narrow them.

Whilst GCSE and A level attainment at age 19 [\[footnote 48\]](#) has continued to fall from peaks in 2015 and 2017 respectively, both have increased compared with 2004 and 2010. Meanwhile, attainment for both GCSE and A level has improved for FSM and non-FSM children between 2010 and 2019, although the attainment gap has increased as a result of non-FSM children improving their attainment by a greater amount than FSM children. [\[footnote 49\]](#)

The Commission recognises the strides that have been made in raising educational attainment and closing social and ethnic gaps, and stresses the vital importance of maintaining the improvements in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The elements of great schools

Evidence presented from schools inspector Ofsted emphasised that with very few exceptions, good education for one kind of child is exactly the same as good education for another, irrespective of their sex, ethnicity, religion or other characteristics. Good curriculum, good teaching, good behaviour, good pastoral support, strong school culture, and high aspirations matter for all children. [\[footnote 50\]](#)

If some categories of children persistently underachieve, the biggest element of the solution is likely to be improving the school's core offering so that all children can do well, rather than simply applying interventions to certain children or groups of children, however they may be defined.

Ofsted's research on 'stuck schools' showed that even schools that have been rated less than 'good' for over a decade have the capacity to improve if school leaders focus on key elements: strong behaviour and discipline, an ambitious, well taught curriculum and early reading in primaries, often with the support of a strong multi-academy trust. [\[footnote 51\]](#) These are not costly interventions, but those schools unable to turn around were often fatigued by new initiatives, high turnover of staff and of pupils.

If the school's core offering is as good as it should be, then the number of children requiring individual or group-based intervention is minimised and more likely to be within the capacity of the school. Strengthening the 'core offering' is one of the building blocks of our education recommendations. This includes:

- good leadership and governance
- good curriculum
- good teaching
- good behaviour and culture
- good pastoral support
- high aspiration

Case study: Delta Academies Trust

There are 13,188 secondary pupils in the Delta Academies Trust, and 31% of these pupils are disadvantaged White British or White English. Below is the evidence we received from the Delta Academy.

In March 2016, Delta established new leadership and very rapidly introduced a series of systems, structures and policies designed to raise standards. These include: setting clear expectations, high-quality curriculum and quality of teaching, raising aspirations and engagement, and a well-developed programme of literacy intervention and vocabulary development designed to address a lack of literacy and literature in the home environment.

In the communities they serve, Delta academies have identified some common themes which significantly hold back this group of learners:

- multi-generational disaffection and low aspiration
- focus on instant gratification

- which in turn often leads to: parental debt, poor planning, lack of long-term aspiration, disconnection between the perceived benefits of education and future prosperity
- poor behaviour exhibited by pupils and a lack of engagement
- well-meaning professionals who address symptoms rather than following the more challenging actions and interventions that lead to improvement.
- low literacy levels in the communities they serve, with a limited culture of reading within the family home

Impact: Darton Academy (Barnsley)

Darton Academy was a special measures school, second lowest in the local authority in 2018. In 2019 it was the highest performing school in the local authority. Delta became responsible for running the school in June 2018 and it converted to an academy with the trust in October 2018.

The rapid rise for all students was mirrored in a rapid improvement for disadvantaged pupils for both progress and attainment, almost doubling the number of disadvantaged children getting a strong pass in GCSE English and maths. The progress of disadvantaged people improved by approximately a grade in English and three-quarters of a grade in maths, on average. [\[footnote 52\]](#)

Table 5: Delta Academies Trust - Examples of rapid improvement in one year - Darton Academy (Barnsley) - All pupils

	2018	2019	↑↓
Progress 8 score	Below average -0.46	Above average +0.37	↑ +0.83
Progress 8 score: English	-0.34	+0.77	↑ +1.11
Progress 8 score: Maths	-0.37	+0.37	↑ +0.74
Progress 8 score: EBacc	-0.47	+0.26	↑ +0.73
Progress 8 score: Open	-0.66	+0.23	↑ +0.89
Grade 5 or above in English & maths GCSEs	39%	54%	↑ +15.3%
Grade 4 or above in English & maths GCSEs	62%	72%	↑ +10.2%

Table 6: Delta Academies Trust - Examples of rapid improvement in one year - Darton Academy (Barnsley) - Disadvantaged pupils

	2018	2019	↑↓
Progress 8 score	-0.62	+0.03	↑ +0.65
Progress 8 score: English	-0.59	+0.36	↑ +0.95
Progress 8 score: Maths	-0.74	+0.02	↑ +0.76
Progress 8 score: EBacc	-0.58	-0.03	↑ +0.55
Progress 8 score: Open	-0.82	-0.13	↑ +0.69
Grade 5 or above in English & maths GCSEs	17%	34%	↑ +17.0%
Grade 4 or above in English & maths GCSEs	40%	54%	↑ +14.0%

Teacher and governor diversity

The teacher workforce is disproportionately White. In 2019, 85.7% of all teachers in state-funded schools in England were White British, and 1.5% were White Irish (out of those whose ethnicity was known). [\[footnote 53\]](#) These groups formed 78.5% and 1.0% of the working age population in the 2011 Census. But data from the School Workforce Census for England shows a positive trend, with workforce diversity (measured by the percentage of teachers that belong to an ethnic minority) increasing from 2010 (11%) to 2018 (14%). [\[footnote 54\]](#)

The literature has varying views on the importance of teacher diversity in ensuring success. Findings from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) suggest that teacher diversity makes it more likely that children of different backgrounds (whether ethnic, disability, class and so on) will have someone who understands their background and a role model to look up to. [\[footnote 55\]](#) Evidence on the impact of teachers from ethnic minorities in the UK is scarce, but studies on the effects of gender has found that children tend to value teachers, whether men or women, who are consistent and even-handed and supportive of them. [\[footnote 56\]](#)

Evidence also suggests there are other important factors that can support and raise the achievement of ethnic minority pupils such as equipping the school workforce with high-quality teacher training, investing in a wider school improvement agenda and the strengthening 'core school offering' (as previously referenced in this report). [\[footnote 57\]](#)

Experiences from the Commission's call for evidence also highlight that although teachers from ethnic minorities are valuable in that they bring their lived experiences to the classroom and push for a broader curriculum, they can face pushback from other teachers in the ethnic majority. Responses illustrated issues in the classroom with senior White teachers missing opportunities to teach a more inclusive portrayal of British culture, and the failing to take advantage of students' diverse backgrounds - even when these opportunities were suggested by their colleagues from ethnic minority backgrounds. The Commission recognises that adding to the curriculum requires removing potentially important existing content. We also recognise that many teachers will not always have access to resources to teach a more inclusive portrayal of British culture. Teachers from all ethnic backgrounds should revel in the rich diversity of their peers and harness it to connect with an ever more diverse body of pupils.

Ethnic minorities are also under-represented in school governance. 94% of governors and trustees who took part in the National Governance Association (NGA) survey identified as White, 1% identified as Black, 2% identified as Asian, and 1% identified as having Mixed ethnicity. [\[footnote 58\]](#) However, those governors that are from ethnic minority backgrounds are also more likely to be younger, or parent governors. This indicates useful avenues to pursue for recruiting more people from minority backgrounds into these roles. The Commission acknowledges the positive impact of having governors with diverse backgrounds, skills, perspectives and life experiences. Diverse boards, that are reflective of school communities, can ensure that decisions taken are in the interest of all pupils, thereby increasing the confidence of parents and wider communities in these decisions.

It is the Commission's belief that all professions should seek to represent the communities they serve. Yet, we acknowledge that to fully understand the challenges and realities of workforce representation, more needs to be done to improve data collection, monitoring and quality of analyses.

In the case of the education system, DfE should:

- identify the most robust data sets that allow trends to be identified and comparisons to be made taking account of age, demographics, professional background and geography
- produce guidance on data collection, monitoring and analysis to better support understanding and drive policy interventions in this area, engaging and collaborating with local authorities across the UK because of the importance of local context and local data
- set clear expectations for governing boards on how to collect and publish data on board diversity as well as how to regularly review their membership and structure

The Commission would also welcome similar standards being applied to other public sector workforces. The Race Disparity Unit should coordinate such activity, building on previous work in this area, and reporting regularly on progress. [\[footnote 59\]](#)

School exclusion

Poor behaviour and inadequate discipline remains a serious problem in schools. Three-quarters of teachers say they commonly experience disruption in their school and two-thirds say they have considered leaving the profession because of poor pupil behaviour, according to a recent survey of teachers. [footnote 60] Permanent exclusion is a necessary tool to protect school safety and maintain high quality education and is not a measure that schools take lightly. It is a vital tool for head teachers and it is clear the Commission must support head teachers in using exclusion as an approach to behaviour management when necessary. The guidance is clear that exclusion should only occur in cases where the behaviour of the child poses a risk to the safety of staff and other pupils or seriously disrupts the working of the school and the learning of others. There are around 400,000 temporary exclusions every year and 8,000 permanent exclusions. In the 2018 to 2019 school year there were 438,300 temporary exclusions, and 7,900 permanent exclusions. The main reason given for school exclusions, both temporary and permanent, is persistent disruptive behaviour. In the 2018 to 2019 school year, 137,900 temporary exclusions were issued to children in all state-funded schools for persistent disruptive behaviour. This made up just over 30% of all temporary exclusions. Persistent disruptive behaviour is also the most common reason for permanent exclusions in state-funded schools, accounting for 2,800 (35%) of all permanent exclusions in the 2018 to 2019 school year. [footnote 61] It is worth noting that in the 2018 to 2019 school year, 15 permanent exclusions (90.2%) were due to racist abuse. For temporary exclusions, 4,889 of 440,000 (1.1%) were due to racist abuse. Both of these rates have remained roughly steady since 2014/15.

In the 2018 to 2019 school year in England, White Gypsy and Roma pupils (21.26%) and Irish Traveller pupils (14.63%) had the highest temporary exclusion rates, followed by Mixed White and Black Caribbean pupils and Black Caribbean pupils. Pupils from the Chinese (0.56%) and Indian (0.88%) ethnic groups had the lowest temporary exclusion rates. [footnote 62] A similar pattern is seen in permanent exclusions, with a rate of 0.39% for Gypsy and Roma pupils, 0.27% for Irish Traveller pupils, with Black Caribbean (0.25%) and Mixed White and Black Caribbean (0.24%) pupils following closely behind. [footnote 63]

With regard to government action, the Timpson Review was published in 2019 making 30 recommendations to ensure exclusions are used appropriately. The Review acknowledged there is a limit to what can be known. There is no "optimum rate of number of exclusions" and exclusion rates may reflect qualities to do with the school or the social context within which the school sits.

The Review found no evidence of systemic or institutional racism, but instead pointed to complex factors when seeking to explore what drives the differences in rates of permanent exclusions and suspensions. [footnote 64]

On causation, sociological variables are listed among a "a range of interwoven, local factors" including differences between schools, poverty, and childhood trauma.

Both the literature review and others who spoke to this review highlighted how wider factors other than ethnicity may also drive these differences. Children may have a number of overlapping vulnerabilities such as poverty, SEN, unsafe family environments and poor mental health, which could all act as a multiplier effect and contribute to higher rates of exclusion


(E Timpson)

These are the same complex factors that we have also discussed: socio-economic status, family strain, community culture, climate and context along with peer pressure are all significant influences of behaviour. However, even when the Timpson Review used 'new odds ratios' [footnote 65] and controlled for other factors, permanent exclusion rates continued to remain high for Black Caribbean and Mixed White and Black Caribbean pupils:

For some other children, the analysis finds their likelihood of exclusion remains higher than for White British children - although the association between ethnicity and exclusion is lower than the raw rates suggest. That is to say that other factors associated with exclusion partially explain the higher rates of exclusion for some groups. This includes Black Caribbean children, who the new analysis suggests are around 1.7 times more likely to be permanently excluded compared to White British children. This compares to a raw rate of permanent exclusion (before the data is adjusted) of 3 times higher. Similarly, children who are Mixed White and Black Caribbean are around 1.6 times more likely to be permanently excluded, which is lower than the unadjusted data that shows they are permanently excluded 2.5 times the rate than their White British peers.

(p34, Timpson Review)

Figure 3: Odds ratio of permanent exclusion by ethnic group compared to White British group (England, analysis from September 2009 to July 2017, across 3 cohorts)



Source: Timpson Review of School Education (2019)

Taking Timpson's findings into consideration, as well as what we heard from communities and education practitioners across the country, the Commission believes the causes for ethnic disparities in the rates of exclusions and suspensions are complex and multifaceted, and can not be reduced to structural racism and individual teacher bias. Data shows, for example, exclusion rates are a much bigger challenge for Black Caribbean pupils than Black African pupils: in 2018/19 Black Caribbean pupils had a permanent exclusion rate of 25 in 10,000, compared 7 in 10,000 for Black African pupils. [footnote 66]

Successful interventions to decrease ethnic disparities in exclusion and suspension must consider the above data and tackle areas often ignored by policy. To be effective, policy action must investigate and understand what are the key causes of disparities and drivers of poor behaviour. It is clear to the Commission that exclusively addressing racism will not sufficiently meet the needs of the ethnic groups who are experiencing higher rates of exclusion or create the much needed policy intervention to support pupils. We've listed below what we know to be the necessary action to improve the exclusion rates and set out a positive agenda for change.

The Commission endorses the findings and recommendations in the Timpson Review of School Exclusion. In particular, we recognise the clear benefits and urge continued Government action in 6 key areas: extend funding to equality and diversity hubs (Timpson Recommendation 4), mandatory training on behaviour as part of teacher training and embedded in Early Career Framework (Recommendation 5), establishment of a Practice Improvement Fund to identify children in need of support and deliver good interventions (Recommendation 8), promote the role of alternative provision (AP) in supporting mainstream and special schools to deliver effective interventions (Recommendation 9), governing bodies, academy trusts and local forums of schools to review information on children who leave their schools and understand how such moves feed into local trends (Recommendation 19) and for the Ofsted to continue considering whether there are concerning patterns to exclusions, off-rolling, absence from school or direction to alternative provision and reflecting this in their inspection judgements (Recommendation 26).

[footnote 67]

In line with Timpson's findings, we further recommend that the government review the provision and quality of alternative provision, ensuring all regions have access to centres where children can receive the support they need to engage in education and take positive next steps. [footnote 68] Exclusion should not be the end of a child's education, and we need to recognise that certain ethnic groups are disproportionately affected by higher rates.

As referenced in this report, a workforce which is representative of the community alongside the use of disaggregated data will help shine a light on these events, supporting leaders and school governors to monitor disparities and enact interventions. Within this, the Commission recognises that children with special educational needs (SEN) are more likely to be excluded [footnote 69] and that for any initiative or policy intervention to be effective, consideration must be taken on the ethnic disproportionality in the identification of SEN.

Along with the key areas from The Timpson Review [footnote 70], the Commission believes it is important for public reporting on this emotive issue to be much clearer in distinguishing between permanent and temporary exclusions, using the phrase 'suspension' instead of temporary exclusion. This would aid public understanding of exclusion rates in schools and the impact they have on certain ethnic groups. This would aid public understanding of exclusion rates in schools and the impact they have on certain ethnic groups.

Further to these actions, we also applaud the greater interest in behaviour that recent governments have shown underlined by Tom Bennett's 2017 independent review of behaviour in schools and more support for behaviour initiatives to reduce the rates of exclusion overall.

Funding

In its 2019 Election Manifesto, the government committed to investing £14 billion over 3 years to increase funding for every primary and secondary school pupil in the country.^[footnote 71] The Commission would like to see more of this investment utilised to help close gaps in educational outcomes for disadvantaged pupils in areas of high deprivation.

As noted in this report, it is widely documented that socio-economic status is strongly implicated in low educational achievement. This is not to 'explain away' any ethnic achievement gaps, but to better understand the root causes and identify relevant policy interventions. Further evidence also shows that the link between funding and need has weakened in recent years: "pupils from more affluent backgrounds are attracting larger increases to funding rates compared with those from more disadvantaged backgrounds."^[footnote 72]

It is the Commission's belief that there are too many funding streams that are not sufficiently addressing need. As noted before, EPI's annual report showed progress in closing the gap between disadvantaged pupils and their peers stagnated before the COVID-19. The funding system as it stands cannot address this challenge or sufficiently deliver the levelling up agenda set out by the government, especially as education disparities may widen due to COVID-19. This analysis highlights the need for new policy levers to close the disadvantage gap and the necessity of an additional, targeted funding allocation to best support disadvantaged pupils.

For example, research indicates the groups with the lowest achievement at age 16 are White British and Black Caribbean and Mixed White and Black Caribbean students from low socio-economic backgrounds, who are scoring substantially below the average for all students (see Strand findings above).

Funding allocation should consider how to best meet the needs of the most disadvantaged, including White British, Black Caribbean, and Mixed White and Black Caribbean students from poor backgrounds who score substantially below the national average. It is particularly important to also consider the localities and schools where performance has been low over a period of time without signs of closing the attainment gap.

The work of the Social Mobility Commission highlights a postcode lottery, with gaps in educational outcomes between the most and least deprived families varying by local authority. There are large differences in disparities, even between local authorities close by to one another. In North Dorset, a 37 percentile difference between education outcomes compares with 48 percentile differences in Poole and Bournemouth. Similarly, in Manchester the difference is 37 percentiles, compared with 48 in Trafford. On the North Yorkshire coast, East Riding reports a 39 percentile difference compared with 49 percentiles in nearby Scarborough.^[footnote 73]

Funding should target the regions, towns and places that show the highest disparities.

Recommendation 7: Promote fairness - Invest in proven interventions through better targeted funding

Taking the evidence into account, the Commission recommends that the government deploys additional funding that is targeted at measures which specifically aim to tackle disparities in educational outcomes for disadvantaged groups.

This recommendation is not an attempt to alter the work of levelling-up funding for schools through the recently introduced National Funding Formula - the full benefits of this work have not yet had a chance to materialise.

Instead, it is a recommendation for new additional funding to systematically target disparities using proven interventions which the DfE should use in order to:

- identify disparities (ethnic, gender and socio-economic status) by regions or local authority areas including drilling down to individual school level, rather than using national data which masks geographical variation in the performance of particular groups
- consider what additional data is needed to illuminate geographical variations and consider how the department can adopt a more holistic definition of need in the allocation of funding
- ensure that the funding uplift is sustained over time, to allow for long-term change in performance, avoiding short-term increases to funding which do not support local authorities or schools to make structural changes and embed practice
- issue funding with clearly defined outcomes and use only proven practices and organisations where there is a track record of success - for example, the DfE's behaviour hubs, phonics hubs, and modern foreign language hubs which support the increase in students taking and passing the English Baccalaureate - in areas where social mobility is low
- support high-performing academy trusts with a track record of turning around schools to go into geographical areas with large disparities
- make the recruitment, development and retention of high quality staff in areas with high disparities a key performance target
- focus on increasing high quality early years provision - interventions to close disparities within an area should seek to ensure that children make the best start in their education. It is easier to improve educational outcomes in the early stages of a child's life, and reduce inequalities between groups in this period, than attempting to do so in later years
- support the transition between primary to secondary as a key intervention point where services should be targeted - where appropriate, funding should be directed to family hubs, education welfare officers to support good levels of school attendance and mental health teams; and high quality careers provision should also be seen as a core element in any intervention to ensure that all children can realise their potential

DfE are best placed to determine how best to target any additional funding and initiatives to the areas that need it most. For example, it could be through increasing the weighting to the national funding formula (NFF) additional needs funding, or geographic funding factors, or using other area-based classifications such as:

"Area-based classifications such as the ONS' neighbourhood 'pen portraits' might be one way to better target funding towards those communities where attainment is lowest without introducing perverse incentives on schools."

^[footnote 74]

Building social and cultural capital - enrichment for all

This Commission embarked on its journey during the storm of COVID-19. This storm has swept away a decade of progress in closing the attainment gap between disadvantaged pupils and their peers. The gap at primary school has increased for the first time since 2007 and disadvantaged pupils in England are now 18.1 months of learning behind their peers by the time they finish their GCSEs.^[footnote 75] It has also exacerbated pre-existing educational disparities already present in the UK - the truth is the full scale of the damage is not yet known. The Education Endowment Foundation estimated the disadvantage gap could widen by as much as 75% between March and September 2020.^[footnote 76]

This is a once in generation challenge, requiring a once in a generation solution. Anything less will undermine the government's stated desire to level up.

We require a bold intervention to overcome what the Chief Executive of the Education Endowment Foundation described as "the test of a generation" - that is, ensuring that today's children have every possible opportunity to succeed after being out of the classroom for much of the past year.^[footnote 77]

The Commission believes that the inspiration for such a bold intervention has existed in our ethnic minority communities for decades: extra hours education.

Migrant communities in the UK have long recognised the value of education. Many ethnic minority parents come from cultures with a profound reverence for good education, something that many in the White majority may take for granted. It is not surprising to ethnic minority people that more than half of privately educated children in London come from ethnic minority backgrounds.^[footnote 78] This reverence for education has meant that, for generations, foreign-born parents have tirelessly toiled to save up and offer their children access to the country's most elite institutions - a passport to a brighter future.

In the second half of the 20th century, the arrival of the Windrush generation and other migrations ushered in a rapid expansion of supplementary education. Ever since, extra hours of formal and non-formal education have helped millions of British children, over several generations, master their parents' mother tongue, get to grips with algebra, acquire knowledge about their faith's traditions and learn English through additional lessons. The social capital that these supplementary education providers give to children should not be underestimated.

Not only do they provide a forum for children to make new friendships, but they also offer the chance to learn new skills which are unaffordable to many. For example, learning to play musical instruments which can be the preserve of children at independent schools, or those who can afford to pay for private lessons. Supplementary education can also offer a window into a heritage, a culture and a language, not accessible in schools. This form of education plays an important role in enriching the sense of identity of many young Britons from diverse backgrounds. A 2010 survey showed that approximately half of supplementary schools supported children from Asian groups (Indian, Bangladeshi or Pakistani), 38% supported children from Black African groups, 22% from Black Caribbean groups and 22% groups from Europe. Other groups served include Middle Eastern (18 % of schools) and South East Asian (14% including Chinese, Vietnamese and Japanese).^[footnote 79]

This is a proud feature of our educational landscape which is attributable to the hard work and resilience of our ethnic minority groups. It is crucial to remember that participation in education out of school hours in the UK is not nearly as strong as in many other societies. More time is spent learning out of school in not only Germany, South Korea and Japan but also Turkey, Albania and Bulgaria.^[footnote 80]

The Commission is persuaded that the model of supplementary education should not rely on the ability of parents to buy extra hours of education, or solely on the goodwill of communities to organically provide it. There is good evidence that extra hours of educational support benefit children - especially those from deprived backgrounds.

A 2015 study of children in 7 different local authorities showed that at key stage 1, pupils who were eligible for free school meals (FSM) and receiving supplementary education outperformed their peers across all 4 main subjects (reading, writing, maths and science). At the other end of the education journey, pupils receiving extra hours of supplementary education did better at their GCSEs than those who did not.[\[footnote 81\]](#) Mainstream education, to some extent, has recognised the benefit of more hours in school for children. Somewhere between a third and a half of schools already offer some form of longer school day.[\[footnote 82\]](#) This needs to be expanded, with the time being utilised to unlock more pupils' potential. The importance of additional time, beyond the mandated hours of school, is made clear by considering the value placed on after school clubs, holiday revision sessions and extracurricular activities. This additional time should be a core offer for all, instead of an unequal opportunity dependent on school and funding choices. Studies from the USA suggest the same. After-school programmes have been found to significantly impact on student performance in reading and mathematics.[\[footnote 83\]](#) Out-of-school small group tutoring programmes where pupils receive around 40 hours per year has a 93% chance to produce benefits greater than the costs.[\[footnote 84\]](#) As has become apparent during the COVID-19 pandemic, the school is more than just a site of learning. For many families it is the opportunity for their children to have a dedicated place to study away from distraction. On average, across OECD countries, students who have access to a room for homework at school scored 14 points higher in reading than students without access to a room for homework.[\[footnote 85\]](#) Education systems with larger shares of students in schools that offer a room for homework tended to show better mean performance in reading, mathematics and science, even after accounting for per capita GDP.[\[footnote 86\]](#) It is not just the academic performance of children that stands to gain from extra hours in the classroom. The Commission recognises that schools, with their autonomy and knowledge of their pupils, will be best placed to find a balance between academic work and extracurricular activities. In Manchester, a Saturday school educational programme for underachieving and disadvantaged pupils at Key Stage 2 led to teachers, parents, and musicians all observing that pupils were making noticeable improvements in behaviour, confidence, and the development of social skills - all valuable attributes required to succeed in the modern age.[\[footnote 87\]](#) The OECD found that students who were enrolled in schools that offer more creative extracurricular activities (including music and art activities) performed better in reading, on average, across OECD countries (by 4 score points) and in 32 countries and economies, after accounting for students' and schools' socio-economic profile. Countries whose schools offer more creative extracurricular activities tended to show greater equity in student performance.[\[footnote 88\]](#) Both the educational benefit to children and the opportunity to nurture their social skills have never been more important than during this period in Britain's history. Here, many academies and free schools, which tend to outperform council-run schools, have used their autonomy to lengthen the school day. Indeed, the government recognised this trend and in 2016 announced up to £285 million a year to give 25% of secondary schools the opportunity to extend their school day to offer a wider range of activities for pupils, including more sport.[\[footnote 89\]](#) The Commission regrets the then government's decision, less than a year after this announcement, to renege on this commitment.[\[footnote 90\]](#)

Case study: Bedford Free School

- Breakfast Club starts at 7:45am through to the start of school day at 8:25am.
- The day runs from 8:30am to 4pm, Mondays to Thursdays. From 3:20pm to 4:00pm students do homework in a 'prep' session with tutors.
- From 4:00pm to 6:00pm the school remains open for homework support; revision sessions; subject interventions and tutorials; individual study activities and; library and ICT facilities.

Case study: Inspiration Trust

The Commission received the following case study from Inspiration Trust:

Extended days, as we have in most schools within Inspiration Trust, have numerous benefits - both academically and socially. Extended days provide access to high quality enrichment to disadvantaged pupils, who's parents might otherwise not be able to afford such activities. The enrichment provided broadens curriculum depth and can provide wider opportunities for pupils to experience increased music, arts and sports - curriculum areas which have multiple benefits, both socially and academically. There can be a positive impact for a wider community as pupils are able access the school day for longer, supporting pupils who might otherwise be potentially unsupervised in the community. This can reduce exposure to potential anti-social activity or threats to pupil safety. Extended days also support working families, which will have a wider positive impact on the economy. Activities range from sports and arts clubs (such as football, drama and musical theatre) to providing wider cultural and social experiences. This might include debating clubs and cookery clubs for example. Extended days can also provide the opportunity for increased teaching and support - either in larger or smaller groups or 1:1. This can help pupils to 'catch up' academically. Some of our schools also use an extended day for homework club or prep - providing a quiet, productive environment for independent study. Many pupils simply do not have access to this at home. An added benefit here is that when pupils go home - the focus is on family time. Some of our schools have used the extended day to offer wider curriculum subjects, therefore increasing curriculum breadth. There are however some challenges in delivering an extended day. The first of these would be cost. There is a budget implication from extending the day as increased levels of staff are required, whether the day is staffed by teachers or otherwise. Organisation of the day is also important. Breaks need to be built in to ensure the day works well for pupils and staff. There are also other logistical considerations. Ending the day later can lead to transport challenges for example. In the winter months it can also be difficult to deliver outdoor sports after dark, without access to the right facilities. It is also important to consider how to implement an extended day with due regards[\[footnote 91\]](#) to teacher workload. Participation is also key - it is essential to monitor engagement, particularly for disadvantaged pupils. As it is these pupils who will benefit most. This is more straightforward if the extended day is compulsory for all. Quality assurance is also a challenge that schools need to consider. An extended day will only really be beneficial if the offer is high quality and tailored to the school context and pupil need. These challenges can all be overcome but do need to be considered. However, the Commission acknowledges the significant challenges to successfully extending the school day. Extra provision will be costly - from the examples cited above, some of the extended hours is not free. It should be possible in a country like ours for every child to enjoy these provisions. We note that transport may not be as conveniently available for secondary pupils at later times. And the extra time at school may not be used as effectively as possible nationwide. But these kinds of concerns, however reasonable, pale into insignificance when considering the scale of the prize on offer.

Recommendation 13: Promote Fairness - Build social and cultural capital - enrichment for all

The Commission recommends that the Secretary of State for Education, in collaboration with the government's education recovery commissioner, urgently considers phasing in an extended school day. Led by evidence showing the positive impact of an extended school day for disadvantaged pupils, the phasing of the extended school day should, in the first instance, prioritise the most disadvantaged areas and communities. The additional hours must provide all pupils with the opportunity to engage in physical and cultural activities, including working with local activity clubs. Participation in such activities will improve pupils' health and social capital. Further, such pursuits should be made more accessible to the most disadvantaged students. In order to overcome the significant operational challenges of delivering an extended school day, advice should be sought from education practitioners, parents, pupils and key stakeholders such as teaching unions. The following must be considered: Management of the school building and operations: assessment of the impact of a longer school day to site maintenance, and all school employees who are responsible for the running of the school. Particular attention should be paid to ensure a longer day does not negatively impact teaching staff, or inadvertently increase disparities for others involved such as cleaners, caterers, and other site staff. The need for additional staffing, or longer hours, will have a staffing cost impact for schools . The impact that an extended school day may have on school's lettings income should also be considered. For those institutions with PFI contracts, consideration must be given to their contracted hours of use of the building. Staffing: the current conditions of employment requires teachers to perform duties directed by the Headteacher for a maximum of 1,265 hours over 195 days a year. DfE must secure and allocate the necessary funding to ensure the contract maintains the same conditions of employment. They will also need to enter into meaningful engagement with trade unions to make this work. Recruitment and retention will be significantly affected if the current employment conditions of teaching staff are eroded or appear to be being eroded. Curriculum sequencing: how extra hours of education may align with and support the curriculum. Continuing Professional Development (CPD): the effect on CPD time, which is often carried out after school hours, will also need to be factored in. Transport schedules: the impact on urban transport activities including traffic patterns. This may require, for example, an increase in funding for public transport and a general change in bus routes and timetables. Parental expectations: how additional hours can best support children, without causing undue stress to them or their family life, and best deliver on parental expectations of their child's school offer. Protecting family time: the benefits and importance of family time are clear, and should be preserved. It is important to highlight that, at present, children on minimum school hours only spend 13% of a whole year in school. Expectations on the standard core school hours: it is clear that each age group has different needs including the ideal amount of family time and time spent in school. In schools across England, there is little variation in the length of the school day, with both primary and secondary aged pupils typically in school from 9am to 3:30pm. It is important to consider how an extended school could support a change in the expected standard core school hour for different age groups.

Delivery on the standard core school hours: it is important to consider how best to support schools that are already struggling to deliver the current school hours.

Length of additional school hours: how best to meet the different needs of individual year groups, who require a different length of time in school

DfE will need to secure ongoing additional funding allocation to establish this recommendation as a permanent change in the way that schools currently operate. This will be imperative to successfully mainstream the extended school day.

This is a unique opportunity for DfE to improve current practices and ensure education practitioners are best equipped and rewarded for their time. Consideration should be given to how the change in additional school hours can support flexible working arrangements (which could make the profession more attractive to many), ensure staff are paid to teach the after-school time they deliver, and to retain their annual leave entitlement.

We also suggest that DfE work with key partners, such as UCAS and Ofqual, to explore how submission dates for higher education institutions, and dates for GCSE and A level results, can be adjusted to accommodate. [\[footnote 92\]](#)

We know from the evidence that additional school hours will disproportionately benefit the disadvantaged. Children in Bangladeshi and Pakistani households are the most likely to live in low income and material deprivation out of all ethnic groups. Yet Bangladeshi and Pakistani pupils also have higher Progress 8 scores than the national average. [\[footnote 93\]](#) This move will build on this success further. Meanwhile White pupils in the North East currently have the lowest Progress 8 score of all pupils. Extra time in school has a chance to level up opportunity for these children and their peers in other White working-class communities across the country. [\[footnote 94\]](#) The answer therefore is not about bespoke interventions that single out ethnic minority groups from the White majority. It is about collectively raising standards for all children based on what works to boost opportunity. A rising tide really can raise all boats.

This also presents the opportunity to expose more children to what has become the preserves of those in private schools. The government can use extra hours in school to help pupils take off one pair of spectacles and see life through another lens. Children become adults and workers but they also become neighbours, spouses, volunteers and voters. They should have the opportunity to navigate their way into the future by debating one another; acting out great scripts, mastering an instrument and playing a sport. Why should access to such rich, cultural capital only be reserved to those fortunate enough to draw on their parent's income? We are a mature, wealthy society that should be investing in our children equitably in every sense of the word.

School really is the best place for children during the day. Doctors from the Royal London hospital found under-16s are in the greatest danger of being stabbed between 4pm and 6pm, with 22% of all victims attacked then.

[\[footnote 95\]](#) Getting children off the streets and in school during the late afternoon could not just change lives for the better in the long term, it could save some in the short-term. The Children's Commissioner has also found that children feel more confident in places where adults are around, and concluded children would be safer with 'more activities in youth clubs or extended schools'. [\[footnote 96\]](#)

The children with the least social capital, whose parents have the weakest networks and wealth stand to gain the most from extending the school day. Exposure to more education after a decade of raising school standards through phonics, greater school autonomy and now further funding is the best way to turn a COVID-19 social mobility malaise into a levelling up triumph.

Making of modern Britain: teaching an inclusive curriculum

The Commission considered the extent to which children acquire a proper grounding in the national story, including its multi-ethnic character, in secondary school.

The highly respected E. D. Hirsch Jr [\[footnote 97\]](#) in his book 'How to Educate a Citizen: the power of shared knowledge to unify a nation', argues that:

As with other parts of a shared-knowledge curriculum, the key issue is the integration of these perspectives into the common curriculum. Knowledge is not functional in language and culture until it is shared. Hence the key practical matter to settle is determining which are the specific elements of knowledge about ... [listed ethnic groups] and other minorities that need to be shared going forward. In general, we need to answer another, similar practical question: What are the specific elements of the traditional shared knowledge of the nation, grade by grade, that we need to share along with this new material?

Whilst this is a quote about the USA, the sentiment is universal. It is widely accepted that the school curriculum and the way it presents the historic past can be central to creating a sense of belonging amongst pupils and a belief they can contribute in the future. When those from different ethnic and social class backgrounds can see, hear and read about their heritage, and the contribution their forefathers and mothers have made to this country through the ages, they can identify themselves as a part of British history. This is not about teaching the personal history of each individual but rather linking the story of different ethnic groups to a unifying sense of Britishness.

Taking in consideration the large number of respondents from our call for evidence, empowering young people with a greater understanding of the past is seen as required and long overdue. Ensuring all pupils have access to high-quality knowledge was identified as crucial to enable young people to better understand the present world, think beyond their individual experiences and participate in creating the future. Michael Young, a British Professor of Sociology of Education at UCL, argued:

'Powerful knowledge' is powerful because it provides the best understanding of the natural and social worlds that we have and helps us go beyond our individual experiences. [\[footnote 98\]](#)

(Michael Young, 2013, page 196)

Knowledge is 'powerful' if it predicts, if it explains, if it enables you to envisage alternatives. [\[footnote 99\]](#)

(Michael Young, 2014, page 74)

We believe that young people are entitled to a wider understanding of the UK which encompasses the local cultures of regions such as the North or the Midlands, the 4 nations that form the UK, as well as the Commonwealth and former colonies such as the West Indies, India and Pakistan. These countries and local areas have historically been 'defined' by their connection to the UK, but equally have played their role in defining 'Britishness' today. The telling of the story of Modern Britain has already begun in many schools and initiatives across the UK.

Case study: The Royal Mint and West India Committee - 'Diversity Built Britain'

The Royal Mint collaborated with the West India Committee in their [Diversity Built Britain](#) campaign to raise awareness of the nation's diversity. Alongside the launch of a new 50p diversity coin that placed 10 million coins in circulation, The Royal Mint worked with the West India Committee to create education material for schools. The education resource packs that have now been circulated to all 18,099 primary schools in England and Wales are aimed at illuminating fascinating stories and accounts of important and inspirational Black people that have lived, worked and studied in the UK. They not only illustrate that our society has been diverse throughout our long history, but seek to create rich materials that raise educational attainment and aspirations for all.

Case study: Curriculum - Oak Academy

Oak National Academy is the government-backed online academy created to support home learning during the COVID-19 pandemic. It has been creating high-quality material and lesson plans for use online for free. In their online hub of video lessons and resources, produced by teachers, they have set out model lesson plans that can be easily adapted in schools.

Oak's key stage 4 geography class on Liverpool is an invaluable example of how the story of the modern UK can be taught through the prism of local areas. One module, entitled 'Urban change in Liverpool' offers a particularly effective example of teaching the impact of migration and diversity of the UK through materials, facts and historical accounts of a city or region. This material could be replicated for all regions and cities and tailored to earlier age groups in key stage 3.

In order to develop a sense of citizenship and to support integration and aspiration amongst all ethnic communities, we believe that pupils need to be exposed to the rich variety of British culture and the influences that have shaped it, ranging from the influence of classical civilisations, the European Enlightenment, the inflows and outflows of the British Empire, and the stream of new arrivals in the post-war period to the present day. There have been many calls for pupils to have a greater opportunity to learn about the Commonwealth contribution to the World Wars and the building of the post-war NHS, through to the significance of events such as the Bristol Bus Boycott in 1963 which shaped race relations legislation in the UK.

It involves equipping the populace with a clearer sense of how its history has led to modern Britain being populated by such a rich and layered collection of communities. As these communities blend ever further, it is a story that should instil pride within the British public" [\[footnote 100\]](#)

(Professor Samir Puri on the telling of the national story)

It is also important that pupils in the UK learn that the literature and language of the country has changed over time, both influencing and being influenced by the relationship to the Empire. The language of writers in the Commonwealth, such as Derek Walcott, Seamus Heaney, and Andrea Levy is steeped in British cultural traditions, but these writers have also shaped contemporary thinking and attitudes. Learning about the way cultures change over time, and how other writers have drawn inspiration from outside their immediate country, can help young people appreciate the past, and see themselves in it, rather than reject it as exclusionary.

British history is not solely one of imperial imposition - Commonwealth history and literature reveals a more complex picture, in which ideas travelled in multiple directions, cultures mixed and positive relations formed that today underpin diaspora around the world, which many ethnic minority children in the UK will feel part of. All this makes up the British story, our story, which has episodes of both shame and pride.

As novelist Chimamanda Adichie expressed:

Stories matter. Many stories matter. Stories have been used to dispossess and to malign, but stories can also be used to empower and humanise. Stories can break the dignity of a people, but stories can also repair that broken dignity. [\[footnote 101\]](#)

Experiences from the Commission's call for evidence also highlight the need to tell the multiple, nuanced stories that have shaped the country we live in today:

Students should be taught about all famous and important people in the society and these famous people should come from every race, religion, class and creed, so that by the time students leave school they have a rounded understanding of the contributions made by ethnic minorities, how they fit into society and the contribution ethnic minority people have made to the fabric of the society and the history, (present and future narrative) of the UK. (call for evidence respondent)

When children from different ethnic groups and socio-economic status groups can see themselves in books they read and in resources they use in a positive and celebratory manner, this can have a huge positive impact on engagement with learning.

(call for evidence respondent)

A well-sequenced, knowledge-rich curriculum, based around subject disciplines, can help students to acquire a sense of place and a framework for understanding cultural diversity. The national curriculum seeks to reflect this multi-layered story and is the product of years of dialogue and research, but not every school is able to deliver it in the way that is proposed. We heard that many schools and teachers do not have the knowledge or confidence to teach the kind of history suitable for a multi-ethnic UK and need additional support to do so. There is a clear need for better, high quality resources that teachers can use and trust.

Providing such a resource would also help schools to ensure they are teaching the story of the UK in a balanced way. We heard examples of some schools using materials which reflected narrow political agendas or gave a biased picture of historical and current events. Without further research it is impossible to judge how widespread this may be, but it is important that education practitioners teach in a way that is politically impartial, in line with their statutory obligations, and respects all pupils.

Understanding different perspectives and contested events is also central to the study of history and should help to equip pupils to navigate a world of 'fake news' and clashing opinions and truths. Taking evidence into consideration, the Commission would welcome the government to set school leadership expectations around political neutrality and transparency on curriculum design. The Commission also recognises the need to better understand whether schools are teaching in an impartial way and recommends the DfE commission and publish research in this area.

Recommendation 20: Achieve inclusivity - Making of modern Britain: teaching an inclusive curriculum

The Commission recommends that DfE work with an appointed panel of independent experts to produce a well-sequenced set of teaching resources to tell the multiple, nuanced stories that have shaped the country we live in today. The resources should be embedded within subjects in the statutory curriculum. These quality resources should include lesson plans, teaching methods and reading materials to complement a knowledge-rich curriculum. Using these examples, DfE, supported by the panel of experts, should design and produce a credible, high-quality, online national library that is continually updated. This online library will complement and enhance the content and quality of lessons taught in all schools, so that all children can learn about the UK and the evolution of our society.

The panel of experts should include experienced headteachers, representatives from subject associations and examining bodies, directors of national museums, and representatives from relevant ethnic minority stakeholder groups such as the government's Windrush Cross-Government Working Group.

Higher education

Data on entry rates to higher education showed that in 2020 White students were the least likely to go to university at 32.6%, followed by students from the Mixed (39.0%), Black (47.5%), Asian (53.1%) and Chinese (71.7%) ethnic groups. [\[footnote 102\]](#)

Male White British pupils eligible for FSM are the least likely of all the main ethnic or social groups to progress to higher education by age 19, at just 12.7%. [\[footnote 103\]](#) This progression rate has fallen slightly for the first time since 2011 to 2012. However, as just noted, for White students eligible for FSM in London, the entry rate has pulled away from that in other parts of the country, and is now nearly 9 percentage points higher than any other region. [\[footnote 104\]](#)

In line with Professor Strand's findings for attainment, most ethnic minorities do relatively well in accessing higher education, including those from lower socio-economic backgrounds. In the 2018 to 2019 academic year, 66.9% of Black African young people had progressed to higher education by age 19, including 59.0% of those eligible for free school meals. Only the Chinese ethnic group has a higher progression rate for FSM students to higher education at 72.8%. [\[footnote 105\]](#)


Table 7: Progression rates to higher education by age 19, 2018 to 2019 school year

	FSM	All other pupils	Total	Odds ratio between FSM and all other pupils
Chinese	72.8%	79.8%	79.3%	0.68
Black African	59.0%	69.7%	66.9%	0.63
Bangladeshi	58.6%	67.8%	64.9%	0.67
Indian	57.2%	73.0%	71.7%	0.49
Asian Other	57.1%	70.5%	68.8%	0.56
Any Other Ethnic Group	55.9%	61.3%	59.9%	0.80
Pakistani	47.1%	59.5%	56.5%	0.61
Black Other	40.8%	56.0%	52.1%	0.54
Mixed White and Black African	39.9%	54.7%	51.5%	0.55
White Other	37.2%	47.9%	46.6%	0.64
Mixed Other	33.6%	56.4%	52.3%	0.39
Mixed White and Asian	33.2%	59.1%	55.2%	0.34
Black Caribbean	31.8%	48.5%	44.7%	0.50
Unknown	28.6%	45.8%	43.0%	0.47
Mixed White and Black Caribbean	21.1%	40.3%	35.8%	0.40
White Irish	20.9%	57.9%	53.0%	0.19
White British	16.0%	40.9%	37.9%	0.28
Traveller of Irish Heritage	6.3%	10.2%	7.6%	0.59
Gypsy and Roma	3.8%	6.1%	5.2%	0.61
Total	26.3%	45.1%	42.5%	0.43

Source: Department for Education, 2020. Note that progression rates can be volatile over time due to the very small number of pupils in some categories. Odds ratio calculated by CRED Secretariat. Odds ratios measure how likely one group is to progress to university compared to another group. For example, Indian students on FSM are just under half as likely to progress to university as Indian students who aren't on FSM. The closer to 1, the more equal the odds are between two groups.

While Black African and Black Caribbean pupils are more likely to progress to university than White British students, Black students are also the most likely out of the aggregated ethnic groups to attend low tariff universities. In 2018 to 2019, Black entrants were 1.7 times as likely to go to low tariff institutions as White entrants. [\[footnote 106\]](#) Meanwhile in the same year 36.3% of White university entrants went to high tariff providers - the highest percentage of all ethnic groups (where ethnicity was known), followed by 36.0% of entrants with Mixed ethnicity. This is in part a selection effect, due to the higher rates of progression to university among ethnic minorities. But only 17.6% of Black entrants went to high tariff providers - the lowest percentage out of all ethnic groups. [\[footnote 107\]](#) In terms of overall progression, Black Caribbean pupils are the least likely of the main ethnic groups to progress to the more elite high tariff universities by age 19. This progression rate of 5.2% is less than half the overall national figure of 10.9% of all pupils. [\[footnote 108\]](#) So, although Black students are progressing to university at healthy rates, they tend to be clustered in the lower tariff institutions as shown in the graph below. Likewise, although Asian students have much larger rates of progression to higher education than both White British and Black students, many are clustered in mid-tier universities.

Figure 4: Percentage of each ethnic group entering low, medium and high tariff providers (UK, 2018 to 2019 academic year)



Different graduate outcomes

Once at university, ethnic minority students - with the exception of Asian students - are more likely to drop out, have lower levels of attainment, and lower earnings after graduating. The highest overall non-continuation rate at 15.5% is found amongst Black students. For 'other providers' (those that are not high tariff providers) Black students have the highest non-continuation rates at 17.0%, followed by students from the Other ethnic group (14.2%) and the Mixed ethnic group (13.9%). For White students in these providers, the non-continuation rate was 10.9%. [\[footnote 109\]](#) This pattern holds true even for those in STEM subjects, which are generally viewed as being secure routes to success: Black students had the highest non-continuation rates for STEM students at higher tariff providers, and Black STEM students in providers with medium to low tariffs had the highest non-continuation rates overall. [\[footnote 110\]](#) Black students also struggle when it comes to degree class: the most recent data (2018 to 2019) shows White students with the highest percentage of first class degrees at 31.5% and Black students with the lowest percentage at 14.5%. Asian students (23.0%) and those with Mixed ethnicity (26.2%) came in the middle. [\[footnote 111\]](#)

The pattern continues into graduate earnings 10 years after completing a first degree, although more detailed ethnic groups in the data highlight the position of Pakistani and Bangladeshi graduates too. For the cohort that graduated in 2006/07, there are 5 ethnic groups with median earnings less than £30,000: Black African (£29,200), Bangladeshi (£28,500), Black Caribbean (£28,500), other Black ethnic groups (£27,000) and the Pakistani ethnic group (£25,600). The White ethnic group has median earnings of £31,000 and median earnings for various Mixed, Indian and Chinese ethnic groups are all above £33,000. [\[footnote 112\]](#) One explanation is that students entering low tariff universities are less able to compete against those from higher tariff universities and are therefore less likely to secure employment in their chosen career. As ethnic minorities are disproportionately more likely to attend these universities, this may limit their employment choices and earnings in later life.

Another explanation is that ethnic minority students, and especially Black students, from lower social status backgrounds are not being well advised on which courses to take at university. About 40% of Black African people and 39% of people from the Bangladeshi ethnic group are overqualified for their roles, compared with 25% of White workers. [\[footnote 113\]](#)

National Centre for Social Research (NatCen), the country's leading independent social research institute, undertook a series of focus groups on behalf of the Commission. The issue of needing access to networks and good careers guidance came through strongly.

Those in high-skilled occupations had typically made more use of formal support services, including university careers services, alongside informal sources of support. [\[footnote 114\]](#) They were more likely to have studied subjects with a clear career trajectory (such as medicine, teaching or accountancy, and typically took up industry placements, work experience, or benefited from informal mentors before and after graduation. [\[footnote 115\]](#)

In contrast, those in low-skilled occupations had relied more heavily on informal information and support and reported limited or negative experiences of formal support services. This group either did not access university careers support or tried to do so after completing their degree (at which point the support was no longer available). [\[footnote 116\]](#) Generally, this group studied degree subjects with multiple or less obvious career trajectories (such as sociology, business or creative arts).

The focus groups also highlighted the impact that being the first in the family to go to university can have on a person's career prospects: participants could feel alone in navigating their way to high-skilled employment, as their families were unable to provide practical careers guidance or support.

Across all ethnic groups and occupations, young people highlighted the need for better careers advice and planning at schools and universities (through alumni networks, inviting employers to schools, and effective careers advice). [\[footnote 117\]](#) Relevant insider knowledge is often not available to those from more disadvantaged backgrounds. Elite universities, for example, often look for evidence of extra-curricular activity such as volunteering when selecting students.

The Commission proposes improvements to the quality of, and access to, careers advice for young people from disadvantaged backgrounds. This builds on the measures to drive change in tackling inequalities between ethnic groups in higher education announced by the government in February 2019. [\[footnote 118\]](#) The measures announced gave the Office for Students (OfS) more powers to scrutinise institutions' access and participation plans. All universities now have to publish data on admissions and attainment, broken down by ethnicity, gender and socio-economic background, to shine a spotlight on those making good progress and those lagging behind.

Attainment at A level in schools and colleges is the most important factor influencing entry to the highest tariff courses and universities. The Commission received advice from OfS noting longstanding patterns of attainment in schools, coupled with perceptions of financial cost and belonging in higher education, influence family and community expectations.

Measures to reduce attainment gaps need to be tackled early by engaging young people while their expectations are still forming, engaging teachers and parents, providing them with career guidance, and removing the academic, financial and cultural barriers to meeting their ambitions, rather than assuming that ambitions themselves are low.

This requires targeted and sustained engagement with young people, schools and families to create pathways into higher education, rather than one-off interventions, and this is best delivered in or close to schools and colleges. It should also be noted that a report commissioned by Gatsby Charitable Foundation into improving career guidance in England noted 8 Gatsby benchmarks of good careers guidance including: a stable careers programme, learning from career and labour market information, addressing the needs of each pupil, linking curriculum learning to careers, encounters with employers and employees, experiences of workplaces, encounters with further and higher education, and personal guidance. [\[footnote 119\]](#)

Recommendation 15: Create Agency - Empower pupils to make more informed choices to fulfil their future potential

We recommend stronger guidance is issued by the Office for Students (OfS) to higher education institutions on funding outreach programmes and placing university outreach staff in schools to help reduce disparities in applications at an earlier stage. Funding should be informed by evidence-led practice and targeted at the 8 elements of good careers support to ensure that more children are able to apply to high-tariff institutions. This funding should be evaluated and monitored to assess whether it is having an impact on application rates.

If guidance from OfS does not lead to strengthened funding for such initiatives, then OfS should look to regulatory or legal changes to ensure improved access and participation to higher education institutions.

Apprenticeships, vocational education and lifelong learning

Data in the higher education section above shows that (1) academic students are not getting into the top universities at the rate that they should, and (2) non-academic students are heading to lower tier universities and dropping out. This is particularly true for Black students.

A thriving university sector is vital for this country and should be even more open to those with the relevant abilities and aptitudes from all backgrounds. But young people appear to be over-investing in university degrees that are not leading to the high status professional jobs they've been led to expect.

There are satisfying and well-rewarded careers that do not require academic qualifications, at least at the entry level, and are often better paid than low level graduate employment. Longitudinal survey and interview data in England revealed that those with degrees were less likely to be in work at the ages of 22 to 23 than those who left school to enter employment at 18. [\[footnote 120\]](#)

More routes into a variety of skilled jobs and a wider definition of 'skill' will benefit UK society and particularly the less affluent who have not all benefited from the great expansion in higher education. Peoples' talents are wide and varied but we tend to overvalue the cognitive and undervalue others.

Around 40% of young people do not achieve a good pass in English and maths that is required to move into the academic stream at school or sixth-form college. [\[footnote 121\]](#) A recent academic paper finds that young people from this group tend to feel like failures despite demonstrating good attainment in other GCSE subjects. [\[footnote 122\]](#) It is believed that pupils' academic self concept (their belief in their own abilities) in turn impacts their success in education. [\[footnote 123\]](#) This is an example of the negative impacts of the British system's narrow view of ability based on generic, cognitive-analytical aptitudes.

The Commission welcomes the government's recent Skills for Jobs white paper and the greater focus on the more than half of school leavers aged 18 who do not go on to university. [\[footnote 124\]](#) It also commends the government's increasing support for traineeships and apprenticeships announced in the recent 2021 Budget.

The government has in recent years been paying more attention to those who are not heading for university and a series of measures and reports. [\[footnote 125\]](#) These all suggest that there is now an infrastructure in place to deliver credible non-university options. This is partly driven by employer and economic necessity, especially with more restrictive immigration rules now in place.

It is vital that ethnic minority young people do not see their future only through a higher education lens. Responses from the Commission's call for evidence highlighted the importance of promoting vocational training options such as apprenticeships, as well as academic routes.

Apprenticeships provide an opportunity to combine work with classroom study, with the possibility to move into full-time academic work later in life if their ambitions pivot in that direction at a later stage. The Commission commends organisations and employers (such as those highlighted in the case studies) who reach out to and provide high quality apprenticeship opportunities to young people.

The Commission is concerned by the evident disparities in the take-up of apprenticeships across age and ethnicity. The data shows that:

- young ethnic minority people are under-represented in the apprenticeship system, including both school leavers and those who take up apprenticeships in their early 20s [\[footnote 126\]](#)
- in London, before the levy was introduced (2015 to 2016) those from the Black ethnic group were well represented in apprenticeships overall - however, they were also more likely to be clustered in lower level and lower paid apprenticeships [\[footnote 127\]](#)
- higher level apprenticeships are dominated by employees aged over 25 - the levy introduced in 2017 has reinforced the bias to investing training money in existing employees at the higher level 4 and 5 vocational training level rather than the level 2 and 3 more suitable for school leavers [\[footnote 128\]](#)

There appears to be a mixture of stronger traditions of understanding and respecting the apprenticeship system in White British families and an exaggerated respect for the academic route as the only path to success and economic safety on the part of ethnic minorities.

There also seems to be a mixture of prejudice and ignorance about apprenticeships in ethnic minority families. A survey by Youth Employment UK earlier this year found that 33% of Black respondents had never had apprenticeships discussed with them, compared with 13% of White respondents. [\[footnote 129\]](#)

This minority bias has overlapped with the thrust of public policy which has been to send as many school leavers as possible into academic, usually residential, higher education, with a corresponding neglect of other pathways.

Recommendation 16: Create agency - Open up access to apprenticeships

The Commission recommends that the government conducts a highly targeted apprenticeships campaign to persuade young people to do apprenticeships in growth sectors. Our view is that such a campaign could be of particular benefit to young people who face discrimination or disadvantage and currently lack access to in-depth information about the full range of career pathways.

Such a campaign could use a range of mechanisms to attract young people, such as relatable young role models, employer testimonies, data on potential earnings and career progression. It could explore the impact of factors that influence a young person's career choices such as: parental engagement, peer influence, access to information on different career routes, employer links with students, and 'people like me' and be delivered in partnership with further education colleges, Jobcentre Plus, youth hubs in community spaces, and careers hubs in schools.

A two-phased approach to roll out is proposed: first, pilots to be undertaken and evaluated in left behind areas across England; and second, a national roll out of a well evidenced, highly targeted campaign which focuses on getting young people into a new job as part of an apprenticeship, and rewards providers for successfully achieving this.

DfE and Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) should work in partnership with the Youth Futures Foundation to:

- co-fund the design of the campaign
- put out a call for further education colleges working in partnership with local employers and the community to apply to be considered for pilots
- commission an independent evaluation of the pilots, one which includes identifying 'what works' as part of its findings

Case study: Rolls-Royce STEM Education Outreach Programme

Rolls-Royce, a world leading industrial technology company, has committed to "advancing STEM subjects among the scientists and engineers of tomorrow" and has a target to reach 25 million people by 2030 with their STEM education programmes and activities.

As part of this objective, they conduct extensive outreach year-round with schools, partners and students through their STEM Ambassadors who champion the full range of their early career pathways. Examples of this outreach include Primary Engineer, careers Q and A sessions and the Big Bang UK.

The 'Rolls-Royce Schools Prize for Science and Technology' is the company's flagship programme and is open to all schools in the UK. It celebrates excellence in STEM teaching and learning, showcases best practice through its annual awards event and supports teachers' continuous professional development.

In addition, Rolls-Royce offers various apprenticeship programmes where apprentices receive a combination of on-the-job training with digital learning and practical skills development as they study towards nationally-recognised qualifications or a range of degree programmes.

Case study: PwC

PwC offers accounting and technology flying start degree programmes. The 4-year programmes fast track applicants' careers in business, accounting and finance, and technology.

Following the accounting route, students will receive 3 paid work placements with PwC during the programme that are built into the university's academic year and last for just one term in each year. The programme places them on track to becoming an ICAEW Chartered Accountant - ensuring they complete 80% of their ICAEW exams during the degree.

Technology apprentices study towards a full BSc degree in Computer Science or Software Engineering, depending on the University attended, and are also able to gain the relevant apprenticeship qualification. During the programme they will spend periods of work based learning in the business working on cutting-edge digital and technology client projects at PwC. This programme is a fully funded degree apprenticeship, therefore, negating the need to pay tuition fees, and as a PwC apprentice from day one, a salary is paid throughout.

For both the accounting and technology routes, the students could secure their future career with the firm.

As a way of improving the accessibility of the programmes, PwC conducts a wide range of activities such as their social mobility community programme and their 'Virtual Insights Week'. They also help students to develop their employability skills through the 'employability hub' which provides them with virtual tools to support them to develop key employability skills from online applications and assessments, video interviews, assessment days.

Case study: The Sutton Trust

The Sutton Trust supports young people from less advantaged backgrounds to access leading universities and careers. They run programmes in partnership with universities and employers that give students practical advice and leave them feeling inspired and more confident about their future.

So far, over 41,000 people have taken part in one of the Sutton Trust's programmes with each of those individuals becoming part of the Sutton Trust alumni community.

One of their programmes is the 'Apprenticeship Summer School' which they deliver in partnership with employers. As part of the programme, students get an in-depth understanding of degree apprenticeships, what they involve and whether a degree apprenticeship is the right choice for them. They also hear from current apprentices, experience networking opportunities, attend sessions hosted by employers and learn the different application processes employers use.

Lifelong learning and alternative routes must also be central to the labour market of the future for those who do not stay on the academic ladder aged 16, and for those who have progressed on the ladder but have not found satisfactory employment subsequently.

Lifelong learning has been much talked about in the past 20 years but for most of that time we have seen adult education and re-education both at higher education levels and at higher manual and technical levels in freefall (the adult education budget has fallen by about two-thirds from 2003 to July 2019). [\[footnote 130\]](#)

The increase in tuition fees in 2012 led to a sharp reduction in the number of mature students at university, which undermined the government's often repeated claim that the participation in higher education of people from disadvantaged backgrounds has continued to rise. [\[footnote 131\]](#) This may be true among school leavers, but not for students aged 21 and above, who are more likely to be from disadvantaged groups, come from ethnic minority backgrounds, have a disability, or have non-traditional qualifications. [\[footnote 132\]](#)

Now we do have a chance to make lifelong learning a reality, key both for an adaptable economy and for those second chances in individual lives. The recently announced Lifetime Skills Guarantee will mean that all individuals are guaranteed state support for any level 3 training and a 3 or 4 year loan guarantee will also soon be available for those who want to change direction and retrain in later life with a part-time course at their local further education college or university.

These changes go some way to redressing the bias towards the funding of the academic route, and offer opportunities for training that are currently only available to university undergraduates studying conventional degrees.

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Employment, fairness at work, and enterprise

Summary

This chapter looks at ethnic minority progress at work. It considers the history of, and current state of, pay and employment, and the trends in social class mobility across generations.

The employment rates for the White British and Indian ethnic groups were 77% and 76% respectively in 2019. For some others it was significantly lower at 69% for Black people, and 56% for people in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group (this last figure is the result of a much lower female participation rate). [\[footnote 1\]](#) Unemployment differences have been declining, though remain significantly higher for younger people. [\[footnote 2\]](#)

The pay gap, meaning the difference between the median hourly earnings of all ethnic minority (not including White minority) groups and White groups, is at its lowest level since 2012 at 2.3%. Employees from the White Irish, Indian and Chinese ethnic groups on average have higher hourly earnings than the White British ethnic group. [\[footnote 3\]](#)

Ethnic minorities have been making progress up the professional and occupational class ladder, though some more than others, and there remains under-representation at the very top. Employees from ethnic minority backgrounds are more likely than those from a White British background to say experiencing discrimination contributed to their failure in achieving their career expectations (20% versus 11%). [\[footnote 4\]](#)

Also, using data from previous reviews led by Baroness Ruby McGregor-Smith and Sir John Parker, evidence heard from a wide range of stakeholders, and an examination of new data, the Commission identified 4 areas of focus:

1. Ethnicity pay gap, evaluating trends in pay and considering the value of ethnicity pay reporting in promoting fair outcomes, using the NHS as a case study.
2. Fairness at work, challenging existing approaches and examining alternative ways to promote fairness for ethnic minorities that leads to better outcomes and achieves inclusivity.
3. Empowering the next generation of entrepreneurs, stimulating the entrepreneurial instincts of enterprising young people from all backgrounds.
4. Artificial intelligence, considering how to identify and mitigate bias in artificial intelligence, and use it as a tool to promote fairness.


The case studies highlighted in this chapter have been identified by the Commission, during its evidence gathering phase, as positive examples of what works and are used for illustrative purposes only in the context in which they arise. The Commission fully recognises that there will be many other examples of similar good practice in the respective fields and industries, so wishes to make clear that in highlighting them they are not particularly endorsed or being given preferential treatment.

Employment and unemployment

The pandemic will have a significant effect on the British economy, causing a big reordering of employment and possibly a return to sustained high levels of unemployment. Some of the data presented below could therefore be overtaken by events. Nevertheless, the pay and employment story has been a broadly positive one in the last quarter of a century. There has been a gradual convergence on the White average in employment, pay and entry into the middle class, with some groups overtaking the White majority and others somewhat underperforming.

In the 1970s, still largely an era of full employment, there was very little disparity between ethnic groups in employment rates.[\[footnote 5\]](#) This was at a time when racial hostility was much greater as well as more tolerated than today, underlining the point that equal outcomes do not necessarily signify lack of discrimination just as differential outcomes are not necessarily caused by discrimination. Employment rates then widened sharply in the 1980s and into the 1990s, due to deindustrialisation and recessions, but since the early 2000s have been narrowing again.[\[footnote 6\]](#)

Figure 5: Percentage of working age people who were employed, by ethnicity over time (UK, 1972 to 2020)



Source: Evidence commissioned by the Commission, Norrie, R., Goodhart, D., using data from the General Household Survey and the Labour Force Survey analysed by Professor Yaojun Li.

The gap in employment between the White ethnic group and the Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi groups has decreased over the past 20 years.[\[footnote 7\]](#) This is mainly due to the fact that these ethnic minority groups started with notably lower employment rates in 2001. For example, the employment rate for the Bangladeshi ethnic group increased by 20.6 percentage points from 2001 to 2019, while the rate for the White ethnic group increased by 4.0 percentage points in the same period.[\[footnote 8\]](#) Disparities in unemployment rates have been declining quite sharply since 2013.[\[footnote 9\]](#) 8% of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi group, 8% of the Black group, and 6% of the Mixed group were unemployed in 2019, compared with 4% of the White group.[\[footnote 10\]](#)

The pre-pandemic employment rate for the White British was 77% in 2019. The rate for people from the Indian ethnic group was just lower, at 76%, while most other minority groups had a lower employment rate: 69% for Black people and 56% for people in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group. For White minorities, classified as White Other, the rate was higher than for the White British group (83%).[\[footnote 11\]](#)


The pandemic is likely to have a mixed impact on the employment rate and financial stability of ethnic minority groups. For example, working in sectors shut down by the pandemic and being self employed is particularly prevalent among Pakistani and Bangladeshi men. This brings uncertainty of income in households which also typically have less savings to fall back on. Only 30% of people from the Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Black African groups live in households with enough to cover one month of income, compared to 60% of the rest of the population. On the other hand, the high representation of other ethnic minority groups in some key worker roles reduces their risk of income losses, at least in the short term.[\[footnote 12\]](#) These are only early trends and changes to employment rates usually lag behind economic shocks. Historically, employment rates of ethnic minority groups have gone down more than overall employment rates during economic downturns in the UK. This indicates a risk to ethnic minority groups if the economic fallout from the COVID-19 crisis fails to turn into a V-shaped recovery.[\[footnote 13\]](#)

There are substantial differences between men and women in employment rates in the combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group: 73% compared with 39% respectively in 2019, likely due to cultural-religious reasons. Less marked differences are observed for all other ethnic groups: White British men and women 80% and 74% respectively, and Black men and women 71% and 67% respectively.[\[footnote 14\]](#)

Age is another important factor, with employment rate differences between the 16 to 24 and 25 to 49 age groups largest in the Indian ethnic group (38% and 84%) and smallest in the White British group (58% and 86%).[\[footnote 15\]](#) This difference is likely to be because young people from the Indian ethnic group are also among the most likely to go on to further education.[\[footnote 16\]](#)

Disparities in unemployment rates between ethnic groups are also wider for the 16 to 24 age group. Overall unemployment in 2019 for White people was 4%, and 7% for all minority groups combined.[\[footnote 17\]](#) For people aged 16 to 24, unemployment rates are far more pronounced: the White ethnic group has an unemployment rate of 10%, compared with 19% for ethnic minority groups.[\[footnote 18\]](#) Black African and Bangladeshi ethnic groups see the highest rates of youth unemployment at 26% and 24% respectively.[\[footnote 19\]](#)

Figure 6: Unemployment rate by ethnicity and age group (UK, 2017 to 2020 combined)




Unemployment rates for the 16 to 24 group are high even for those from Indian and Chinese ethnic groups who comfortably outperform the White average in education and incomes overall and generally benefit from positive stereotypes. It is noticeable that young people from the Black Caribbean ethnic group (who are more likely to come from families that have been established in the UK for longer) have a much lower unemployment rate than those from the Black African ethnic group, even though prejudice faced by both groups is likely to apply in equal measure.

Discrimination is likely to be a part of the story too, an assumption reinforced by field experiments in which responses are compared in imaginary job applications between people with majority and minority sounding names. We will look at this later in the 'Bias at work and what to do about it' section. ## Pay, social class and entry to top jobs


The hourly median pay gap between all minorities and the White British ethnic group has shrunk to 2.3%, its smallest level since 2012 when it was 5.1%.[\[footnote 20\]](#) This headline figure hides some large variations: the Pakistani ethnic group earned 16% less on average than the White British group, the Bangladeshi ethnic group 15% less, and the Black African group 8% less. Meanwhile the White Irish (41%), Chinese (23%) and Indian (16%) ethnic groups earned more on average than the White British group.

In terms of gender, men earned a higher hourly median wage than women in all but 3 ethnic groups in 2019 (Arab, Bangladeshi, and Black Caribbean). Black Caribbean and Arab women also earn more on average than White British women.[\[footnote 21\]](#)

Figure 7: Hourly median pay gap compared with the White British ethnic group, by ethnicity (England and Wales, 2019)

The ethnicity pay gap data only includes those who are employed in the UK, omitting those who are either self employed or not in work. This is significant, particularly when considering that many ethnic minority groups already have lower employment rates than the White British group.

These 'raw' pay numbers also do not take into account things like age, qualifications, region, whether someone was born in the UK or not, and when adjusted it can reduce the pay gap for some and increase it for others. So, for example, after adjustment, the strongly positive pay gap for the UK-born Chinese ethnic group turns into a small negative one, and for the UK-born Indian group is reduced to a smaller positive pay gap. In other words, although people from the Chinese ethnic group are earning more on average than White British people, they are actually earning less when taking account of all of these other factors.

Figure 8: Hourly median pay gap compared with the White British ethnic group, adjusted for characteristics affecting pay, by ethnicity (England and Wales, 2019) [\[footnote 22\]](#)

The overall convergence story on employment and pay is also reflected in a shift up the social scale. Some of this has happened almost automatically as the social structure has changed in the past 50 years, eliminating manual working class jobs and creating many more middle class and professional jobs, but some ethnic groups have moved up the social scale more than others. Over the past 50 years several ethnic groups have made exceptional progress in the UK.

According to work on social mobility by Professor Yaojun Li, ethnic minority children with parents in routine manual roles [\[footnote 23\]](#) were much more likely to achieve upward mobility compared with their White peers. Only 5% of children from the Chinese ethnic group remain in the same routine manual positions as their parents, compared with 24% of White children.

With the exception of men from the Black Caribbean and combined Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups, most ethnic groups are now broadly level with the White ethnic group in terms of occupational class. [\[footnote 24\]](#) Black Caribbean men arriving in the UK had a lower start in terms of class position and were well behind White men in occupational advancement or in access to the top occupational classes (including jobs such as teacher, manager, social worker and engineer) for most of the past 50 years. However, according to Li's work there are also signs that they are catching up, with second-generation men (those born in the UK or arriving before the age of 13) being little different from White men and second-generation women surpassing White women.

Meanwhile, Pakistani and Bangladeshi men, along with Black African and Black Caribbean men, were the most vulnerable to unemployment in times of economic downturn, with the chances of getting a position in the top occupational class also declining over the decades for first generation Pakistani and Bangladeshi men. Women in the Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic group also tend to have persistent disadvantages relative to White women in terms of both employment status and class position. Three-quarters of the first generation and around half of the second-generation women in this group were economically inactive, although the situation has improved in the current decade.

In spite of the variations, there have been more signs of social progress than social regress over the past 50 years, with some groups, like those from the Indian and Chinese ethnic groups doing even better than those from the White ethnic group, and other groups catching up.

What about the extent to which ethnic minorities advance into the very top positions in professional, business and public life?

The executive recruitment agency Green Park's Colour of Power project has recently found that 52 out of 1,099 of the "most powerful jobs" were held by ethnic minority individuals. That is 4.7%. It concluded that Britain's leadership positions had failed to improve between 2017 and 2020, with only 15 additional ethnic minority-held roles since 2017. [\[footnote 25\]](#)

When looking at the top of the FTSE 100, we see that there has been an improvement in the representation of ethnic minorities on board just in this last year. In January 2020, 52 FTSE 100 companies had ethnic representation on their boards, and in November 2020 this figure rose to 74. [\[footnote 26\]](#) However, at the same time the number of Black people at the very top of the top FTSE 100 companies (meaning chair, chief executive or chief financial officer) recently fell from 2 to 0 (reported in February 2021). [\[footnote 27\]](#)


Overall, some sectors of the UK are more open than others, the top of business and academia remain notably White while the public sector in general has a better track record than the private. [\[footnote 28\]](#)

Now we take a closer look at the share of ethnic minorities in the upper echelons of 3 professions - the Civil Service, law, and medicine.

Civil Service

As of 2020, 9.1% of senior civil servants came from an ethnic minority background, which has increased from around 4% in 2010. [\[footnote 29\]](#) There is substantial variation across government departments. In 2019, the department with the highest levels of ethnic diversity is the Department for Health and Social Care, where 12.8% of senior civil servants came from an ethnic minority background. In contrast, only 2.2% of senior civil servants at the Ministry of Defence came from an ethnic minority background. [\[footnote 30\]](#)

Figure 9: Percentage of civil servants who were from ethnic minority groups (not including White minorities), by government department and grade



The Civil Service fast stream is the Civil Service's talent spotting programme for its future leadership. The most recent data shows that, in 2018, over 12,000 applications were received from ethnic minority applicants (31.2% of those where ethnicity was known). Of people recommended for appointment, 15.8% were from an ethnic minority background. Both these figures have been increasing steadily since the late 1990s. [\[footnote 31\]](#) The Civil Service has a series of ethnic minority targets for appointments to the senior service. Its current target is to have 9.5% of appointments to the Senior Civil Service from an ethnic minority background, rising to 13.2% in 2022/25. [\[footnote 32\]](#) It is currently falling short of these; indeed, they may be unrealistic targets given the minority share of the talent pool that entered the Civil Service at the turn of the century.


Law

As of 2019, 21% of lawyers working in law firms in England and Wales were from an ethnic minority background, 15% of lawyers are Asian (up 6 percentage points since 2014) compared with 7% of the workforce in England, Scotland and Wales in 2018. 3% of lawyers are Black (no change since 2017) and this reflects the workforce in England, Scotland and Wales in 2018 (3%). There has been no change in the percentage of lawyers from the Mixed (2%) or Other (1%) ethnic groups. [\[footnote 33\]](#) Ethnic minority partners tend to be clustered more in 'sole-owner' law firms as well as smaller firms. The largest firms (50 or more partners) have the lowest percentage of ethnic minority partners (8%). In contrast, 36% of one-partner firms have a partner from an ethnic minority background. [\[footnote 34\]](#) The most elite law firms, known as the 'magic circle' and including Freshfields, Allen & Overy, Slaughter & May, Clifford Chance and Linklaters, show some variation in their diversity levels at partner level. [\[footnote 35\]](#) For instance, 6% of partners at Slaughter and May are of ethnic minority background compared with 10% at Linklaters as of 2018/19. These firms are mostly more diverse at associate level than the national average. Around 18% to 26% of magic circle associates are from an ethnic minority compared with 15% of associates across all law firms. The exception was Freshfields at 13%. [\[footnote 36\]](#) Among barristers, levels of ethnic diversity are broadly similar to solicitors. Overall, 14.6% of practicing barristers come from an ethnic minority background. At the QC level, [\[footnote 37\]](#) 8.8% are from ethnic minority backgrounds. Finally, the ethnic diversity of pupil barristers is higher, with 22.9% of them coming from an ethnic minority background. [\[footnote 38\]](#) Judges from ethnic minority backgrounds are still relatively rare but with this growing pipeline are expected to become more common.

Medicine

Medicine is a profession where ethnic minority groups are strongly represented. In 2020, almost half (46.1%) of doctors working in the NHS were from an ethnic minority background, with 30.2% from the Asian ethnic group, 5.2% from the Black ethnic group, 3.5% from the Mixed ethnic group and 2.6% from the Chinese ethnic group. [\[footnote 39\]](#) Senior doctors (including consultants and speciality doctors) were overall more likely to be White (56.2%) or Asian (31.4%) than junior doctors (including speciality registrars and Foundation year doctors) (50.5% and 29.3%), and likewise a higher percentage of junior doctors were from Black, Chinese, Mixed or Other ethnic backgrounds compared with senior doctors. However, representation varies between these grades. Overall, around 40% of consultants are from ethnic minority backgrounds, as is a similar share of foundation Year 1 doctors. [\[footnote 40\]](#)

Figure 10: Percentage of doctors who were from each ethnic group, by grade



Ethnicity pay gap reporting

An ethnicity pay gap is calculated as the difference between the median hourly earnings of the reference group (White or White British) and other ethnic groups as a proportion of median hourly earnings of the reference group. [\[footnote 41\]](#) For this reason, pay gaps, on whatever grounds, do not necessarily represent unequal pay for equal work, but can describe the structure of an organisation and how different ethnic groups are distributed across its pay bands.

Ethnicity pay gap reporting is a potentially useful tool but needs to be approached with care. Reported ethnicity pay data should be disaggregated by different ethnicities to provide the best information possible. The pay gaps, once identified, should be reviewed to gain an understanding of why they exist in different organisations.

Discussions with businesses have revealed that, like the Commission, they are aware of the pitfalls around the execution of ethnicity pay reporting, but feel that this work needs to start somewhere. We specifically consider the NHS as a case study later in this section, reviewing disparities in pay among ethnic minority healthcare staff as well as disparities in recruitment and progression.

We recognise the appetite that some employers have to act and publish their ethnicity pay gaps. A number of private and public sector employers (such as the NHS) have already voluntarily published their ethnicity pay gaps. We believe that ethnicity pay gaps should continue to be reported on a voluntary basis and that the government should provide guidance to employers who choose to do so.

It is clear that pay gap reporting as it is currently devised for gender cannot be applied to ethnicity. There are significant statistical and data issues that would arise as a result of substituting a binary protected characteristic (male or female) with a characteristic that has multiple categories.

The main statistical problem that arises with ethnicity pay reporting is the unreliability of sample sizes. If an employer with 250 employees (the threshold suggested in the 2018 BEIS consultation on ethnic pay gap reporting) [\[footnote 42\]](#) reports a gender pay gap, on average they will be comparing 125 men with 125 women.

If they report an ethnicity pay gap as well, on average they will be comparing 225 White employees with 25 ethnic minority employees. Any findings from such a comparison will be unreliable and make it impossible to look at the workforce stratified by the 18 ONS ethnicity classifications.

If an employer is in an area with a low ethnic minority population there may not be a diverse local candidate pool for firms to employ from. The 2011 Census data shows that of the 650 constituencies in the UK, 437 are over 90% White. [\[footnote 43\]](#) so many employers around the country simply do not have enough ethnic minorities for the recording sample to be valid.

For example, any employer in the Lake District can expect 98% of its candidate pool to be White. An employer there with 300 staff could then expect to have on average just 6 ethnic minority employees.

Any comparison between the median of 294 employees with the median of 6 employees will be meaningless and is likely to change considerably just from adding or subtracting one ethnic minority employee.

Additionally, the age distribution of ethnic minority groups can influence the ethnicity pay gap. Those from ethnic minority groups are more likely to be younger, meaning they have not yet had the opportunity to reach the peak of their careers. In order to account for this, firms would have to control for age, which makes sample sizes smaller and the reported data subject to fluctuations year on year.

Recommendation 9: Promote fairness - Investigate what causes existing ethnic pay disparities

The Commission recommends that all employers that choose to publish their ethnicity pay figures should also publish a diagnosis and action plan to lay out the reasons for and the strategy to improve any disparities. Reported ethnicity pay data should also be disaggregated by different ethnicities to provide the best information possible to facilitate change. Account should also be taken of small sample sizes in particular regions and smaller organisations.

To support employers undertaking this exercise, the Commission recommends that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) is tasked with producing guidance for employers to draw on.

NHS pay, recruitment and progression

In 2018, the NHS became one of the first public sector organisations to publish breakdowns of pay for all staff by ethnic group, but the picture presented by the overall NHS data is complicated.

For instance, in 2019, the average monthly basic pay of (full-time equivalent) Asian men overall, was £3,864, greater than that of White men (£3,145) who in turn earned more than Black men (£2,646). [\[footnote 44\]](#) Similarly, Asian women (£2,717) earned more than White women (£2,491), who in turn earned more than Black women (£2,320). [\[footnote 45\]](#) There is a disparity here but more information is required to understand why and where this disparity exists. The high number of Asian groups at consultant level in the NHS is likely to explain some of this difference.

Generally, there is no consistent pattern with examples of both positive and negative pay gaps, as well as examples of parity. One of the standout figures is that Black male senior managers earn just 83p for every £1 earned by their White counterparts, while Asian male senior managers earn £1.01. [\[footnote 46\]](#) This might have something to do with the seniority levels within this category. At the 'very senior manager' grade, Black men earn 97p for every £1 earned by White men, while Asian men earn £1.04. The corresponding figures for women are 99p and £1.06 respectively. [\[footnote 47\]](#)

Such a picture is not consistent with a pattern one might expect of systemic discrimination, although undoubtedly, there will be cases of discrimination and bias in what is the largest employer in the country. The weight of the evidence considered tends to point towards the White group receiving marginally more pay within staff groups. An analysis of pay by ethnicity controlling for age would provide further insight into pay differences.

Case study: The Surash Pearce Report on Ethnic Pay Gap

This report [\[footnote 48\]](#) (published in September 2020) presents a comprehensive review into ethnic pay gap and workforce development at The Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust.

The report used the following data during its review:

- electronic staff records
- WRES data - 2018/19 data
- NHS National Staff Survey
- recruitment data from TRAC recruitment management system
- local and national Clinical Excellence Awards data

By combining these varied data sets the review was able to build a more in-depth understanding of differences in the pay, progression and experiences of the trusts' ethnic minority staff.

Some of the key headline findings include:

- BME staff are more likely to pursue continuous professional development and non-mandatory training
- BME staff at Newcastle Hospitals report being more likely than White staff to be bullied or harassed by other members of staff, with less opportunity to progress in their careers, but more discrimination from managers
- White staff report experienced more abuse from service users compared with BME staff at Newcastle Hospitals
- a White applicant to a consultant job in Newcastle is more likely to be shortlisted and more likely to be successful at interview (relative likelihood 1.53 times)
- additional programmed activities (PA) [\[footnote 49\]](#) payments: female consultants lag behind male consultants
- Clinical Excellence Award (CEA): Locally a BME consultant makes 24.5% less than a White consultant, compared with national awards which is only 5.4% less.
- more female BME consultants applied for the local CEA [\[footnote 50\]](#) (2017/18) and were more likely to be awarded CEAs, however the value of their award was the lowest level.

Impact:

Newcastle Hospitals believe they are the first Trust in the country to publish such detailed, transparent and extensive information about this issue. Some of the information in this report makes difficult and uncomfortable reading but the Trust has reflected on it and is using the report to learn from and as a basis for improvement. Newcastle Hospitals has used the information to inspire positive dialogue and taken action to address race inequality in the workforce.

Case study: Occupational preferences research

During the Commission's investigations of this topic, an exploratory piece of research [\[footnote 51\]](#) was commissioned to try to understand possible reasons behind the occupational preferences of NHS staff and if there were any differences by ethnicity. The study had a small sample size (n=116), along with an uneven distribution for gender, White and ethnic minority groups, and full and part-time employees. As a result, findings should be regarded as indicative only.

However, this is an example of the kind of work that could be done by Trusts or the NHS as a whole to consider the causes of any career progression gap between different groups of employees:

The study explored factors influencing behaviours in the attainment of managerial and leadership roles across ethnic groups - that is, White and ethnic minority populations in the NHS. As the authors stated "the objective of this study was to offer preliminary findings on whether there is a significant difference in behaviours of ethnic groups that explains variance in attaining managerial and leadership roles".

The study found that a much higher proportion of respondents from Black and Asian groups perceive becoming a manager or leader to be a risky career choice. IT also found that a higher number of Black respondents disagree that their manager and others more senior provide them with feedback to become a manager, in comparison with White respondents. This merits better understanding as there are simple HR activities which can address these perceptions.

The research also suggested across all ethnic groups there was a link between the level of educational attainment of respondents' parents and the respondents' career progression. Therefore suggesting that socio-economic background is a factor meriting further investigation where racial disparities arise.

As noted previously, the pay gaps, once identified, should be reviewed to gain an understanding of why they exist in different organisations. There are several ways in which this could be done. An example of this is demonstrated through the case study above of an exploratory piece of research conducted of NHS staff.

Recommendation 10: Promote fairness - Improve understanding of the ethnicity pay gap in NHS England


The Commission recommends that NHS England as a whole should commission a strategic review of the causes of disparate pay and, where discrimination is pinpointed, spell out the measures that might meaningfully address it. Such a review would shine a light on the barriers to in-work progression and how to overcome them - for example, in promotion, are foreign qualifications equally validated yet 'informally' seen as 'inferior'. It would ask how the NHS performs on pay gaps compared with international comparators and if other metrics than pay gaps reveal barriers better.

Bias at work and what to do about it

Bias and discrimination at work are usually hard to pin down, especially when they are not only a social taboo, but also illegal. The field experiments using job applications tests, mentioned below, provide conclusive evidence that bias, at least in hiring, does exist. They also highlight the need for more scrutiny of the interventions that do make a difference.

Job application field experiments have been carried out in the UK since the late 1960s. The most recent was conducted by Dr Valentina Di Stasio and Professor Anthony Heath as part of a wider EU-funded project and found a call-back ratio of 1.6:1. [\[footnote 52\]](#) In other words, to receive a call-back, people with ethnic minority names had to write 1.6 letters for every 1 written by someone with a majority name. A less recent study focused on UK cities was conducted by NatCen on behalf of the Department for Work and Pensions. This study found a similar call-back ratio of 1.7:1, with ratios varying between ethnic minority groups from 1.5:1 to 1.9:1. [\[footnote 53\]](#)

Figure 11: Response rates to job enquiries ('call-back ratios') compared with the White ethnic group, by ethnicity (DWP, 2009)



There are important caveats. We know that discrimination occurs, but these experiments cannot be relied upon to provide clarity on the extent that it happens in every day life.

While these application tests show discrimination against names that are recognised as not being traditionally British, it is unclear if this effect is about race, class or perceived foreign culture. More granular studies should be conducted which manipulate first names as well as surnames, class as well as ethnicity, and which include greater and lesser levels of CV qualifications, as all have been found to affect the results. [\[footnote 54\]](#) They should also attempt to assess the ethnic makeup of those making hiring decisions, or at least the ethnic composition of the hiring organisation or unit, to test for variations in bias among assessors.

Field experiments are, of course, not the only possible evidence for discrimination. Varying promotion rates may also signify discrimination, with more ethnic minority employees overall saying that experiencing discrimination contributed to them failing to achieve their career expectations than those from a White British background (20% compared to 11%). Black employees had a higher rate of experiencing discrimination at 29%. [\[footnote 55\]](#) but this was still not the experience of the majority.

Subjective factors may also affect perceptions of discrimination. Human beings tend to discriminate, even when unintended. We are all susceptible to differentiating between in-groups and out-groups and will be prone to favour those we perceive as belonging.

The Commission recognises that some organisations have already adopted initiatives that produce fairer recruitment, for example through name-blind applications and diverse interview panels. For example, Baker McKenzie, the international law firm, uses a combined approach of blind screening and the Contextual Recruitment System (CRS) developed by Rare Recruitment (see case study below). [\[footnote 56\]](#) Evidence submitted from the Employers Lawyers Association (ELA) to the Commission's call for evidence further highlighted that many firms have adopted Rare Recruitment's Contextual Recruitment System in recruiting candidates from diverse backgrounds. This initiative was considered important in helping the legal profession in particular to reduce the evidenced racial inequalities that exist when recruiting young people. [\[footnote 57\]](#)

Case study: Rare Recruitment's Contextual Recruitment System

Research shows high-achieving people from disadvantaged backgrounds outperform their peers in elite jobs. Rare's pioneering Contextual Recruitment System (CRS) provides real time contextual information that allows organisations to identify exceptional candidates they might otherwise miss.

The system uses big data to help organisations identify candidates with the greatest potential. It measures candidates' achievements, including academic performance at university, against uniquely comprehensive datasets and classification systems developed by Rare over a decade.

The system works by combining publicly available information with candidates' application responses. Rare uses information from their bespoke databases. For example, in the UK, the first database contains the exam results of more than 4,000 secondary schools and sixth-form colleges nationally, while the second contains 2.5 million residential postcodes.

The system delivers 2 outputs to employers: flags to measure disadvantage and Performance Index (PI) to measure outperformance against students at the same school. Rare reports that firms adopting their CRS hire 61% more people from disadvantaged backgrounds.

Unconscious bias is a form of 'fast thinking' - those quick decisions we make without realising and are no doubt connected to particular values or world views that are hard-wired into our minds. Such bias is commonplace because it is reflexive and automatic. It is also laced with preferences and prejudices based on our upbringing and family and social backgrounds.

All people, not just White people, are subject to these biases but it matters more if you are 84% of the population and tend to dominate the top positions. There is a perception that people at the top tend to have affinity bias, appointing people in their own image. Polling by Harvey Nash's Engage network of senior executive and board leaders from ethnic minority backgrounds found that 63% believed that the unconscious biases of boards and CEOs is a factor in explaining why there is so little diversity at board level. [\[footnote 58\]](#)

Indeed, FTSE 100 CEOs do have a certain profile. They are nearly all White [\[footnote 59\]](#), male, university graduates and one-quarter have MBAs. 18% have studied at Oxford or Cambridge, and almost half of them have been promoted from inside the same company (46% in 2019). [\[footnote 60\]](#) If ambitious minority people do not fit the mental image of what leadership looks like, they fear they will be overlooked. For those who come from a different background or have a different set of experiences, the implicit culture or feel of professional life can seem strange, especially for those from a minority or working-class background.

Research by the Equality and Human Rights Commission found that for FTSE 350 leadership role descriptions provided by 25 companies, 28% explicitly specified some form of cultural fit or 'chemistry'. [\[footnote 61\]](#) Youth Futures Foundation and research from NatCen Social Research illustrate how these requirements can further disadvantage those from underrepresented backgrounds:

Such 'information gaps' can grow even larger if young people from more affluent backgrounds have a better understanding of the demands of a job application process as well as a greater appreciation of the relevant cultural norms (which can be particularly beneficial in interviews and assessment centres).

(Youth Futures Foundation, call for evidence)

Young people across ethnic groups were aware that they may lack the cultural capital that high skilled employers may value. In turn, they suspected that prospective employers may make (conscious or unconscious) judgements based on the way graduates from working-class backgrounds dress and present themselves, as well as their vocabulary, accent and ability to articulate themselves in an interview.

(NatCen Social Research [\[footnote 62\]](#))

Many companies have been prompted into intense soul-searching with regard to race, prompted by the Black Lives Matter movement last year. They have adopted various diversity and inclusion indexes, tick-box exercises and charters, such as unconscious bias training. The result, however, seems to be a focus on process rather than outcomes: this training scheme, that equality initiative, a newly designed culturally neutral form.

Most researchers remain sceptical about the impact of unconscious bias training, quotas and diversity specialists. Research by Kalev and Dobbin, published in the Harvard Business Review, found that mandatory diversity and inclusion measures have not always been successful. [\[footnote 63\]](#) Many of the products of the diversity and inclusion industry are not standardised or certified by an official body, or independently assessed to show any level of efficacy, and some of the most popular products, such as unconscious bias training, have been shown to have unclear or mixed impact. Indeed, research by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Probation found that sometimes, probation staff feel reluctant to speak freely for fear of their words coming across as racist, limiting opportunity for further discussions. [\[footnote 64\]](#) The Equality and Human Rights Commission found that evidence for unconscious bias training's ability effectively to change behaviour is limited and "there is potential for back-firing effects when UBT participants are exposed to information that suggests stereotypes and biases are unchangeable." [\[footnote 65\]](#)

While the Commission recognises the place of such practices in the journey to promote diverse and inclusive work environments, it maintains that diversity and eliminating disparities requires impactful organisational redesign and training that leads to truly inclusive environments. By inclusive, this means an environment where anyone feels comfortable to be themselves and confident that they have the same chance of succeeding as anyone else with the same qualifications and experience. Diversity training and policies that treat people differently according to ethnicity does not work.

We all have a responsibility to reduce bias and there must be some tolerance for human fallibility. As Musa al-Gharbi makes clear in his article 'Diversity is Important. Diversity-Related Training is Terrible', diversity-related training should be a process of mutual exploration in which bias, discrimination, nepotism and motivated reasoning should be seen as 'general cognitive tendencies' which people of all backgrounds and ethnicities are susceptible to.

[\[footnote 66\]](#) This indicates 'nudge'-style procedures (such as name-blind CVs, transparent performance metrics, family-friendly policies, proactive mentoring and networking procedures) are more useful than methods that overtly discriminate against some groups, for example quotas.

The Commission recognises that employers will want to do something to show a commitment to fairness. However, finding one ethnic minority face for a board, for example, is not a substitute for a proper fairness strategy. It should not be assumed that someone's ethnic background will change a board's culture, nor that when people from different backgrounds come together they will be more creative. Greater emphasis should be placed on diversity of thought and perspective around a board table which is not associated with anyone's race or ethnicity. Widening the pool of places where positions are advertised or people recruited could attract more diverse candidates in every sense of the word without discriminating against any group.

Organisations can be (re)designed to change behaviour, and therefore outcomes. Sometimes the changes are so simple that they seem trite, for example, using images of successful colleagues with an ethnic minority background on walls. But these 'nudge' measures and a better understanding of how selection for top jobs operate have been proven to produce among the best results and beneficial outcomes, without alienating people.

One example of increasing representation through the use of nudge measures such as mentoring is Liverpool City Council's initiative 'Step Forward - Step Up'. The programme, due to be launched in September 2021, will be delivered by a consortium of key city employers led by the Lord Mayor of Liverpool. Through a series of development modules (such as leadership development programme, mentoring and action learning sets), it will seek to develop and create a diverse talent pipeline in Liverpool. Participating employers support the programme by sponsoring participants' fees, promoting career opportunities, contributing to modules, providing mentoring and committing to embedding diversity at all levels, among other things. This programme was developed in partnership with the successful model created by Bristol City Council's 'Stepping Up' initiative. [\[footnote 67\]](#) a locally driven public-private collaboration to advance representation.

From the evidence it received, the Commission identified a promising inclusion tool by Zyna Search developed by In Diverse Company that provides an alternate way for businesses to measure inclusion based on behavioural psychology and research. The bespoke model, called the Cultural Inclusion Maturity Model (CIMM) [\[footnote 68\]](#), is focused on driving consistent and meaningful behaviour changes in a measurable way, and tailored to meet respective business needs. In Diverse Company's work with private and public sector firms has revealed that, despite an increased ethnic diversity at the board level, other employees in the organisation still face marginalisation. Shifting cultures takes a more sustained effort than increasing representation. Both however, are critically important, and are likely to feed into each other. The Commission has seen (preliminary) evidence of the CIMM's novel approach yielding positive results, for example within a leading pharmaceutical company and also a recruitment company that In Diverse Company have partnered with.

Case study: Cultural Inclusion Maturity Model

The Culture Inclusion Maturity Model was developed with a mission to create a dynamic system of inclusion measurement that enables organisations to recognise, track and monitor progress in establishing an inclusive workplace on a global scale. The constructs of the model are underpinned by psychological and business research.

The unique methodology measures inclusion by assessing the behaviours of leaders, teams and employees and auditing the organisation's capability (defined by policies, processes, and procedures). The model not only provides a specific measure for an organisation which can be compared with others, it also clearly defines where the measure is in terms of its maturity level and as such enables organisations to see how they can make improvements.

At the end of the process, organisations receive:

- an inclusion accreditation - either bronze, silver, or gold
- a comprehensive breakdown of findings - highlighting areas of the organisation that are more or less inclusive than others

- a list of recommended actions - tailored to the organisation, specifically designed to increase overall inclusion and employee well-being

The model has been tested for validity and reliability in the UK, Europe, Asia and the US, and across a range of sectors to ensure the measure is robust. Progress is measured by running the CIMM on a regular basis (every 12 to 18 months) with key outcomes for organisation including, improved:

- well-being - inclusive work cultures provide a safer place for employees to perform at their best
- transparency - inclusive cultures drive transparency and reduce instances of corporate wrongdoing and corruption, build trust between employees and managers, and create reputable brands
- business performance - inclusive cultures drive better decisions, productivity, innovation, creativity leading to better business performance
- diversity - inclusive cultures, ones where all employees feel they belong and can also be open about their differences, are ones that not only attract diverse talent but also they get the most from diversity of perspective

Impact: there is early evidence to show additional organisational benefits, such as a reduced number of grievance and disciplinary actions, reduction in sickness levels, and increases in staff engagement and customer satisfaction.

The Commission also recognises the important role of public sector procurement and supporting in-work progression. It welcomes the publication of the government's 'Transforming public procurement' green paper^[footnote 69] and supports the work of the In-Work Progression Commission led by Baroness McGregor-Smith.

Recommendation 8: Promote fairness - Advance fairness in the workplace

a) The Commission calls on organisations to now move away from funding unconscious bias training. The existing training should be replaced with new interventions that when implemented, can be measured or evaluated for their efficacy, such as:

- mandated sponsorship groups to ensure wider exposure of ethnic minority individuals to their peers, managers and other decision makers
- training and routine skills support for all employees in their professional and personal lives (for example on collaboration, confidence, communication, and presentation skills), which could disproportionately benefit more disadvantaged groups

b) The Commission also calls on the government to work with a panel of academics and practitioners to develop resources and evidence-based approaches of what does work to advance fairness in the workplace. The landscape of diversity training is highly mixed, and the government can play a role in guiding organisations to high quality materials and resources. These resources should include guidance for employers, and be piloted in the Civil Service to replace the use of unconscious bias training.

NHS staff experience

The NHS is a success story with significant over-representation of ethnic minorities in high status professional roles, but also a less happy story, with a consistently negative experience reported by many of its ethnic minority staff at lower levels.

The Commission heard from frontline staff who felt that there were still informal progression or recruitment practices that could be slowing the reduction of disparities. The Commission heard that "For exec and non-exec roles, having transparency in the application process is vital. We have examples of conversations and pats on the back to get appointments to the board." This was raised as a particular issue when moving into management: "At junior stage I didn't feel discrimination but getting forward into other roles it becomes difficult. It goes back to these networks that the average Black person doesn't have".

These processes are challenging to nail down and then to police, given their informal nature, but more broadly, the NHS recognises that there are problematic disparities which impact the experience, wellbeing and health outcomes of staff themselves, as well as their career progression, and the performance of the Trusts in which they work.^[footnote 70]

Ethnic minority staff report worse experiences, when compared with White staff. The Commission heard examples of the kinds of negative experiences faced by some on the frontline; "the issues came when I was actually qualified. I would go on to wards and not even be recognised [as a nurse]- people would even ring agencies to confirm if I was an actual nurse".

The NHS's Work Race Equality Standard (WRES) is a series of indicators chosen to measure equality within the NHS. Evidence from WRES shows ethnic minority NHS staff are more likely to report personally experiencing discrimination at work from a colleague (15.3% of people who were not White, compared with 6.4% of White workers).^[footnote 71] They are also more likely to report harassment, bullying or abuse (29% compared with 24.2%), and less likely to believe there were equal opportunities for career progression or promotion (69.9% compared with 86.3%).^[footnote 72]

In terms of actual opportunities, WRES shows White applicants were 1.46 times more likely to be appointed from shortlisting across all posts, while 'BME' staff were more likely to be formally disciplined by a factor of 1.22.^[footnote 73]

It should be noted that the surveys from which this data is taken have a low response rate for ethnic minorities (16.7%).^[footnote 74] WRES indicators are limited to White staff versus 'BME' staff, and so do not tell the full story as to where the actual disparities lie.

The Commission accepts the work of WRES as important to monitor fairness within the NHS but suggests that further detail is required. This includes disaggregating within the 'BME' category, as well as looking at opportunities in more detail, most notably in terms of disparity within staff groups.

In an effort to establish how NHS organisations can address workforce inequalities, the King's Fund looked at case study examples of where interventions such as establishing staff networks, ensuring safe routes for raising concerns, and enabling staff development and career progression were being implemented.^[footnote 75] It was found that these were broadly perceived to be beneficial, but also recognised that there is no single 'one size fits all' approach that can work.

The Care Quality Commission (CQC) takes a range of diversity indicators, including WRES scores and recruitment data, into account when running its inspections, as well as engagement with bodies or groups within healthcare providers to gain qualitative understanding of such issues. However, the Commission has heard about a lack of trust in the CQC process among frontline staff. As one paramedic stated, "the CQC has made it clear they ignore race issues".

The Commission heard feedback that more needs to be done by the CQC to ensure disparities are better understood and considered in inspections. The results from this have the potential to be one of the strongest tools for encouraging change and progress for one of the largest employers in the UK.

Recommendation 2: Build trust - Review the Care Quality Commission's (CQC) inspection process

The Commission recommends that the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) commission a review into the CQC's approach to scoring employee diversity and inclusion in their inspections.

The Commission recommends that this review is chaired by an expert with close knowledge of the health care system and CQC internal processes, ideally a former inspector or inspector of an alternative inspection body. The review team should work closely with the NHS Workforce Race Equality Standard team and the disciplinary bodies of the medical professionals to ensure that the views of these bodies feed into this work.

Enterprise

The UK continues to rank as one of the world's most entrepreneurial countries.^[footnote 76] Enterprise is a crucial engine of economic growth and the entrepreneurial path should be accessible to all. It has some of the lowest barriers to entry, yet potential entrepreneur's experiences are influenced by their ethnicity, gender, age and geographic location.

There is clearly an appetite for those from ethnic minority backgrounds to pursue enterprise, and benefits to the rest of society when they do. In 2018 around 250,000 firms in the UK were ethnic minority-led, and generated around £25 billion of growth value added (GVA) - the equivalent of the city of Manchester.^[footnote 77] Additionally, ethnic minority owned firms were more likely to export their goods and services than White owned firms in all regions across the UK, bringing vital income to the UK economy.^[footnote 78]

The Commission believes in the power of agency. The need to stimulate the entrepreneurial instincts of the country's people is greater than ever. Whilst this is the case, we know that more support for ethnic minority entrepreneurs and those from lower socio-economic backgrounds is needed. The data shows that:

- Those from Asian and Other ethnic minority backgrounds are less able to get access to finance to start working on their idea. 49% of Asian and other ethnic minorities previously aspiring entrepreneurs cited 'difficulties getting finance' as a reason they stopped working on their idea, compared with 25% of White British people. [\[footnote 79\]](#) We explore some of the reasons as to why later.
- Despite those from Black backgrounds having similar success rates to their White counterparts in starting a business, they also see worse outcomes. [\[footnote 80\]](#) This is thought to be a result of their location and lower household income levels (40% of ethnic minority people in the UK live in London. [\[footnote 81\]](#) which faces higher costs as well as higher competition).
- In terms of performance, Black business owners report a median turnover of £25,000 - this is £10,000 less than White business owners and £15,000 less than Asian and Other ethnic minority business owners. In 2019, 72% of Black and 62% of Asian and Other ethnic minority business owners report making a profit, compared with 84% of White business owners. [\[footnote 82\]](#)
- For female business owners, over one third of those from Black, Asian and Other ethnic minority backgrounds reported making no profit in 2019, compared with 15% of White female business owners. [\[footnote 83\]](#) Overall, median turnover for female entrepreneurs' businesses was a third of male entrepreneurs' and productivity was less than half.
- Those who are afforded more and better opportunities to build social capital (for example, through their jobs) have higher success in comparison to those with less opportunity (for example, those previously looking after the home). However, there is an under representation of Black people in managerial and senior roles, thereby reducing their opportunities to develop relevant social capital. [\[footnote 84\]](#)
- Ethnic minority entrepreneurs also experience poorer outcomes in accessing venture capital than their White counterparts - Black entrepreneurs were cited as experiencing the poorest outcomes of all (with only 38 Black entrepreneurs, in a sample of 3,784, receiving venture capital funding in the past 10 years). [\[footnote 85\]](#)
- 40% of the total capital invested at seed stage between 2009 and 2019 went to founding teams with at least one member from a top ranking university. [\[footnote 86\]](#) This indicates that those who receive higher education from such institutions disproportionately benefit from receiving starting capital towards their venture.

The Commission found there to be a fundamental barrier in communication between ethnic minority groups and high street banks. Many aren't engaging and feel discouraged in seeking finance due to a fear of rejection. There is evidence to show that business owners from ethnic minority backgrounds are disproportionately declined for lending [\[footnote 87\]](#), and while there is no evidence of racial discrimination by banks [\[footnote 88\]](#), this has resulted in perceptions of a systemic disadvantage underpinning discouragement. [\[footnote 89\]](#)

When given evidence to the Commission, Jamaican-born entrepreneur Levi Roots, recalled his own experience as a young entrepreneur in Brixton during the 1980s. He was repeatedly declined for investment and felt dissatisfied with the advice he received from his local bank. Roots believed that the support and opportunities available to him as an aspiring entrepreneur were limited in comparison to those in the more affluent area of Herne Hill nearby. While some have found financing to support their business ideas through avenues such as the government-backed Start Up Loans scheme [\[footnote 90\]](#), many others are reluctant to borrow from banks, preferring to finance their business ideas through considered safer means such as personal savings, or support from friends and family. However the limited personal resources of those from lower socio-economic backgrounds consequently hinders their development of their ideas. There is work here for high street banks and lending institutions in making themselves more accessible to these community groups who currently do not consider lending to be a viable access route for them.

The Commission considered ways in which to better connect the industry with disproportionately affected groups from ethnic minority and lower socio-economic backgrounds and widen access for them. Banks are already asking this question and conducting research, but we have seen few action based solutions. More than ever, the younger generation have the desire to be their own boss, but of all age groups, are unlikely to act on this ambition. [\[footnote 91\]](#) They are alive to the latest technologies, trends and ideas, but are unfortunately, among those hardest hit by the economic downturn of the COVID-19 pandemic. [\[footnote 92\]](#) For many, starting a business poses too big a risk when compared to the stability of more traditional forms of employment.

The Commission heard from many young people who shared their ambitions and voiced their frustrations regarding perceived barriers. Many among them felt strongly that there was a need to mitigate against the regional inequalities of labour market opportunities available to them. It is for this reason that the Commission chose to focus on providing increased opportunities to young people. We recognise the benefit of having targeted interventions to support them, particularly those facing worse outcomes as a result of demographic factors. We believe enterprise is a crucial way to raise individual agency and contribute to the country's economic recovery.

Universities have been known to be regional engines of innovation. They contain a copious amount of untapped potential and present the ideal infrastructure and resources to generate ideas, activities and meet those like minded. Yet relatively few university graduates go on to become entrepreneurs. [\[footnote 93\]](#) The Commission felt that there was much fertile ground in better utilising the role they can play in nurturing entrepreneurial spirit. As it stands, opportunities across universities are being missed, with a disproportionate amount of capital at seed stage invested in those from the UK's elite [\[footnote 94\]](#) and tier 1 [\[footnote 95\]](#) educational institutions. [\[footnote 96\]](#) Yet, several universities across the UK have been recognised for the support they provide to aspiring entrepreneurs. [\[footnote 97\]](#) These institutions reside in areas with large ethnic minority populations, serve their local populations and support their local economies, yet face limitations from the low endowments provided to them, in comparison to those more research-focused and internationally-facing. [\[footnote 98\]](#) Generating investment into them could further aid in their ability to provide talented students with early opportunities to build companies, and grow talent within their regions. Financial institutions are in a position to offer the required resource, and should be encouraged to do so.

During our evidence session with HSBC UK, we found there to be much goodwill and a desire to support under-represented communities bridge the gap of enterprise ambition with reality. There was an awareness of the disparities these groups faced and agreement that institutions who were committed, and working hard to support underrepresented groups through their journey, should benefit from additional support in doing so. After all, entrepreneurial success requires rounded support - this means financial investment accompanied by business support services such as mentoring, capacity building and network access. [\[footnote 99\]](#) Together with HSBC UK, the Commission developed a proposal which aimed to encourage the entrepreneurial ambitions and innovation of the next generation through the spirit of competition. Competition is a key engine of innovation and we have seen cases of this time and again - take Dragon's Den for example. There are many individuals across the UK from all backgrounds who, with some financial investment and support, have the opportunity to become a household name like Levi Roots.

Since its inception in 2014, HSBC UK's SME lending fund has supplied over £75 billion to boost British business growth. [\[footnote 100\]](#) As a part of their renewed commitment in 2021 to lend a further £15 billion to SMEs through this fund, the Commission felt it was important that young people were given the opportunity to contribute to the country's economic recovery through this fund.

Recommendation 17: Create agency - Encourage innovation

The Commission recommends that HSBC UK works in collaboration with universities across the UK to pilot a competitive enterprise programme that will target aspiring entrepreneurs from underrepresented and low-income backgrounds.

The universities that would be considered to take part in the pilot will be those who would benefit most from an increased endowment that would: 1) bolster their offer of support to aspiring entrepreneurs; and 2) further enable them to nurture entrepreneurial talent.

The programme will support participants in the development of their proposals through the provision of advice, mentorship and access to networks, and provide financial backing towards the winning entrant's enterprise. The Commission envisages that participants of the programme will form an alumni community that will act as an additional source of support.

This should act as a model for other banks and financial institutions to emulate in collaboration with universities as a way to nurture talent, encourage innovation, and offer support to aspiring entrepreneurs from underrepresented and low-income backgrounds across the UK.

Entrepreneur Levi Roots was supportive of this recommendation, saying:

There is no doubt that disparities, especially towards Black and ethnic minority entrepreneurs in employment and higher education have become that slippery, greasy pole of opportunities on which our aspiring young are now attempting to navigate. The ability to adapt and be resilient through such interventions is key to speeding up and supporting their ascension towards these aspirational goals.

Artificial intelligence

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems raise complex questions of fairness. AI can be hugely beneficial - for example through speed, transparency, and better decisions. However, it brings novel ways for bias to be introduced. Because these systems can be replicated at a huge scale, the Commission knows that understanding and accountability in these systems are critical. From hiring, to loan administration, policing, insurance pricing, and more. These systems can improve or unfairly worsen the lives of the people they touch.

To steward automated systems responsibly, we must acknowledge their novelty and complexity. First, we need to define fairness mathematically so we can evaluate these systems. There are many^[footnote 101] possible definitions which fit different contexts. Our existing legal structures, such as the Equality Act, may need to be re-evaluated for the algorithmic age.

Second, bias can enter the system in various ways. First, through data - for example, if a loan decision system receives data for a particular ethnic group that only contains default borrowers, the system may learn to use ethnicity data to unfairly deny loans to that group. Second, through the model; for example, unfair rules may be unknowingly hardcoded into the system (in practice, this is less common). Last, through decisions; for example, a system may give a fair output which humans may be more confident about than is deserved.

The rate of change in these systems means specific remedies are premature. Organisations and decision-makers should use tools that detect and mitigate bias before, during, and after a system deployment. For example, Algorithmic Impact Assessments^[footnote 102] are questionnaires that help raise fairness risks before a system is used. There are also now myriad technical tools that can be used to inspect data, models, and outputs for bias.^[footnote 103] The government and organisations need to stay up to date with the rapidly advancing field of fairness, accountability, and transparency^[footnote 104] in automated decision systems.

Last, before dismissing any system, it should be compared with the alternative. An automated system may be imperfect, but a human system may be worse.

Case Study: Addressing bias in hiring to let talent flourish

How could we ensure automated hiring systems hire for talent and talent only? First, we must have 2 hard conversations. What do we mean by talent? And what does it mean to be fair to it?

Human bias is the greatest risk at this stage. Assuming definitions of talent and fairness (a big assumption), we might intervene in various ways. A hiring system trained on the data of a company's historical employees may learn biased relationships if the company has disproportionately hired one ethnicity, therefore, the hiring analyst should think about the data collected. One could modify the model, for example, by penalising it during the "learning" phase if ethnicity and predicted outcome are statistically dependent. Or, one could modify the outputs.

For example, if the model predicts different hiring outcomes for the same candidate if only the value of the "ethnicity" variable changes, the output is discarded and not used.

These are only examples and the reality is much more complex. However, it shows that there may be ways to trust automated systems and remove human biases to allow talent, not other characteristics, to be rewarded.

The Commission acknowledges that the government is currently working to advance this field in order to accelerate AI adoption and fair outcomes. We welcome the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation's (CDEI) ongoing work in this space and supports the recommendations from its review into bias in algorithmic decision-making.^[footnote 105] If acted on, the recommendations will help change the behaviour of all organisations who make potentially life-changing decisions on the basis of data and algorithms.

Recommendation 3: Build trust - Improve the transparency and use of artificial intelligence

The Commission supports the recommendations of the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) and calls on the government to:

- place a mandatory transparency obligation on all public sector organisations applying algorithms that have an impact on significant decisions affecting individuals
- ask the Equality and Human Rights Commission to issue guidance that clarifies how to apply the Equality Act to algorithmic decision-making, which should include guidance on the collection of data to measure bias, and the lawfulness of bias mitigation techniques

Footnotes:

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Crime and policing

Summary

One of the biggest concerns about unfair treatment of minorities lies in crime and policing. The data consistently highlights the over-representation of ethnic minority groups - both as perpetrators and victims - when it comes to hate crime, violent crime and drug related offences. Police workforce diversity figures continue to remain low. Past injustices still loom large in perceptions of the police for some ethnic minority Britons, especially Black Caribbean people. The Commission undertook extensive engagement and examination of data to establish causes of key disparities in crime and policing, commissioning new research and building on previous reviews led by Rt Hon David Lammy MP and Dame Elish Angiolini. This chapter aims to demonstrate what drives these disparities and propose ways of addressing them with a focus on 4 areas:


- re-establishing mutual trust between communities and police service areas
- preventing harm and directing young people away from entering the criminal justice system
- encouraging affected ethnic minority groups to work with and support police services to improve outcomes for their local communities
- improving workforce diversity in a way that encourages those skills needed to better serve multi race and ethnic communities

In its exploration of these areas, the Commission found the following. Ethnic minority people, and specifically Black people, are disproportionately victims of violent crime and homicide; for every White victim of homicide aged 16 to 24 in 2018/19, there were 24 Black victims^[footnote 1], and that young people need a better mechanism to help them escape criminal exploitation before it is too late. Greater emphasis on the importance of community leadership and the value of role models is also required. Class B drug offences accounted for nearly half of prosecutions for almost all ethnic groups.^[footnote 2] This chapter outlines a need for public health-oriented out of court diversion (OOCV) approaches to keep young people out of the criminal justice system. Stop and search is a critical tool for policing when used appropriately, and lawfully. We found that communities are not given enough information about the drivers of police activity that lead to the initiation of stop and search activity in a specific area, and that the statistics have remained unexplained for too long. More also needs to be done, by police services and community citizens, to increase local knowledge of the legitimacy of stop and search, and improve transparency and accountability of its use. Nearly half (49%) of all stop and searches in England and Wales were made by the Metropolitan Police in London, and this is where the majority (80%) of all stop and searches involving Black people were made. This is also where nearly 60% of all Black people in England and Wales live.^[footnote 3] Stop and search disparities should be analysed based on smaller geographic areas, and new Safeguarding Trust groups are proposed to align police and community priorities and to help rebuild bridges between the two. Assaults without injury on police officers have been increasing year on year since the year ending March 2015.^[footnote 4] In 2017 the Police Federation of England and Wales published data highlighting that, on average, one police officer was assaulted every 4 minutes.^[footnote 5] The latest annual statistics from the Home Office shows that over 30,000 assaults took place in the year ending March 2020.^[footnote 6] During the COVID lockdown in 2020, the media reported that Metropolitan Police alone experienced an increase of nearly 40%^[footnote 7] of assaults on their officers.^[footnote 8] This increase comes despite the introduction into law of the Assault on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act in 2018. Ethnic minority police officers are also experiencing racist abuse from citizens they serve - including from those in their own ethnic minority groups. Racist assaults against police officers in the Metropolitan Police service almost doubled between the year ending November 2019 and November 2020.^[footnote 9] This and the increasing assaults are issues that seem to be overlooked in public discourse, and seldom discussed with veracity when it comes to police actions or police service recruitment. Yet they both, in the Commission's view, have an impact on addressing entrenched disparities and improving outcomes for all concerned. No police services were fully ethnically representative of the population they serve^[footnote 10] although the Commission has identified some who are, independently, making substantial progress towards achieving that goal and commends them accordingly. Police services will also need to go beyond just being representative of the ethnic minority population of an area. The Commission proposes a requirement for the police service to identify and fill the gaps in the skills required to best serve diverse communities.

Hate crime and harassment of minorities

Hate crime is a serious offence that can have long-term impacts on individual victims. It is a very personal attack. Experiencing a hate crime is particularly distressing for victims who are targeted based on their identity or how others perceive them. Research shows that victims are more likely to suffer serious psychological effects as a result of hate crime - a trauma that, by association, also easily spreads through their wider community.^[footnote 11] Although it is often believed that hate crime is rising sharply, the most reliable data shows that it may be declining. There were 76,070 race-related hate crimes recorded by police in England and Wales in 2019 to 2020, up 131% since 2011 to 2012.^[footnote 12] But according to the more robust Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW), racially motivated hate crimes went down from 149,000 (in the years ending March 2010 to March 2012) to 104,000 (in the years ending March 2018 to March 2020).^[footnote 13]^[footnote 14] Whilst the decline is significant, the figures still show that a sizeable number of incidents take place. They equate to about 142 racially motivated hate crimes per day. There is no number that is, or should be, acceptable to any civilised society. These incidents cause serious and lasting trauma in people's lives. But we recognise that it is impossible to drive the overall figure down to zero - sadly certain types of people are what they are. That said we can and must continue to make every endeavour to reduce this number to the absolute lowest possible. While the most common offence type of racially-motivated hate crime recorded by the police in the year ending March 2020 was public order offences, such as graffiti or verbal abuse, there were also over 10,000 incidents of violence without injury and about 4,500 incidents of violence with injury.^[footnote 15] Hate crime is also more likely to be experienced by people from ethnic minorities. 1.1% of Asian people experienced a hate crime in the years ending March 2018 to March 2020, as did 1.1% of Black people,^[footnote 16] compared with 0.2% of White people. These figures are substantially less than the percentages of people experiencing crime in general (see Figure 12).

Figure 12: Percentage of people experiencing hate crime, and all crime, by ethnicity (England and Wales, April 2017 to March 2020)



We should also note that hate crime is not just carried out by White people. The hate crime figures in England and Wales reveal an over-representation of Black people among perpetrators.[\[footnote 17\]](#) In 2019, 80% of those proceeded against for religiously or racially motivated hate crimes were White, 9% Black and 7% Asian.[\[footnote 18\]](#) In the USA, FBI data shows an even bigger disproportionate representation[\[footnote 19\]](#): of known hate crime offenders, 52.5% were White and 23.9% were Black or African American.[\[footnote 20\]](#)

Fear of hate crime among ethnic minority communities is also greater than its likelihood of occurring. The year ending March 2018 to March 2020 CSEW shows that 16% of Asian people and 13% of Black people were 'very worried' about being attacked because of their race or ethnicity.[\[footnote 21\]](#)

This perception reinforces the right of everyone to feel safe in their communities. Everyone, no matter their background, should be able to live their lives without fear of becoming a victim of a hate crime. As the data shows, this fear particularly impacts ethnic minority people, and could play a part in limiting integration between different communities, and stop individuals from being involved in wider society. There is no place for hate crime, and when it occurs, communities need to see action being taken to address it. In tandem, there needs to be consistent messaging about the prevalence of hate crime correcting the perceptions of 'a rise in hate crime'. This can help to allay the fears of communities.

Abuse experienced 'online', in other words through social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Instagram, also has a significant impact on victims. Whether an everyday private citizen or high-profile public figure, being unexpectedly abused in the safety of one's own home - and having it instantly exposed to an international audience - creates a unique torment and fear for the affected individual.

The Home Affairs Select Committee has highlighted how ethnic minority female MPs are particularly vulnerable to egregious online harassment.[\[footnote 22\]](#) Footballers, celebrities and politicians have also spoken of their experiences of being abused in this way, for no other reason than their race.

Given that platforms such as Facebook and YouTube have over 1 billion users, prominent examples of abuse can go viral quickly. These trigger a mob-like pursuit of victims, whilst the popularity of the platforms themselves also provide racists with a new, more public - and more powerful - way to inflict pain and suffering on host of new victims.[\[footnote 23\]](#) In many cases the perpetrators use the advent of anonymity, on these platforms and others, to target those they otherwise would not - and could not - reach in the cold light of day. Ethnic minorities, in particular, are disproportionately affected by online harassment, online trolling and cyberbullying.[\[footnote 24\]](#)

The Commission strongly urges the government to use its forthcoming online safety legislation to address abuse online, including anonymous abuse. We consider that it is very much possible to do this in a way that also protects the legitimate use of anonymity online by groups such as human rights defenders, whistleblowers and victims of abuse.

Social media companies have a social responsibility - and that means a duty of care to their users. This duty should compel them to address online abuse with effective systems and processes. The largest social media platforms currently claim to prohibit racist abuse on their services. But far too often they fail to take decisive action to tackle it. Asking these platforms to account for the transparent and consistent enforcement of their own terms and conditions is surely a minimum requirement.

Failing to comply should, in the Commission's view, lead to substantial penalties - and public naming and shaming for their seeming intransigence to the pain racism causes its victims. To be clear, the Commission is not seeking to inhibit robust exchanges online, nor censure legitimate debate and freedom of expression in its truest sense. Indeed, it is concerning to see that those campaigning against racism online have found their sites removed for decontextualized racial slurs as evidence of racism.[\[footnote 25\]](#)

Being anonymous online does not give anyone the right to abuse others. The police have a range of existing legal powers to identify and prosecute individuals who attempt to use anonymity to escape sanctions for online abuse, where the activity is illegal. Hate crime exists in UK law across the Public Order Act 1986, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Malicious Communications Act 1988, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, the Communications Act 2003 and the Football (Offences) Act 1991.


The Commission calls on social media companies to work in tandem with the government to remove racially abusive content that is illegal. Government should assess current powers to see if they are sufficient to tackle abuse online - including illegal and anonymous abuse. The outcome of that work should inform the government's future position in relation to illegal anonymous abuse online.

Primary causes and drivers of crime

The way race and crime can intersect has long been a taboo subject. The spread of well-meaning 'society is to blame' assumptions, and a positive desire not to further stereotype already disadvantaged groups, has created a reluctance to talk honestly about the seriously damaging criminal behaviour of a small minority of people - especially in ethnically diverse inner-city areas.

The Commission has heard views from frontline and senior police officers that communities often overestimate the level of crime in their local areas. All crime, as reported in the CSEW (excluding fraud and computer misuse), peaked in 1995 at 19.8 million crimes, and in 2018 had decreased by 68% to around 6.2 million.[\[footnote 26\]](#) Though these trends in crime rates may differ at a local level, the Commission believes that there is a need to acknowledge and welcome that this country's overall crime rate has reduced.

Figure 13: Number of crimes experienced by Crime Survey respondents, by type of crime (England and Wales, January 1981 to March 2018) [\[footnote 27\]](#)



Note: The figures for 'All crime' exclude fraud and computer misuse. Data for 2019 onwards is not included in the chart as it is not comparable to previous years' data because of methodological changes in the Crime Survey. The Commission is also well aware that criminal behaviour is found in all groups, and further states that the majority of people in the country do not commit crime. For example, when looking at the number of 10 to 17 year old first time entrants into the criminal justice system in 2019, approximately 2,447 were from ethnic minorities. This represents 0.25% of the ethnic minority population aged 10 to 17 in England and Wales. There were approximately 7,150 White first time entrants, which represents 0.16% of the White population aged 10 to 17.[\[footnote 28\]](#)[\[footnote 29\]](#) In discussion about race in general, the political focus in crime and policing has been on the big disparities in the rates of stop and search between Black and White people, in every police service area in England and Wales.[\[footnote 30\]](#) Yet it is the Commission's view that the story in this area has not been focusing enough on the disparities in crime, and often violent crime, that lie behind stop and search. In addition, there has also been less focus on what the primary causes and drivers of suspected and actual criminal activity can be.

As David Lammy noted in his own review:

Many of the causes of BAME overrepresentation lie outside the CJS [criminal justice system], as do the answers to it. People from a Black background are more...likely to live in poverty than those from a White background. Black children are more...likely to grow up in a lone parent family. Black and Mixed ethnic boys are more likely than White boys to be permanently excluded from school and to be arrested as a teenager.[\[footnote 31\]](#) These are all issues that are beyond the control or remit of the police service.

The Commission heard evidence from many people, with experience from the perspectives of affected communities and the police, about the change in police attitudes on race over the last 30 to 40 years (notwithstanding the caveats in the final section of this chapter). It is important to acknowledge other factors, in addition to racism, when considering disproportionality between ethnic groups in policing. The police service is imperfect, like all major services and organisations. However the challenges they face when dealing with both victims and perpetrators of crime are complex as the causes are beyond their control. Great strides have been made towards becoming a service that can fairly police a multi-ethnic society. It is important to recognise and acknowledge this.

Understanding disparities: victims of violent crime

Ethnic minority people are more likely to be victims of crime^[footnote 32] and specifically victims of violent crime and homicide.^[footnote 33] For the average of the 10 years from 2009 to 2019, 16 to 24 year old Black people were 11 times more likely than their White counterparts to be a victim of homicide.^[footnote 34] Between March 2018 and March 2020, for White, Black and Asian homicide victims, the principal suspect in the case was more likely to be the same ethnicity. 83% of cases with White homicide victims had a principal suspect that was also White and 80% of homicide cases with a Black victim had a Black principal suspect (in a total of 99 homicides).^[footnote 35] In England and Wales in the year ending March 2020, there were 668 victims of homicide (where ethnicity was known), of which 105 victims were Black (16% of all homicide victims, where ethnicity was known). 443 homicide victims were White (66%), 56 were Asian (8%) and 64 from Other ethnic groups (10%).^[footnote 36] Nearly half (48%) of all Black victims were in the 16 to 24 year old age group.^[footnote 37] In the same year, there were 506 male victims and 188 female victims of homicide.^[footnote 38] However there are stark differences in the relationships that men and women victims have to suspects. Of female victims aged 16 and over, almost half (46%, 81 homicides) were killed by a family member or partner compared with 7% of male victims (33 homicides).^[footnote 39]^[footnote 40] In the year ending March 2020. In the 3 years between April 2016 and March 2019, 77% of female victims were White, 12% were Asian and 5% were Black.^[footnote 41] The police recorded over 1.2 million domestic abuse-related incidents^[footnote 42] and crime in England and Wales^[footnote 43], of which 59% were subsequently recorded as domestic abuse-related crimes.^[footnote 44] Over half (53%) of violence against the person offences that had female victims were domestic-abuse related.^[footnote 45] Women were more likely than men to be victims of domestic abuse^[footnote 46] and have been over time. In the year ending March 2020, 7.3% of women in England and Wales had experienced any type of domestic abuse in the last year, compared with 3.6% of men.^[footnote 47] People in the Mixed ethnic group were significantly more likely to experience domestic abuse within the last year than those in the Black or Asian ethnic groups in the year ending March 2020^[footnote 48], and among women, White women were more likely than Asian or Black women to experience domestic abuse (in the three years April 2017 to March 2020 combined).^[footnote 49]

Understanding disparities: trends and drivers of homicide


A Home Office report on the trends and drivers of homicide^[footnote 50] found that although most victims and suspects of homicide are White, Black people are disproportionately represented among them. In the year ending March 2018, homicide rates were more than 4 times higher for Black victims than for White victims and 8 times higher for Black suspects than for White suspects. This disproportionality varies by age, sex and deprivation - it is highest among young men, and more than halves in the most deprived areas. Given that higher proportions of Black people live in more deprived areas than White people, it is likely that deprivation and the younger age profile of Black people (than average)^[footnote 51] explains much of the disproportionality between the 2 ethnic groups.^[footnote 52] Although the UK homicide figures are much lower than those in the US, the UK figures still make disturbing reading, especially when one considers how young so many of the victims and perpetrators are. The data shows that knife crime in particular has been on the rise in recent years, though this increase can in part be explained by data quality and recording improvements made by most police forces over time. 43,424 knife or sharp instrument offences were recorded by the police in the year to September 2020 (excluding Greater Manchester^[footnote 53]), up from 30,620 in 2011.^[footnote 54] A disproportionate level of knife offences take place in London. In the year ending September 2020, there were 152 knife offences per 100,000 people in London, compared with a national average of 79 per 100,000.^[footnote 55] In 2017, over one-third of people under 25 convicted of knife offences in England and Wales were from an ethnic minority (excluding White minorities).^[footnote 56] In the same year half of all knife crime offenders and nearly two-thirds of offenders aged under 25 in London were from an ethnic minority.^[footnote 57] The most common method of killing in homicides has been sharp instruments, including knives, for some years. Over the last decade, the percentage of homicide offences committed by a sharp instrument has been between 32% and 40%. In the most recent year of data (year ending March 2020), there were 275 sharp instrument related murders, which is 40% of all recorded homicides.^[footnote 58] Of these, 54% of the victims were White (149 victims) and 27% were Black (75 victims)^[footnote 59]. This is the highest total number of knife-related murders with Black victims in the past 10 years.

Ethnic minority over-representation in the criminal justice system

More broadly, people from ethnic minorities are overrepresented at many points of the criminal justice system. The largest disparities appear at the point of stop and search and, as the Lammy Review pointed out, at arrest, custodial sentencing and prison population. Among ethnic minority groups, Black people are usually the most overrepresented.^[footnote 60] Black people were arrested at a rate over 3 times higher than White people in the year ending March 2020.^[footnote 61] People in Asian and Other (including Chinese) ethnic groups had the highest custody rates in 2018.^[footnote 62] The percentage of the prison population from ethnic minorities was 27% at 30 June 2020, almost twice the ethnic minority percentage in the population, with Black people and people in Mixed ethnic groups disproportionately represented.^[footnote 63]^[footnote 64]

Figures from the Ministry of Justice also show over-representation of all ethnic minority groups among those convicted of serious crimes such as robbery and possession of weapon offences in England and Wales in 2019^[footnote 65], relative to their population shares at the last Census.^[footnote 66]

Figure 14: Percentages of convictions in each offence group, and percentage of the overall population, by ethnicity (England and Wales, 2019)



Research into the fairness of juries shows that jury conviction rates for ethnic minority and White groups are similar across a range of offence-types, with only small differences and no overall pattern.^[footnote 67] The circumstances surrounding any crime vary from group to group - which may impact upon sentencing. For instance, in April 2014 to March 2016, issues such as involvement with gangs - which can also relate to the coercion or

exploitation of the convicted individual - show up in 34% of pre-sentence reports on Black young people, compared to 11% of young people in Asian and Other groups and 5% of White young people. [\[footnote 68\]](#)

There are many reasons for the disproportionate numbers of ethnic minority people involved in violent crime as both victims and perpetrators, but the disparity casts a significant shadow over Black life, and also contributes to negative stereotypes of young Black men. Nevertheless, it is important to remember this context when we address the complex issue of stop and search.

Understanding the disparities: stop and search

Stop and search can be used by the police as a tactic to address a number of crimes, from counter-terrorism, burglary, illegal drug use, violent crime and anti-social behaviour. However, successive home secretaries have centred the narratives for the use of stop and search on violent crime, specifically knife crime.

In 2017, then Home Secretary Amber Rudd wrote that the purpose of stop and search was "to take as many offensive weapons, knives, guns, acid and harmful drugs out of the pockets of criminals as possible". [\[footnote 69\]](#) In 2019, the focus on drugs appeared to have lessened, and Sajid Javid [\[footnote 70\]](#) emphasised the importance of the tool for "disrupting crime and taking weapons off our streets". Most recently, the current Home Secretary, Priti Patel, [\[footnote 71\]](#) cited tackling violence and knife crime as the reason the Home Office lifted restrictions in emergency stop and search powers.

There is, however, a disconnect between this narrative and what is seen on the ground. In engaging with the Commission, several police services cited drugs and hard drug county lines as a key driver for the use of stop and search, and the data shows that the majority of searches are based on suspicion of drugs (although other suspected crimes may also be involved, just not recorded). [\[footnote 72\]](#) More needs to be done to bridge the gap between how the purpose of stop and search is communicated, and how this legal power is actually being used in practice.

This is a finding echoed in the recent report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) on the disproportionate use of police powers, which writes: "The prevalence of self-generated, possession-only drug searches, about a quarter of which find drugs, indicates that stop and search is not always being targeted at offences that are the most serious and high priority for forces, or that matter most to the public..."

we consider that now is the time for a national debate on the policing of controlled drugs through stop and search". [\[footnote 73\]](#)

Is stop and search tackling the war on drugs? Or is it removing knives from our streets? Both the government and the police's messaging in this area needs greater consistency and clarity in order for communities to understand the drivers of police activity, and why certain areas may require a greater police presence or application of its use. The Commission's view is that this confusion can translate into a lack of transparency, which further damages the already negative impression some communities have of the police.


Interpreting stop and search data accurately

There were 563,837 stop and searches in England and Wales in the year ending March 2020 (excluding Greater Manchester and vehicle only searches). [\[footnote 74\]](#) There were 11 stops for every 1,000 people, down from 25 per 1,000 people in the year ending March 2010. Rates were highest [\[footnote 75\]](#) for Black Caribbean people (39 stops per 1,000), Black African people (39 stops per 1,000) and people in the Asian other ethnic group (30 per 1,000). Rates were lowest for Arab (1 per 1,000) and Chinese (2 per 1,000) people. White people were stopped and searched at a rate of 6 per 1,000.

The Metropolitan Police in London had the highest rates of stop and search for every ethnic group except the White and Mixed groups. In almost every police force area, Black people had the highest recorded stop and search rate.

It is sometimes claimed that Black people are 9 times more likely than White people to be stopped and searched. [\[footnote 76\]](#) This relative rate is reported at a national level and does not account for differences in the sizes or characteristics of local populations or the way stop and search is used at a local level. For these reasons, the national relative rate is not always accurate and stop and search rates should be analysed at smaller geographic levels.

Figure 15: Stop and search rate per 1,000 people, by ethnicity in London (Metropolitan Police) and the rest of England and Wales (England and Wales, April 2019 to March 2020) [\[footnote 77\]](#)



Note: Greater Manchester Police were unable to provide data for the year ending March 2020 and are excluded from the analysis.

The Race Disparity Unit outlines 3 main factors affecting the interpretation of stop and search rates and can distort the national relative disparity between Black people and White people:

- population changes
- the number of people who do not report their ethnicity
- geographic clustering (where stop and search is used as well as where people live) [\[footnote 78\]](#)

Figure 15 shows the rates of stop and search in London (the Metropolitan Police area) compared with the rates for the rest of England and Wales. Almost half (49%) of all stops and searches took place in London. However, even within London there are differences in the use of stop and search depending on the neighbourhood. For example, half of the stop and searches carried out in London between July and September 2020 took place in just 9% of neighbourhoods. [\[footnote 79\]](#)

For Black people, the Metropolitan Police force area is the one which most influences the national disparity figures often quoted in the media and by public commentators. This is where 4 out of 5 stop and searches of Black people happen, and where nearly 60% of Black people live. [\[footnote 80\]](#) For White people, it is the very low stop and search rate in police services outside the London area that most strongly influences the national disparity. In these areas, the stop and search rate for White people is 5 for every 1,000 people, and around 90% of White people live in them.

The size of local populations within different geographic areas can be a factor which affects how disparities are interpreted and sometimes reported. For example, in Dorset as a whole, the relative disparity in stops and search rates between Black and White people was 23 times in the year ending March 2020. [\[footnote 81\]](#) Upon looking at an even smaller geographic area, the Purbeck district had the highest disparity in stop and search between Black and White people of all Dorset districts (47 times). However, Purbeck undertook just 2 stop and searches of Black individuals and 38 stops of White people that year. The area has a small Black population of 48 people and a White population of around 43,000 (as at 2011 Census), therefore the relative disparity between the two groups is skewed. [\[footnote 82\]](#) Dorset Police has demonstrated proactive investment to understand the drivers of disparities

and has launched a programme of work to address disproportionality in stop and search. This includes the establishment of a stop and search board chaired by the Deputy Chief Constable with workstreams looking at operational delivery, community engagement and commissioning research with external organisations and academics.

There clearly are big disparities in stop and search, but the relative national disparity takes national populations as its reference point - not the relevant resident populations of smaller, urban areas with relatively high crime rates where stop and search is used more. Stop and search disparities should therefore be analysed at smaller geographic areas, preferably below police force area. As such, users of stop and search data need to exercise caution when interpreting and reporting ethnic disparities based on areas with small numbers of stop and search and small ethnic minority populations.

Between April 2010 and March 2019, rates of stop and search decreased for all ethnic groups.^[footnote 83] In this timeframe, the stop and search rate decreased the most for White people, by 79% (from 19 stops per 1,000 to 4 per 1,000). Rates for Asian people decreased by 72% (from 39 to 11 per 1,000) and for people from Mixed ethnic groups by 69% (from 35 to 11 per 1,000). Rates of stop and search decreased the least for Black people, by 68% (from 117 per 1,000 to 38) and for people in the Other (including Chinese) ethnic group, also by 68% (from 21 to 7 per 1,000 people).

These reductions varied by police force area. For example, in the same time period, the stop and search rate for Asian people decreased in all police force areas except Durham and South Wales where it increased. The rate for Black people decreased in almost all police force areas, except Kent, West Midlands, Staffordshire, Cheshire, South Wales and Essex where it increased.^[footnote 84]

Numbers of stop and search have also significantly reduced since the year ending March 2010, from nearly 1.4 million to about 570,000 in the year ending March 2020. However, in recent years (between the year ending March 2019 and March 2020), the total number of stop and searches increased by 51% from around 370,000 to around 570,000.^[footnote 85]

Drivers of stop and search activity (a): tackling violent crime

In England and Wales in 2019 to 2020, 76% of all stops resulted in no further action and 13% resulted in arrest.^[footnote 86] The highest percentage of arrests resulting from stop and search was of White people (52%), followed by 19% of stops of Black people, and 9% of stops of Asian people. This equates to approximately 1 in 2 White people arrested as a result of stop and search, 1 in 5 Black people, and 1 in 10 Asian people.^[footnote 87] However, in a review of 9,378 stop and search records from 2019, HMICFRS estimate that there were reasonable grounds for stop and search in 81.7% of cases - the vast majority of instances in which it was used.^[footnote 88] Dame Cressida Dick, Metropolitan Police Commissioner, defending the stop and search policy said that 72% of killings of youths under 25 years old involved Black victims in London.^[footnote 89] She said Black people were 4 times more likely to be a victim of violence than White people, and 8 times more likely to be a perpetrator in London. The knowledge that stop and search can lawfully be conducted on any individual can be, in and of itself, an effective deterrent against this - one of the most heinous of crimes.

We know that stop and search is designed as a crime prevention, indeed life saving, policing tactic but the Commission believes that issues with the way in which it is carried out need to be addressed by both police services and the communities they work with. And there is a bigger story here, behind these cold numbers, that our politics and public conversation has not been facing head on. The Commission is concerned that there has been insufficient leadership on these issues of violent crime from affected ethnic minority communities, and believes that more individual and collective agency is needed to tackle these issues directly. Even before the police need to get involved. First, there needs to be an understanding of the many risk factors associated with people who are drawn into violent crime. These include adverse childhood experience (such as abuse, neglect, parental criminality, substance abuse, and being taken into care)^[footnote 90], education attainment (school exclusion and low attainment)^[footnote 91], experience of victimisation^[footnote 92] and living in areas of deprivation.^[footnote 93]

Some respondents to the Commission's call for evidence also provided views that long-term experiences of racism can have an effect on people, arguing that consistent experiences of racism can add to feelings of disenfranchisement and cause violence, involvement in gangs or make crime to seem either more appealing or feel less serious. Additionally, respondents believed that people may be drawn towards crime in order to prosper, feel respect and a sense of identity or belonging to something. The Commission recognises that people involved in violent crime can often trace their problems back to a combination of traumas experienced in their lives.

Understanding youth involvement in serious gang activity

While narratives on gang involvement predominantly focus on young men and boys, the Commission acknowledges that gang-involvement also impacts women and girls. In a report providing analysis of Children in Need census data for the year ending March 2018, the Children's Commissioner found that 34% of gang-associated children and young people were female. That report states: "we have been told that younger children, particularly girls, are being recruited by gangs because their profile makes them less likely to be noticed by the authorities".^[footnote 94]

We also know that while some young people get drawn into county lines gangs and other forms of violence, most even from the same circumstances do not. So what is it that makes some young people more vulnerable than others? And how can they be supported to escape harm and criminality?

Poverty does not entirely explain why this type of violent crime has hit certain communities so disproportionately. Young Black males are disproportionately overrepresented on the Metropolitan Police's 'gang's matrix'^[footnote 95] though there is a wide variety of gang types and they are not always engaged in violent crime. Many come from poorer backgrounds and areas which are more likely to be policed, for example, 69% of stop and searches in London between July and September 2020 took place in neighbourhoods that were more deprived than average.^[footnote 96]

The Home Office's Serious Violence Strategy (2018) ^[footnote 97] identified possible risk factors for involvement in serious gang activity, including childhood abuse and neglect, past criminality, parental criminality, drug taking, truancy from school, living in high crime areas and having delinquent peers.

Evidence also shows that factors of girls' involvement in gangs include "family breakdown, domestic violence in the home, a lack of positive role models and low self-esteem".^[footnote 98]

The Commission has heard views that some gang crime is based on drug turf war conflict or money but at least as much appears to be revenge attacks based on fairly trivial incidents. A Children's Commissioner report on improving safeguarding responses to gang violence and criminal exploitation highlights a case where a child was "stabbed in revenge for failure to repay a 'debt' arising from an arrest".^[footnote 99]

Historically research has focused on gang membership as an expression of masculinity and the recognition and status for young men arising from rebellious behaviour and the gang as a form of alternative family.^[footnote 100] ^[footnote 101] Gang leaders understand children and young people's need for love and recognition and know how to provide it.

Ivan Congreve, a former Salvation Army leader at Springfield Lodge in south London told the BBC in 2008:

All of the guys on our programme are from a broken family of one sort or another and that leads them into gangs... We are based in between Peckham and Brixton. We have a lot of gang culture in the area. And that's where some boys seem to be able to find the family they are looking for. They are accepted, looked after and respected in ways that they don't feel they get from their family. Although a gang is quite a dysfunctional family, they still see it as a family."^[footnote 102]

Springfield Lodge^[footnote 103] provides 16 to 21 year olds with a home and teaches them the skills to become independent.

More recently, research has suggested that young men's gang involvement is linked to finding their place in a post-industrial context^[footnote 104], finding "refuge in a racist society", an expression of manhood that also considers racial dynamics and thriving in a fraternal network.^[footnote 105] A 2021 report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Probation (HMIP) highlights the experiences of ethnic minority service users. One case study captures a service user's experience having moved from Bangladesh to Bradford, in a predominantly Pakistani area.

Being in Bradford where most of the Asians are Pakistani, whenever me and my brother used to speak Bengali, we used to be looked at in a negative way by Pakistani boys in school. Eventually this led to us getting in fights with groups of Pakistani boys that we had to defend ourselves from... When more Bengalis moved into the area, me and my brother bonded with them. We used to stick together and make sure we were safe... Me and the Bengali boys that we used to hang with started committing crime because our families were struggling. We didn't have the intention to start as a gang but because we were involved in crime and violence, we became a gang.^[footnote 106]

Evidence shows that girls' involvement in gangs can often be attributed to 'love' or relationships with male gang members^[footnote 107], with many girls recruited into gangs through inducements such as "the giving of gifts, praise and overtures of friendship".^[footnote 108]

The Centre for Social Justice and urban youth charity XLP highlight a case study example of this:

When I was 15... I met a 20 year-old who was in a gang. He had money, a car and he said that he was going to protect me, that no one was going to touch me and that if I needed anything he would give it to me. Instead of going to school I began to sit at his house with his friends smoking weed, becoming exposed to gang violence and becoming sexually active.

How young people develop their place and identity in society will depend on their exposure to peers and role models, expectations of those in authority with whom they interact, and their link to other adults. This notion of the alternative family can extend to encompass a deeper idea of 'community'. The African American Anthropologist Signithia Fordham has talked about 'fictive kinship', meaning a collective social identity that distinguishes 'us' from 'them'.^[footnote 109] Many ethnic minority young people get trapped in this form of alternative family, where to break-out means a betrayal of deep kinship loyalties.

Community based initiatives to divert young people away from criminal activity

We need to demonstrate to all young people the value of finding respect and recognition in mainstream society without resorting to crime or violence. The Sutton Trust highlights the importance of 'attachment' and relationships in the development of children: "studies into drivers of youth crime and risky behaviours have found that attachment to fathers is relatively more important for boys, and attachment to mothers for girls".^[footnote 110] Evidence also shows that mentorship^[footnote 111], targeted social skills training including positive role models, and programmes that work with both parents and young people are effective in preventing youth violence and gang involvement.^[footnote 112]

The Commission believes that community leadership and role models are at the heart of helping young people redirect their energies into actions that provide opportunities for progression in society, and prevent their involvement in violent crime. We recognise the power of young people to be an instrumental part of this leadership, and heard insights from young people themselves who were calling for role models:

We need to get role models from within our communities to communicate. We need them to represent our communities. And we cannot forget about the older generations, because we need their experiences to educate the younger generations. Everyone can feel empathy. If we share people's stories who have witnessed and experienced prejudice, they can help. We need to educate our communities to promote kindness and respect. It is never too late.^[footnote 113]

(Anonymous, age 15)

The Commission further recognises the wisdom and lived experience of the Windrush generation that has seen the changing shape of race relations in the UK, from which the young can learn. This knowledge needs to be framed into a message that speaks more about responsibilities, conflict resolution, and the building of bridges.

Richard Taylor OBE, father of Damilola Taylor, speaking after an event marking the 19th anniversary of his 10-year-old son's death, emphasised this need to build bridges:

Something has gone badly wrong and I believe that only as a society can we put it right. We can start by challenging each other to be more caring.^[footnote 114]

Parents, teachers, social workers and policy makers, individually and collectively, need to better understand and address the complex pressures faced by young people, especially from disadvantaged backgrounds. Acting on the potential missteps between childhood and adulthood is vital to helping them to overcome disadvantage.

But, in tandem with these efforts, there are also things that can be done now to aid the sea change on violent crime needed within local communities themselves. And the Commission notes that a national approach to this work has already begun - an example of which is described here.

First launched in 2005, the Scottish Violence Reduction Units were formed in response to high rates of homicide and gang violence across the Strathclyde Police area, and particularly Glasgow. By adopting a public health approach that treats violence as a preventable disease, their approach focuses 'on the power of relationships to help reduce violence', giving gang members the chance to leave their past life behind, alongside increased stop and search and tougher sentencing for knife carrying in Scotland. An evaluation of the Community Initiative to Reduce Violence in Glasgow found that violent crime fell by 46% among CIRV participants, weapon carrying fell by 85%, knife carrying fell by 58%, and gang fighting fell by 73%.^[footnote 115] A number of respondents to the Commission's call for evidence referenced the Glasgow approach as a successful initiative for knife crime reduction, and many suggested that a similar strategy would work in other UK cities.

This approach was emulated in England and Wales in 2019 when the Home Office announced that 18 police service areas would receive funding to 'establish (or build upon existing) Violence Reduction Units' (VRUs). The VRUs adopted a public health approach across their activities, commissioning a broad range of interventions to tackle serious violence. A Home Office process evaluation of the VRUs in 2020 found that 'good progress had generally been made by the VRUs over the first year of the programme'.^[footnote 116]

Although these initiatives are in their early stages, the Commission commends the work of VRUs across the UK for the overall impact they are already having on addressing violent crime.

Drivers of stop and search activity (b): tackling drug-related crime

In London in the year ending March 2020, 62% of positive outcomes of stop and search were related to drug offences.^[footnote 117] One study found a 10% increase in stop and search during a given month decreased recorded drug offences by 1.85%^[footnote 118], suggesting that drug crime patterns change when stop and search is taking place in an area. The latest available data from 2019 states that convictions for drug offences were highest for all ethnic groups in the Metropolitan Police area^[footnote 119]^[footnote 120]. Among Asian people convicted of drug offences, over half (58%) of drug convictions for Asian people were in only 2 police service areas: the Metropolitan Police area and the West Midlands. For Black people, 69% of all convictions were in the same 2 areas.

Overall the data shows that Black men were arrested for drug offences at a rate 8 times higher than White men in the year ending March 2020^[footnote 121] and ethnic minority groups are disproportionately convicted of drug dealing. In 2019, 42% of those convicted of dealing class A drugs and 25% of those convicted of dealing class B drugs were from ethnic minorities^[footnote 122]^[footnote 123].

However, despite perceptions, drug-related crime and its consequences are not always found in large cities. For example, by 2017, drug-related deaths in Yorkshire and Humber had risen by more than 75% in 6 years.^[footnote 124]

The issue of drug possession with intent to supply among Asian people has also been widely reported. In an investigation into the links between Huddersfield and the national, and international drugs trade, journalist Mobeen Azhar found that in 2016 to 2017 British Pakistani people accounted for 27% of convictions for possession with intent to supply Class A drugs in Yorkshire and Humber^[footnote 125]; according to the 2011 Census they made up just 5% of the urban population of the region. In that same 12 month period the majority of convictions were among the White British community but this is to be expected as they make up the majority of the area's population.

^[footnote 126]

A 2017 report by the National Crime Agency^[footnote 127] on the so-called 'county lines' gangs delivering hard drugs around the country found that there are an estimated 720 such 'lines', most originating from London where it is estimated that the majority of gang members are Black. In Liverpool and Manchester, it is estimated that most gang members are White, and in Birmingham mostly Asian.^[footnote 128]

As outlined earlier in the chapter, criminality can stem from adverse childhood experiences as well as deprivation.^[footnote 129] Yet the concept of 'personal agency' is at the core of the Commission's outlook, and it recognises that all individuals regardless of their ethnicity, personal attributes, or economic circumstances have the moral capacity to discriminate between different courses of behaviour. Offending behaviour should not be excused as a consequence of dire personal circumstances.

However, the Commission is also careful to note that there are exceptions to this, for example, exploitation and grooming into criminal activity, where the notion of 'choice' may not be as easily identifiable, and where young individuals may not always be as free to make these choices.

Improving stop and search encounters

The Commission recognises that the police can only operate with the trust, respect and consent of the people. This is the original notion of Robert Peel's police service whose role was to prevent crime and disorder with the consent and respect of the public.^[footnote 130]

The police do not bear the only responsibility for preventing crime and disorder. Involvement is required from the community to prevent criminality in society. We all need the police, regardless of our ethnicity, to safeguard our lives, liberty, and property. Those most affected are those grieving parents who have just lost a child, and arguably those at risk of being drawn into crime.

Stop and search is a useful tactic, governed by legislation, and is used to investigate various forms of criminal activity including burglary and violent crime. The Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act 1984 Code A states that police require reasonable grounds for suspicion before a stop and search is carried out.

Reasonable grounds refers to the fact that there "must be an objective basis for that suspicion based on facts, information and/or intelligence which are relevant to the likelihood that the object in question will be found, so that a reasonable person would be entitled to reach the same conclusion based on the same facts and information and/or intelligence."^[footnote 131]

There is a tension where some communities are supportive of the use of stop and search, whilst others call for the end of the policing tactic altogether. Some respondents in the Commission's call for evidence said that there is a need to end the use of stop and search, citing the tool as an opportunity for racial profiling. But the alternative to no stop and search would likely mean an instant arrest on suspicion in lieu, and the individual would then need to

be taken to a police station to have a similar process carried out before being released - if no further action was required.

The Commission has also heard evidence^[footnote 132] that communities impacted by violent crime are often supportive of stop and search being used in circumstances when: a) the reasons for the use of the tool in their area are explained to them, and b) they understand the benefits of stop and search in the context of their neighbourhood. This was echoed in some responses to the Commission's call for evidence, where respondents indicated an acceptance of the use of stop and search, as long as it is used fairly and properly.

Differing perspectives on trust: a view from both sides

The Commission recognises that stop and search is a critical tool for policing and, when used fairly and properly, it can lead to positive outcomes. This is also the view of academics, police officers and citizens (including young people) from whom the Commission has received and heard evidence. However, it is also clear that there are some ethnic minority communities who remain deeply mistrustful of both the practice and the police services themselves. The reasons for this mistrust are often steeped in a terrible legacy of historical incidents of racism and racist behaviour, carried out under the auspices of a few different police services.

These instances have, understandably cut deeply into those affected generations within ethnic minority communities. We also note that there are more recent examples of abhorrent encounters between individual police officers and citizens. Sadly, for some, these have served only to open old wounds and reinforce suspicion and legacy mistrust, which has been directed at the wider police service - not just to those few rogue elements within.

But it is also the case that there is very little research that has been conducted on the police service's perspective of policing in the communities they serve - including intelligence-led stop and search encounters. Anecdotally, some officers have spoken confidentially of the challenges and aggressive - sometimes violent - behaviours they have to overcome in the course of carrying out their job. The Metropolitan Police Service recently reported that racist assaults on their police officers had almost doubled between the year ending November 2019 and the year ending November 2020^[footnote 133] and, separately, it was reported in the media that assaults on their police officers had increased by nearly 40% during the COVID-19 lockdown in 2020.^[footnote 134]

The Commission states unequivocally that the overwhelming majority of those who serve in police force areas across the country are decent and good people. These are men and women who work to protect and serve us all. They put themselves in harm's way so that we don't have to. They are the ones we turn to, sometimes when we are in the most desperate circumstances. It is an injustice in itself to portray them, or the wider police service as a whole, as anything less.

But as with all workforces cross-sector, and all corners of society as a whole, there are a minority of individuals who bring shame and dishonour to themselves and to those they represent.

That said, levels of confidence in the police service have remained high for some of the ethnic groups that have experienced higher rates of stop and search. The Crime Survey of England and Wales shows that in the year ending March 2020, 84% of people in the Asian Other ethnic group, 81% of Bangladeshi people and 69% of Black African people and had confidence in their local police.^[footnote 135] These 3 groups experienced among the highest rates of stop and search in the same year.^[footnote 136] However there is a noticeable drop in confidence for Black Caribbean people (54%), who also experienced the highest rates of stop and search in the same year.^[footnote 137] This lack of confidence appears to stem from different experiences, and the intergenerational memory that members of Black Caribbean communities in particular have of unfair and excessive policing in the past.

Addressing concerns that destabilise community trust

We noted earlier that HMICFRS deemed the vast majority of stop and searches they looked into met the requirement for 'reasonable grounds'. Of the remaining in their sample, however, 22% of the recorded grounds were assessed as weak, and 14% were assessed as 'not reasonable'.

The Commission is supportive of HMICFRS' conclusion that "forces need to place more emphasis on ensuring that officers and their supervisors understand what constitutes reasonable grounds and how to record them accurately... Forces should work to improve their find rates by focusing officers' efforts on searches that are based on strong grounds".^[footnote 138]

Going beyond this, the Commission also believes that a greater distinction is required between 'weak' or 'not reasonable' grounds, and also a better understanding of what constitutes unlawful grounds. Where grounds for searches are legitimate, and the search is conducted fairly and appropriately, disparities that arise are more easily and justifiably explained. It is in instances where the use of the tactic is deemed unlawful that further investigation of disparities arising as a consequence would be required.

Another area that plays a role in driving mistrust between communities and the police service is the use of force and restraint and the tragic outcomes that can occur as a result.

The Angiolini Review^[footnote 139] found that White people make up 86% of those who died in police custody from 2012 to 2017, with 14% from ethnic minority groups. The proportion of Black people who died in police custody between April 2007 and March 2016 was lower than the proportion arrested for notifiable offences.^[footnote 140] However a disproportionate number of ethnic minority people have died following use of force.^[footnote 141]

In the 11 years to March 2009, 87 people died following police restraint. 67% were White, 16% were Black, 7% had Mixed ethnicity, 6% were Asian, and the ethnicity was not known for 5%.^[footnote 142] However, this does not mean there is a causal link between the use of restraint and death, restraint is typically seen as a contributing factor as opposed to a cause in its own right. The IOPC does not report the ethnicity of restraint related deaths but bespoke analysis produced for the Home Office shows that between April 2005 and March 2015, 10% of deaths in police custody were 'restraint related' - 3 ethnic minority people and 18 White people.^[footnote 143]

The Commission supports the Angiolini Review recommendations aimed at addressing disproportionality in the use of restraint and notes that, in the year ending March 2020, there were 18 deaths - 14 White people, 3 Black people and 1 person of unknown ethnicity - in or following police contact in England and Wales.^[footnote 144]

On the issue of racism itself, Dame Elish Angiolini makes it clear that this is not easily proven. She writes:

It is difficult to be able to prove that racism was a factor in deaths in police custody unless sufficient evidence exists and racism can be inferred from the specific facts and circumstances of that case or from a series of such cases of a similar nature arising from the conduct of the suspended officer. Racial stereotyping may or may not be a significant contributory factor in some deaths in custody.

Going further with training

Another issue is that police service areas do not appear to take a uniform approach to training their police officers on how to conduct stop and search. The College of Policing has produced comprehensive training products but it is a matter for individual police services to decide how to use them.^[footnote 145]

Better training is often proposed as a potential solution to tackling biases in stop and search. However, the College of Policing conducted a trial^[footnote 146] in which 6 police services were given pilot stop and search training.

The study concluded that the problems with stop and search would not be solved by training alone.

Evidence shared during the Commission's engagement with senior officers, frontline officers and academics highlighted good practice models for stop and search. This includes police services having a forum to inform the public of why the police are using the stop and search tactic in their area before it is employed, officers approaching stop and searches with an informed understanding of different ethnic and faith cultures, asking the right questions, and officers knowing how to disengage appropriately from members of the public when nothing is found. Both the police officer and the citizen need to be able to exit this encounter in a positive way.^[footnote 147]

Similarly, the Commission has heard views of what does not work in relation to stop and search from community citizens and young people. Qualitative research with young Black and Asian people showed that those who had experienced stop and search felt that grounds used to initiate stops often lacked legitimacy, and that the legal basis for stops varied. They also reported mixed experiences of stop and search, ranging from calm and friendly, to negative and hostile.^[footnote 148]

Evidence describing training for young people on how to handle such encounters was also considered. Some community organisations affiliated with their local police service deliver this to good effect. They teach young people what stop and search is, what their rights are, what the process that they can expect to undergo is; and how to behave, react and respond to police officers who are carrying it out. The young people undergoing this training also gave positive feedback and expressed a better understanding of the process and why it may come about.

The Commission encourages more communities to consider where and how they can work together with their local police service to better inform themselves about the law, the process they should expect during an encounter, and what their rights are.

Case Study: Stop and Search Know Your Rights, West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner

The West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner funds a 'Stop and Search Know Your Rights' project that aims to raise young people's awareness around stop and search, to explain why police use this power and to inform them of their rights. The objective is to encourage young people to handle a Stop positively, with confidence and control.

The project is delivered in schools and within the community, with information cards distributed at events. Feedback from young people who have been part of the project includes:

- 'We now know what a stop and search is'
- 'We understand our rights'
- 'We realise stop and search is monitored and police are held to account'

Stop and Search trainers work with West Midlands Police to promote trust and transparency, and also attend colleges and universities to promote and recruit for West Midlands Stop and Search scrutiny panels in order to hear youth perspectives. To date the programme has delivered over 400 workshops, reaching in excess of 15,000 people.

Other organisations have adopted a similar approach. Release and StopWatch are developing programmes to ensure that 'young people are given the tools to interact with the police in as safe a manner as possible, equipping them with the skills and knowledge to handle situations where they are stopped and searched'. The project includes developing training and materials over a twelve-month period to help young people deal with stop and search exchanges, providing them with skills to manage a situation and reduce negative outcomes. Release describes the project as 'a harm reduction approach to the policing of young people'. [\[footnote 149\]](#)

Anecdotal evidence, as well as submissions to the Commission's call for evidence, also highlighted a need for more training on de-escalation techniques, and discouraging the use of force in certain encounters.

The HMICFRS report on stop and search similarly alludes to this issue: [\[footnote 150\]](#)

In too many forces, officers and staff are not being provided with the skills they need to understand how they come across in everyday interactions. Nor are they being shown how they can build rapport to help prevent conflict and escalation in order to secure public cooperation and reduce the need for conflict management, de-escalation and the use of force.

The Commission is supportive of the need for effective training which provides de-escalation skills, to avoid unnecessary conflict during stop and search, arrest, and police custody. There is also a need for better training on communication skills, to ensure messages are delivered accurately and effectively to the individuals concerned, their families and, as appropriate, to the wider public.

Recommendation 5: Build trust - Improve training to provide police officers with practical skills to interact with communities

The Commission recommends that the College of Policing, working alongside the NPCC and APCC, develop a strategy to improve the efficacy and implementation of stop and search, and de-escalation training, ensuring a consistent person-centred approach is taken by all police service areas.

De-escalation training will be required for all new police officers joining the service, and upscaled to include all current serving officers who are expected to interact with the public as part of their role. This would be a requirement not just at the point of initial police training, but as a key aspect of continual professional development within different stages and levels of policing.

Transparency and accountability to re-establish trust

But, as outlined above, training alone cannot address the inconsistency in police conduct during stop and search. Pace Code A highlights that:

Supervising officers must monitor the use of stop and search powers and should consider in particular whether there is any evidence that they are being exercised on the basis of stereotyped images or inappropriate generalisations... Supervisors must also examine whether the records reveal any trends or patterns which give cause for concern and, if so, take appropriate action to address this. [\[footnote 151\]](#)

The Commission believes that senior accountability is required when monitoring how stop and search is conducted in a police service. We also acknowledge that body-worn video (BWV) cameras provide an additional means to build transparency and monitor conduct during encounters with the public, supporting the police to do their job, whilst helping to safeguard trust from the public. While there are varied findings on the effectiveness of BWV cameras for improving criminal justice outcomes, there are indications that its use can reduce the number of allegations made against officers and change behaviour relating to both police-conduct and public conduct. [\[footnote 152\]](#)

The College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice outlines guidance on the operational use of BWV, stating:

Where available, body-worn video (BWV) should be used in accordance with force policy. The standard approach is that BWV should be activated so as to capture all relevant information in the time leading up to the person being detained for a search, the conduct of the search itself, and the subsequent conclusion of the encounter. [\[footnote 153\]](#)

HMICFRS also points to BWV cameras as a potential means for continuous professional development, and posited 3 recommendations pertaining to the use of BWV across police services in their 2021 report on the use of stop and search and use of force. Their recommendation included a requirement for police services to ensure BWV cameras are utilised for the entirety of all stop and search encounters; a need for internal monitoring of BWV footage; and, a requirement for external scrutiny of BWV footage. [\[footnote 154\]](#) The inspectorate has also announced the intention to examine the extent to which services use BWV footage in their internal monitoring and external scrutiny processes as part of future Police Effectiveness, Efficiency and Legitimacy (PEEL) inspections.

Recommendation 14: Promote fairness - Increase legitimacy and accountability of stop and search through body-worn video

In this context, there is a strong presumption that in all police services body-worn video (BWV) cameras will be switched on if the officer is in a situation which they believe could lead to a stop and search, or as soon as it is practicable to do so during that encounter. Building on the recommendations posited by HMICFRS, the Commission recommends that for instances where BWV cameras are not switched on during a stop and search, the officer is required to provide a written explanation as to why it was not switched on. Operational guidelines for this requirement should be developed by the College of Policing, and included in the Authorised Professional Practice for stop and search.

Officers must include this written explanation on the stop and search record slip, and it must be available for the individual who was stopped and searched to access following the encounter. The written explanation should be reviewed by a supervising officer to confirm whether the explanation provided is reasonable, and appropriate action should be taken where the rationale provided is of concern. This can, for example, be through performance or misconduct procedures.

The BWV footage of stop and searches should also be scrutinised at 2 levels through dip-sampling:

a) First, external scrutiny through community Safeguarding Trust groups (a recommendation for the formation of these groups is found in the following section) who should be able to request BWV camera footage from a specified date for review. b) Second, police services must implement an internal performance framework that includes dip-sampling review of BWV footage by supervising officers. Feedback should then be given to officers conducting stop and search, and appropriate action should be taken where interactions require improvement. For example, individual officers may be directed to further training or, in most serious instances, be referred to appropriate misconduct procedures.

Equip communities with information on the drivers of police activity

The Commission considers the key issue with stop and search is a lack of consistency, transparency and oversight that allows the perpetuation of charges of racism in public discourse and the media. A large part of this perception of over-policing, and biases in policing, may also be rooted in the lack of information provided to communities about the drivers of police activity in their local areas.

Our research set out 3 main factors informing a decision to establish reasonable grounds to initiate stop and search. [\[footnote 155\]](#) First, long established local intelligence, including knowledge of particular crime 'hotspots' or patterns of crime within an area. Second, direct information regarding an alleged offender or offence, including physical description of the alleged offender(s) and/or accounts of the crime undertaken (often provided by members of the public and/or CCTV operators). Third, assessment of the situation and interaction with the alleged offender.

The Commission pays tribute to the many admirable steps already taken by the police, community representatives, advocacy groups, as well as ordinary individuals to build better relations. However, there is currently no uniform approach across the 43 police service areas to promote transparency, community involvement and scrutiny.

Build transparency and community involvement in policing

But there is guidance that can be built on. The College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice (APP) guidance highlights the fact that the police are legally required to engage with local communities, and under section 34 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, Chief Officers must make arrangements in each neighbourhood to obtain the views of the public on crime and disorder in the local area, provide local information about crime and policing, and hold regular public meetings. [\[footnote 156\]](#)

In addition, the guidance states that:

Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) or their equivalents must, under section 96 of the Police Act 1996 as amended by section 14 of the PRSR 2011, make arrangements for obtaining the views of communities in particular circumstances (for example, before issuing a police and crime plan) and, under section 17, have regard to the views of people in their areas on policing, when carrying out their functions.^[footnote 157] The APP guidance outlines the key principles required for independent scrutiny processes introduced by police services and their PCCs, such as independent advisory groups. This includes recognition that panels need to be representative, reflecting the diversity of their local areas and independently chaired by someone independent of the police.^[footnote 158]

The Commission recognises that the legislation and guidance are still open to interpretation by each police service area, leading to large degrees of variance on how community scrutiny and involvement works. We also note the need for members of scrutiny groups to be well-informed and given the necessary support to scrutinise and work with policing. This is an issue that HMICFRS points to, highlighting that "some panels were ineffective because members were not given the tools they needed to perform the role. And a small number of forces either had no arrangements in place or their panels met too infrequently".^[footnote 159]

In the Commission's view, scrutiny and community engagement should be operational in all police services at 2 levels: borough or community safety partnership level, with oversight and direct lines of reporting to Police and Crime Commissioners and the Chief Constable; and at service level with ability to scrutinise the Chief Constable.

Some police services advertise scrutiny as 'ride alongs' with police officers, where community members can experience policing from within and provide feedback. However, others demonstrate good practice in community scrutiny and involvement. The Criminal Justice Alliance report particularly identified Bedfordshire Police as having a transparent, informed, independent and representative approach to community scrutiny.^[footnote 160]

Case study: Bedfordshire Police

Bedfordshire Stop Search Scrutiny Panel uses a traffic light system to 'rate' officers' use of stop and search. Where a search is graded green, the officer is provided with positive feedback. If amber, the officer is given advice on how to improve. A red-graded search will be escalated to be reviewed by the Professional Standards Department and then raised with local senior management of the officer to ensure direct accountability and management action. Feedback is provided at the next panel meeting. Approximately 5% of stop and searches are scrutinised on a monthly basis.

The scrutiny panel has a membership pool of 50 and recruitment is independent of the police. Membership is 50% male 50% female with representation from people in Asian, Black, Mixed and White ethnic groups; there is also some youth representation with the minimum age set at 16.

The scrutiny panel also undertakes a wide range of community engagement activities to ensure its panel is open and representative of both age and demographics of the country. This includes using radio stations, sports centres, community centres, schools and colleges to raise awareness of the work of the panel. The Bedfordshire stop search scrutiny panel also works alongside the police Community Cohesion Team with the aim of engaging people with experience of stop and search.

The scrutiny panel meetings occur in a variety of locations accessible to the general public, including youth centres, local charity Youthscape and Bedfordshire Police HQ. Bedfordshire works closely with the community through a dedicated community cohesion lead who liaises with the stop and search lead and the scrutiny panel.

Chief Inspector Hob Hoque stated in October 2020:

It is of course great news that the panel were happy with how our officers used force on these occasions. We have still identified some great feedback from the panel, which we will be taking back to the officers involved as well as the wider organisation to help us improve how we do things.

Panel Chair Montell Neufville said:

It is clear that on occasions it is necessary to use force to protect people, property and officers themselves, and most do this in line with operational practices. The panel's role is to provide that reassurance to local people that tactics are being used fairly and that force is the last resort to achieve the outcome.^[footnote 161]

During the COVID-19 pandemic, scrutiny panels have continued to take place, but have been coordinated through the use of virtual meetings, enabling the panel to view the body-worn video footage and review the numerical data from remote locations.

Recommendation 4: Build trust - Bridge divides and create partnerships between the police and communities

Noting the key concerns highlighted above in relation to communication, transparency and consistency in approach for stop and search, the Commission makes a two-part recommendation:

a) First, that the College of Policing, working alongside the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC), and National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC), develop a minimum standard framework for community 'Safeguarding Trust' groups that will not only have a function to scrutinise and problem-solve alongside policing, but also to ensure there is a minimum level of engagement with communities in every police service area.

The framework for the minimum standard should include, but not be limited to:

- a requirement for stop and search data to be made more granular and publicly available for groups to scrutinise
- a requirement for groups to be independently chaired and representative of their communities
- a duty for Safeguarding Trust group minutes to be published
- an ability for groups to scrutinise and hold police services to account on policing activity and disparities in stop and search, use of force, workforce mix and internal misconduct
- an ability for groups to review stop and search authorisations made under Section 60 (S.60) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, where police will be required to provide the Safeguarding Trust group with a rationale as to why a S.60 was authorised

Once a year, Safeguarding Trust groups should write to, and receive a response from the Chief Constable and Police and Crime Commissioner to update on progress. Police services should also be required to demonstrate how they have responded and implemented changes as a result of scrutiny or challenge by the community.

Throughout the framework development phase, there should be engagement with independent experts in community engagement and scrutiny external to policing. Consideration should be given to how members of Safeguarding Trust groups are adequately enabled to undertake their roles.

Where required, the Home Office should also provide support in identifying those areas where trustworthiness is low and set targets to close the confidence gap, with Mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners to publish delivery plans to achieve that improvement. Progress against these delivery plans should be presented and discussed at the Safeguarding Trust group meetings.

There is a strong will and commitment from police services to create these groups and work alongside communities. Through these Safeguarding Trust groups, communities will have greater agency and involvement in the policing of their local areas. But this cannot be achieved without commitment from the citizens themselves. The Commission therefore encourages citizens of all race and ethnic groups within these communities to come forward, get involved and support these police services.

b) The Commission recommends that Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) inspect each police service area against the minimum standard framework, reviewing police services on their efficacy, relationship building and a requirement for services to demonstrate the actions they are taking to build positive relationships with all communities within their police service area.

The Commission is of the view that community scrutiny needs to drive accountability and drive change in policing. The aim of these groups is to bring transparency for communities to understand what is happening in their local areas, the drivers behind the policing activity, and provide scrutiny and challenge to policing to drive action where appropriate.

However, the Commission also notes that communities themselves - particularly the citizens who reside in them - will need to exercise their own agency, individually and collectively, to play their part in making this successful.

There needs to be a will on both sides to bridge current divides, and to work collaboratively to achieve better outcomes for all.

There is already a commitment among some police forces to strengthen community involvement in and scrutiny of policing tactics, with Greater Manchester Police and West Midlands Police being supportive of the Commission's recommendation.

Superintendent Marie O'Loughlin, Diversity, Equality and Inclusion, Greater Manchester Police:

Greater Manchester Police is absolutely committed to delivering equality of service to our communities right across Greater Manchester. We know that the police have a unique role in society, in that we can be required to use powers over our fellow citizens. It is absolutely right that because of these unique powers the Police Service faces unique levels of scrutiny and accountability. Greater Manchester Police is committed to working with the College of Policing and NPCC in the development of a minimum standard for community 'Safeguarding Trust' groups that have a function to scrutinise and problem-solve alongside policing.

Chief Superintendent Phil Dolby, Force Lead, Diversity and Inclusion Team, West Midlands Police:

At West Midlands Police we are big believers in accountability and public scrutiny. We are a police service, not a 'force', and policing needs to work hard to earn the public's trust through demonstrating legitimacy and building confidence with our communities. West Midlands Police is supportive of the proposal to develop a minimum standard for groups that will enable communities to scrutinise and problem-solve alongside policing.

Other perspectives on preventing youth crime

In addition to community leadership, the Commission considers that there are not enough countervailing mechanisms for young people who want to extricate themselves from criminal activity before it is too late. The Commission heard the view that often, young people participating in criminal activity do not see themselves at risk. Instead, they feel like they are having a good time, being part of a surrogate family, being treated as adults by those they consider their peers.

There is an existing initiative for young people, called 'Is This Ok?', that was piloted for 7 months in Bradford and the London Borough of Waltham Forest. The evaluation of the initial pilot that took place in September 2019, demonstrated that it had some success in dealing with exploitation and abuse.

The pilot was funded by BBC Children in Need and delivered in partnership by Missing People and NSPCC and Childline.[\[footnote 162\]](#)

Case study: 'Is This Ok?'

Is This Ok? is a service for 13 to 18 year olds that provides a digital gateway to those that are at risk of, or experiencing, exploitation and or abuse. It was developed as an action in response to young people being at risk of exploitation and being groomed into gangs, drug crime and violence.

The service uses chatbot technology to direct, navigate and connect users to:

- information about services and organisations that young people can access for further information and support for a range of topic areas relating to exploitation and abuse
- a live chat function where the user can anonymously discuss their concerns and worries with a trained call handler

During the delivery period (September 2019 to March 2020) of the pilot, the chatbot was accessed 1,746 times, with 11% of these interactions being repeat users.

In addition to the chatbot there is an option to speak to a call handler through a live chat function. Of the chat transcripts, there were a number of encouraging responses from young people, with many stating that they now 'know there is somewhere or someone I can go to if I'm worried something is not OK'.

The service is intended to provide support to young people who are vulnerable to criminal or sexual exploitation, who would not otherwise access any other forms of support. The feedback from call handlers suggests the pilot successfully reached and engaged young people with low level concerns. Further work is required to understand why the pilot was not as successful in reaching those with higher level concerns and at the greatest risk of exploitation.[\[footnote 163\]](#)

There are also other initiatives that use digital technology as part of their work to divert and signpost young people away from damaging behaviours that may lead to the criminal justice system, including Project Axis at Hillingdon Youth Justice Service.

Case study: Hillingdon Youth Justice Service - Project Axis

Project Axis is an award-winning programme endorsed by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) that supports the early identification of young people at risk of criminal exploitation. By centrally collating, analysing and sharing data across agencies, it informs the wider local authority and partnership response. Project Axis disrupts county line activity and coordinated drug operations. It enables Hillingdon to work closely with the police on Child Sexual Exploitation operations, allows triangulation of data, and delivers targeted intervention and diversion exactly where it is needed.[\[footnote 164\]](#)

An example of what has been achieved through Project Axis is outlined below:

Intelligence was shared by the allocated Metropolitan Police Schools Officer regarding a 14 year old student (A) who had recently moved to the school and had become involved with a group of known criminal peers. On receiving the information, Project Axis triangulated the information across systems and databases to establish if 'A' was known to other services. Due to a recent move into the area, 'A' did not appear on partners' systems however using the Axis database 'A' was identified as being at risk based on associates.

Contact was made with 'A' through the school and parent, and 'A' undertook a comprehensive Early Help Assessment followed by the implementation of a targeted action plan.

Following a period of 12 weeks engaging on Project Axis, 'A':

- engaged with counselling delivered by the school counsellor
- increased their school attendance and required no further periods in alternative education
- changed peer group within school
- along with their parent, developed a greater awareness of the risks associated with peer coercion and exploitation

Building on the 'Is This Ok?' chatbot and Project Axis models, the Commission has heard further views from the children's charity Coram that there is a need for a technology strategy to disrupt youth crime pathways and enable early intervention at scale.

The charity has newly formed a National Innovation Incubator for Children's Social Care which is already taking this concept forward as part of a wider programme of innovation, partnering with local authorities including: Stoke City Council, North Yorkshire County Council, Hertfordshire County Council, Southend Borough Council, London Borough of Newham, London Borough of Redbridge, London Borough of Havering, and London Borough of Bromley.

The Commission therefore believes that a new, 'disruptive' solution that helps to create agency and opportunities for individuals to gain control of their lives, and also stops or prevents the exploitation of young people and children into crime is required.

Recommendation 18: Create agency - Improve safety and support for children at risk

The Commission recommends that the Youth Justice Board (YJB), working with partners across government with expertise in child criminal exploitation, develops a digital solution that can be accessed and used by children and young people before or at the point of crisis.

The government will be required to secure and deploy additional resourcing to the YJB to ensure that the YJB is appropriately resourced to deliver and implement this recommendation.

The digital solution, which for example may take the form of a mobile application, text line or chatbot will act as an entry point to signpost and refer those at risk of, or already experiencing criminal exploitation, to appropriate local organisations who can support them. The services will be driven and implemented at a local level, for example, through youth offending teams.

This recommendation will help empower young people with the agency and ability to escape criminal behaviours and exploitation without the need to go to the police. The solution, based on existing technology innovations, will need to reach young people at critical points in their journey, intervening at an early stage for those at risk of criminal exploitation and preventing those already in the criminal justice system from being drawn deeper into criminality.

Reducing the harm caused by low level drug crime

One of the themes from the Lammy Review which the Commission has aimed to build on includes the diversion of low-level drug offences outside of the criminal justice system.

For England and Wales, in 2019 to 2020, 63% of 'reasonable ground' stop and searches were conducted to find drugs.[\[footnote 165\]](#)

In 2019, possession of cannabis was the most common drug offence for Black people and the second most common for all other ethnic groups. Class B drug offences accounted for nearly half of prosecutions for almost all ethnic groups: 49% of White defendants and 48% of defendants from Black, Asian and Mixed ethnic groups.[\[footnote 166\]](#)

In the youth justice estate, in the year ending March 2020, 16% of Black and Asian children, 13% of children in Mixed and Other ethnic groups, and 8% of White children in youth custody had committed drug offences.[\[footnote 167\]](#)

The Commission found gaps in research and understanding of the overall prevalence of illegal drug use by ethnicity. However in England, for pupils aged 11 to 15 years in 2018, 17% said they had taken drugs in the last year. When looking at ethnicity, Asian pupils were less likely than any other ethnic groups to have taken drugs in the last year at 13%, compared with 23% of Mixed ethnicity pupils, 18% of Black pupils and 17% of White pupils. Of the drugs taken, cannabis is the drug that pupils were most likely to have taken in the last year, with 8% saying that they had done so. The statistics also show that of those pupils who had taken drugs, 42% said that their early experience of drug use involved cannabis.[\[footnote 168\]](#)

With over 2.6 million users[\[footnote 169\]](#) during the last year alone the cannabis market is currently the single biggest illegal drug market in terms of number of consumers and has an estimated revenue of approximately £2 billion.[\[footnote 170\]](#) For adults, cannabis represented the highest number of all types of drug use for year ending March 2020, and approximately one third of individuals who use cannabis were frequent users of the drug.[\[footnote 171\]](#) For 16 to 24 year olds, cannabis was the most common drug used with 18.7% having reported that they had used the drug in the last year.[\[footnote 172\]](#) Drug use also varied by household income, with those with a total household income less than £10,400 (13.2%) more likely to have used cannabis than people in higher income households.[\[footnote 173\]](#)

Cannabis was also the most commonly seized drug by police services in the year ending March 2020, representing 74% of all drug seizures and amounting to about 125,000 seizures.[\[footnote 174\]](#) There were approximately 40,000 convictions at all courts for all drug offences, not only cannabis.[\[footnote 175\]](#) In 2019, 63% of convictions for drug offences were for White offenders, 20% for Black offenders and 10% for Asian offenders.[\[footnote 176\]](#)

We know that poorer communities are more likely to experience stop and search, most stop and searches are made on suspicion of drugs.[\[footnote 177\]](#) and that the majority of stop and searches in London were of people aged 15 to 24 years in the year ending January 2021.[\[footnote 178\]](#) Black and Asian people were among the most likely to be living in the most deprived 10% of neighbourhoods in 2019.[\[footnote 179\]](#)

The Commission believes that there is a double disadvantage for young people living in more deprived areas, where greater police presence leads to them being stopped, searched and consequently prosecuted for possession of Class B drugs. Once they have entered the criminal justice system, these young people, and specifically young ethnic minority men are more likely to then re-enter the criminal justice system than their White counterparts. This then has a disproportionate impact on their ability to progress in life, and can often be the gateway into a cycle of re-entry into the criminal justice system, hampering education and employment prospects.[\[footnote 180\]](#)

The question to be posed here is: what is the best response to drug possession that will achieve society's objectives to punish, rehabilitate and correct behaviours? Drug possession, regardless of whether Class A or Class B, is a crime and anyone who chooses to engage with illegal drugs must contend with the repercussions of their decisions. However, we question the extent to which these repercussions must fall within the criminal justice system.

The Commission believes there is a case for treating low-level Class B drug possession for personal use only through alternative pathways outside of the criminal justice system. This would enable the police to direct greater efforts and resources towards hard drugs and the violent crime with which it is associated, whilst also preventing harm through adopting public health interventions.

By focusing on possession of Class B drugs for personal use, the Commission believes it is making practical and achievable proposals that could help staunch the flow of young people into more serious crime.

The use of Class B drugs is widespread across the population of the UK, but the majority of those who use them are aged under 30; and there is some evidence that young people with heavy cannabis use have been pulled into county lines operations to pay off debts.[\[footnote 181\]](#)

The Commission welcomes the government's recent announcement of a £148m investment into tackling the issue of drugs, which will provide additional resources for law enforcement to tackle the supply of drugs and dismantle organised gangs. It will also deliver more money to drug treatment and recovery to help cut drug related crime and disrupt the cycle of misuse and reoffending.

Part of this investment includes the introduction of the pilot Project ADDER (Addiction, Diversion, Disruption, Enforcement and Recovery). This new, intensive approach to tackling drug misuse, combines targeted and tougher policing with enhanced treatment and recovery services.[\[footnote 182\]](#) The pilot will run in 5 areas across the UK with some of the highest rates of drug misuse: Blackpool, Hastings, Middlesbrough, Norwich and Swansea Bay. We note that the ethnic minority populations of the identified locations are small, particularly in Blackpool and Swansea[\[footnote 183\]](#), and that the project will presumably tackle all classes of drugs. But there is another troubling area that it may not address.

This is the disproportionate criminalisation of young people, often from ethnic minority and deprived backgrounds, through their personal use of cannabis and other 'soft drugs'. The Commission does not endorse the legalisation of Class B drugs. They have a detrimental impact on an individual's physical and mental wellbeing, with research showing links between frequent use of cannabis and risk of developing psychosis disorders.[\[footnote 184\]](#) For young people under 18 years old, there have been links between cannabis consumption and risks of developing depression and suicidal behaviour later in life.[\[footnote 185\]](#) In year ending March 2020, admissions for drug-related mental and behavioural disorders, and for poisoning by drug misuse, were highest for younger people, peaking between the ages of 25 and 34.[\[footnote 186\]](#) And cannabis accounted for three-quarters of all patients in drug treatment in 2015 to 2016.[\[footnote 187\]](#) It is also established that regular use can predispose people to later Class A drug use by, in some way, opening a 'gateway'.[\[footnote 188\]](#)

The tragic effects of drug abuse can also be seen downstream in the criminal justice system. Between 2008 and 2016, there were 88 drug-related deaths in prison custody[\[footnote 189\]](#) of which 12 were counted within the definition of suicide as they were classified as self-poisoning (either intentional or undetermined intent).[\[footnote 190\]](#) In 2017, there were 60 self-inflicted deaths among White prisoners, at a rate of 0.96 per 1,000 prisoners compared with a rate of 0.09 for Black prisoners (2 self-inflicted deaths).[\[footnote 191\]](#) In the same year, there were 621 self-harm incidents involving White prisoners per thousand compared to 100 for Black prisoners.[\[footnote 192\]](#)

But health-oriented Out of Court Disposals (OOCs) can potentially address substance abuse before it becomes addictive, and may prevent criminal offenders from drifting into more serious criminal behaviours. They can also spare young people a criminal record, and the resulting blight on future opportunities for education or employment, for what could be a one-time indiscretion or phase in the thralls of youth.

A review prepared for the Commission[\[footnote 193\]](#) found no strong evidence to suggest that reducing punishments for drug possession increases drug use. They found that many alternative measures to decriminalisation have reduced arrests and convictions for low-level drug offences. This is exemplified in the Thames Valley Police Drug Diversion programme, which "provides individuals with an opportunity to avoid the stigma of receiving a criminal record, whilst at the same time offering incentives to attend drug diversion programmes and treatment".[\[footnote 194\]](#)

Case study: Thames Valley Police Drug Diversion Programme

Thames Valley Police (TVP) implemented a pilot study on the West Berkshire Local Policing Area (LPA) which utilised a 'diversion to drug service provider' scheme used in lieu of traditional criminal justice pathways. The pilot utilised a community resolution outcome for those found in possession of illegal drugs. This involved a non-enforceable referral to a drug service provider. The intervention involved an assessment followed by 3 face-to-face intervention sessions with a member of the drug service provider.

A paper outlining the impact of the West Berkshire drugs diversion pilot between 10 December 2017 and 13 January 2019 found that 62% of the referrals came as a result of an officer initiated stop check, and contact was made with all of those referred. The majority of referrals (76%) were for possession of cannabis.

The evaluation found that 84% of those who were sent for treatment would have received a sanction that would not have addressed the reasons for their drug use, had they not been referred to the programme. There was a proven re-offending rate of 8.7% for adults in the pilot cohort when compared with a national proven re-offending rate of 25.7%.

I did the drug diversion sessions when I was stopped by the police in the wrong place at the wrong time with a joint of cannabis on me.... But I actually found the sessions to be really useful and I learnt a lot from them... I think it's really important that Thames Valley Police offer this so that we don't just get a criminal record.

(Male, 17, completed the drug diversion programme in Oct/Nov 2020.)

Five police services have implemented specific drug diversion schemes in the UK: Durham Police, Avon and Somerset, North Wales, Thames Valley Police, and West Midlands Police - whose particular approach is exemplified below.[\[footnote 195\]](#)

Case study: West Midlands Police pre-arrest drug diversion

Announced in October 2020, the process for pre-arrest drug diversion in West Midlands Police involves applying a community resolution. This is a non-statutory, out of court disposal (OOC) for officers to utilise. Community resolutions do not lead to a criminal record. This diversion is for 'simple' possession of controlled drug offences only, and 'any possession with intent to supply' offences are excluded from this scheme.

The annual cost of drug misuse to the West Midlands Police force area is around £1.4bn. 1 in 5 crimes reported to West Midlands Police are believed to be drug related, with around 50% of burglaries, theft, shoplifting and robbery committed by Class A drug users. The purpose of this pilot is to adopt a Public Health approach to the use of controlled drugs.

Monitoring and evaluation of the project is ongoing, however, in the first 3 months of the PCC commissioned scheme, West Midlands Police made 527 referrals onto the scheme, with 270 of those being assessed, and 127 people attending the intervention so far. The vast majority of these referrals are for people under the age of 30, and almost 90% of individuals stated cannabis as their drug of choice. 34% of people (with known ethnicity) assessed for the programme so far are White British, 23% are Pakistani (the 2 largest groups).

Currently, to be eligible for an OOC, the offender must admit guilt and agree to the 'disposal'. The Commission has heard views that people from ethnic minorities, and specifically Black men are less likely to receive a diversionary option, such as an OOC, as the requirement to admit guilt acts as a potential barrier to be diverted. This is reflected in the youth justice estate; between 2017 and 2019, Black, Asian and Mixed ethnicity children were substantially less likely than White children to receive an out of court disposal.[\[footnote 196\]](#) The Lammy Review also points to this barrier in the context of custodial sentences, where ethnic minority defendants were

consistently more likely than White defendants to plead not guilty in court. At the heart of this remains the question of trust, and we urge police services, criminal justice agencies, and ethnic minority communities to work together to understand and address this reluctance to admit guilt.

For example, a multi-agency National Youth Justice Board project was launched in 2020 seeking to understand the disproportionality in the OOD system, specifically in relation to Community Resolutions. The Commission considers that the findings from this work will help to inform the approach for a diversion route that mitigates against the risks of disproportionality in the uptake of diversionary routes.

We consider examples such as the Thames Valley and West Midlands Police drug diversion pilot models as effective and proportionate means through which young people may be appropriately diverted from addiction and crime, whilst also trying to address the root cause of their personal drug use. It's about implementing fair practices in policing that will provide improved outcomes for those young people, and their wider communities.

Recommendation 12: Promote fairness - Prevent harm, reduce crime and divert young people away from the criminal justice system

The Commission therefore recommends a multi-agency approach bringing together the College of Policing (CoP), National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC), Home Office (HO) and Ministry of Justice (MoJ) to develop an evidence-based pilot to divert offences of low-level Class B drug possession into public health services.

It is suggested that the pilot is trialled in 4 of the 6 police force areas where almost half (48%) of all arrests for drug offences took place in the year ending March 2020: the Metropolitan Police, Merseyside, West Yorkshire, and Humberside (noting that Thames Valley and West Midlands are already undertaking police drug diversion pilots). The aim is that following evaluation of the pilot by the College of Policing, a consistent approach is adopted nationally.

Under this diversion scheme, individuals committing the offence of 'possession of a Class B drug' will automatically be considered for a drugs referral in lieu of traditional criminal justice routes. In accordance with current OOD guidance, individuals committing the offence must admit guilt to be eligible for this referral mechanism. The Commission also notes that information about those referred into this programme should not be disclosed to potential employers, education providers or voluntary sector organisations, in order to preserve opportunities for young people - once they have completed their course - to pursue further or higher education or employment without being held back by a criminal record.

The responsibility for developing operational guidance for the new drug diversion approach should sit with the CoP, working alongside the NPCC, Home Office and MoJ, and drawing from the evidence of what has worked from models such as the Thames Valley Police pilot approach.

[\[footnote 197\]](#)

The implementation of this recommendation will go further to ensure fairness in treatment of all those in possession of illegal substances across all communities and prevent the mass criminalisation of young people found in possession of small quantities of Class B drugs. The Crown Prosecution Service has indicated support for such an approach:

The Crown Prosecution Service recognises the importance of using a range of interventions to tackle the disproportionate impact the criminal justice system can have on young people, and we are very interested in the outcomes of this project.


(Gerry Wareham, National Youth Justice Lead, Crown Prosecution Service)

How to achieve a more diverse police service

A key element in building trust with communities is fostering the belief among all groups that policing is a respected career, that the police service is theirs and over time can come to look more like the communities it is policing. Respondents to the Commission's call for evidence echoed this sentiment; many said that by having a more diverse workforce, police services would be able to build better relationships and trust with the communities they work with. Some progress has been made in recent years, as we registered above, but relative to the big strides that minorities have made into the professions elsewhere, noted in the employment chapter, policing remains a cold spot, especially at higher levels.

No police services are fully ethnically representative of the population they serve [\[footnote 198\]](#), with the exception of Lincolnshire where the workforce was 2.3% ethnic minority (excluding White minorities) in 2020 compared with a population that was 2.4% ethnic minority [\[footnote 199\]](#)

Figure 16: Percentage of police officers from ethnic minorities, and percentage of the overall population from ethnic minorities (at 2011 Census), by police force area (England and Wales, 31 March 2020)



Note: based on full-time equivalent police officers

In England and Wales as a whole:

- 3.1% of police officers were Asian, compared with 6.8% of the population
- 1.3% of police officers were Black, compared with 3.3% of the population
- 92.7% of officers were White, compared with 86.0% of the population
- the Mixed ethnic group was representative, making up 2.2% of police officers and 2.2% of the population [\[footnote 200\]](#)

In the year ending March 2020, 2,756 [\[footnote 201\]](#) police officers were promoted. This included 2,558 White officers, 57 Asian officers, 52 officers from Mixed ethnic groups, 12 Black officers, and 10 officers from Other (including Chinese) ethnic groups. [\[footnote 202\]](#) However, the Commission was concerned to note that the data does not include the Metropolitan Police, which is the largest and most ethnically diverse service in England and Wales. Consequently this may alter the number of promotions significantly.

Based on this data, and noting the omission of the Metropolitan Police, it showed that only White officers were promoted to the highest rank of Chief Officer (which includes Assistant Chief Constables, Deputy Chief Constables and Chief Constables). A total of 25 promotions to this rank were made. At a Chief Superintendent rank, there were 58 promotions in total, of which there was one promotion of an officer in each of the Mixed, Asian and Other ethnic groups and no promotions of Black officers (where ethnicity was known).

The Commission recognises that this can be explained by the lack of diverse candidates in the pipeline for senior positions. But creating that pipeline is an operational imperative. It makes it easier to gather intelligence and evidence from those who might be unwilling to come forward otherwise, to bring people to court, to protect people, and to be able to respond to incidents with more sensitivity and understanding. [\[footnote 203\]](#) We do not believe

that a White police officer is unable to police areas with large ethnic minority communities, or show empathy and understanding with people from minority groups, but a more diverse police service overall could help to rebuild trust with communities at the local level.

Understanding barriers to recruitment: culture of policing

The challenge of community perceptions

The Commission heard evidence that people from ethnic minority backgrounds are often put off joining the police by the doubts, criticism, and fears of friends or family, with some even having a sense that they are betraying their community and joining the 'other side'.^[footnote 204]

On closer inspection of this evidence, what was also revealed was the shocking racial abuse that ethnic minority police officers can be subjected to by other ethnic minority citizens in the communities they serve. Social media platforms highlighted disturbing comments which will not be repeated here. Printable examples, already publicly commented on, include the following from one such citizen:

You respect Black police officers?? Really??? Are you guys even Black talking like that do you hear yourselves rn!? Ain't no Black man got any place working for the police u guys ain't serious man smfh^[footnote 205]

And the following from political and race relations activist, Lee Jasper:

...You're White or some kind of wretched ass kissing uncle tom. You call out my racism instead of the Met?^[footnote 206]

A Black, female police officer described how she actively avoided working at the BLM protests last year:

I've spoken to numerous colleagues of different ethnic backgrounds; some have been heckled and had racist abuse thrown at them. Others have been asked, 'Why are you standing there when you should be with us?' As a Black person in uniform you can be portrayed as a traitor. But that's not what it's about. I don't want to be a part of people hurling abuse, it [this movement] should be about education and better representation - and sometimes, you have to be the change you want to see yourself.^[footnote 207]

It is notable that little is said in public discourse about this particular barrier to diverse recruitment. Yet in the Commission's view it is a pertinent and contributing factor towards the reluctance of ethnic minorities - particularly of Caribbean or African heritage - to apply to join the police service. It also sits at odds with the claims that are made by representatives of ethnic minority communities, including public figures who demand greater representation in the workforce and at senior levels. Under-represented communities cannot reasonably expect to call for change, but then fail to call out those from within who treat individuals taking that crucial step forward in this appalling way. The Commission encourages communities to support and promote the aspirations of those from diverse backgrounds who wish to join the police service. To not do so is a retrograde step and will limit the pace of change that we all wish to see.

The risks of doing the job

Assaults without injury on police officers have been increasing year on year since the year ending March 2015.^[footnote 208] In 2017, the Police Federation published data highlighting that, on average, a police officer was assaulted every 4 minutes.^[footnote 209] In 2018 the Assault on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act came into law but, despite this, the figures have continued to climb.

The latest annual statistics from the Home Office show that over 30,000 assaults took place in the year ending March 2020^[footnote 210] - the equivalent of 85 police officers every day.^[footnote 211] The Metropolitan Police recorded the highest instances, followed by West Yorkshire police. And even with the COVID lockdowns in 2020, the Metropolitan Police alone experienced an increase of nearly 40%^[footnote 212] of assaults on their officers - likely attributable to various protests, demonstrations and breaches of the law that took place in London. These assaults included spitting and coughing on officers.

The rise in assaults has, unsurprisingly, had a great impact on police officers, both physically and mentally. This in turn has led to a loss of policing days as those affected need time off to recuperate. But perhaps most disturbingly, these assaults have led to a new trend by perpetrators - who are shown to be from all race and ethnic backgrounds - to film the attacks and then post them online. Invariably this indicates that assaults are not happening on a one to one basis, rather it suggests that groups of perpetrators are involved. Commenting on media reports highlighting the issue last year Ken Marsh, Chair of the Metropolitan Police Federation, stated that police officers had become 'society's punching bag'.^[footnote 213]

This is wholly unacceptable, and has rightly been condemned on all sides. That said, this troubling issue appears to remain live - and also has a chilling effect on those individuals who are considering a career in the police service. Again, members of communities need to reflect on the role they play in affecting the change in policing that they would wish to see.

The need to maintain progress on organisational change

While the Commission has found no available data on charges of racism in the police workforce, views shared during engagement with frontline officers highlighted a need for 'cultural change' within the police service:

There is a culture of making everyone the same when you come into policing as opposed to utilising and listening to the different skills they have. It would be a good cultural change to move forward on to embrace cultural differences^[footnote 214]

(Anonymous, Frontline Police Officer)

The National Sikh Police Association submitted evidence to the Commission from a survey carried out in August 2020 on 'racial disparities in the UK police force' which found that of the people who participated, almost half (47%) had considered leaving their career due to their treatment. The majority (62%) of people reported suffering some form of racism at work, and 59% felt they had been overlooked for opportunities some or most of the time due to racism or unconscious bias.^[footnote 215]

However, as outlined earlier in the chapter, the Commission has also heard overwhelming views that there has been a dynamic shift in police attitudes on race over the last few decades. Issues of cultural change and commitment to fostering a fair police service were emphasised by all senior officers that the Commission engaged with.

Yet, how the police are perceived can be shaped by a small minority whose prejudiced behaviour attracts media attention. The Commission notes that while senior officers may appropriately sanction or act on such behaviour, these examples not only impact public perception of the police but also the likelihood individuals would choose to pursue a career within policing.

Internal police misconduct procedures

Another aspect of the internal culture of policing relates to complaints and misconduct. As outlined in the Employment chapter, this is an issue that appears to be pertinent across different sectors. In 2019, the NPCC conducted its own research^[footnote 216] into disproportionality in police complaints and misconduct cases against ethnic minority officers and staff. It found that there were significant differences between White and ethnic minority officers in the amount of internal conduct allegations received and the severity assessments made by professional standards departments (PSDs).

Findings in the NPCC report reveal that:

some BAME officers have been disproportionately subjected to a misconduct investigation by a PSD, when the matter should have been dealt with by their supervision at the earliest opportunity. Thus preventing an unnecessary, lengthy investigation period which subsequently has a significant negative impact on that BAME officer's health, reputation, career progression, family and community of that BAME officer.^[footnote 217]

The NPCC research^[footnote 218] found that PSDs do not have a consistent approach to misconduct cases and that a lack of supervision and leadership within police forces contributed to creating disparities in misconduct cases and outcomes. It noted that the journey of ethnic minority officers when facing conduct allegations often involves being referred to the Professional Standards Department (PSD) by their supervisor for low level allegations, which would ordinarily be dealt with by that supervisor and at an earlier opportunity.

This is either out of fear of being called racist or not having the knowledge to deal with the matters raised appropriately... The internal culture within the service is feeding the levels of disparity due to fear of reprisals or being labelled. Inadvertently the avoidance of dealing with low-level matters at the earliest opportunity is magnifying those levels of distrust and resulting in the exact consequences those supervisors are seeking to avoid.^[footnote 219]

The Commission supports ongoing work by the NPCC to further address the existing disparities, including: work to enhance diversity in the PSD workforce representation, the implementation of reforms that compel PSD decision makers to discharge matters of low level conduct to local line managers, and the bar being raised for both the investigation of a disciplinary investigation in order to focus the system on the most serious of cases.

Achieving meaningful and sustainable diversity in policing

A diverse workforce that is equipped with the necessary skills to work effectively with the communities it serves is dependent on a welcoming, inclusive culture where all of its members are comfortable and confident. Culture changes require a sustained effort and increasing representation alone is not enough to achieve this, although they are linked. The focus in this area needs to be rooted in fairness, openness and respect for all groups. The Commission believes that evidence based initiatives that encourage personal development are key; from mentorship and support for junior members of staff, to improved complaint mechanisms. Every police officer should be comfortable to be themselves and given the same opportunities to succeed as their peers.

There is merit in utilising former police officers and current police staff associations or networks to support and encourage both personal development within the force, and recruitment efforts to reach underrepresented communities. Though, as outlined in the Employment and Enterprise chapter, it cannot be assumed that someone's ethnic background will necessarily change a culture. A concerted effort is also required to ensure that management can be involved in both championing the development of ethnic minority officers within the force and harnessing a culture of fairness across the police service.

The College of Policing, NPCC and APCC recognise that reaching the milestone of a workforce that mirrors the local community they serve may not always be a meaningful measure. For many local services, achieving meaningful diversity, which includes addressing the skills gap, will require going beyond just being representative of the ethnic minority population of the area. [\[footnote 220\]](#)

The Commission heard evidence from a number of key organisations in the policing community who were keen to see section 159 of the Equality Act 2010, preventing positive discrimination in recruitment, suspended to enable Police Forces to recruit specifically to improve ethnic diversity in the workforce. The idea of the law being used as a means of 'ensuring' such diversity is a compelling one - however it is not without significant consequences to wider society.

Following the Patten Report, the Police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI) became perhaps one of the most well-known examples of how legislation has been used as a means of addressing a similar (faith-based) challenge to achieve proportionate representation. As such the Commission undertook a deep-dive with them to learn about how they were able to do this. PSNI implemented a 50:50 recruitment policy to make the police service representative of the predominant faiths in their communities. Following the implementation of the policy, and increase in numbers of Catholic officers in the service, levels of confidence in the local police were similar between both Protestant and Catholic communities in 2017/18. [\[footnote 221\]](#)

However, the Commission also heard evidence from police officers and citizens that, although the legislation had positive outcomes for Catholic and Protestant communities, as their wider communities became more diverse over time this same success was not replicated for minority groups.

This suggests that legislation may not be the best way to address the issue. Indeed, the Commission found strong evidence of where and how effective work has already been undertaken by some police services and the partners they work with across the country [\[footnote 222\]](#), to dispel negative perceptions, promote fairness and improve equality - even in the most challenging of circumstances.

The Commission commends Nottinghamshire Police as a model which has recruited a higher proportion of officers from ethnic minority backgrounds than any other force in England and Wales. They achieved this through a campaign of engagement with different parts of the community, not just those of different faiths and ethnicities, but also across the local public sector, to raise awareness of the opportunity to apply.

Case study: Nottinghamshire Police - Recruitment Approach [\[footnote 223\]](#)

In 2012, Nottinghamshire's PCC set a long term ambition to improve ethnic minority experiences of policing and the recruitment, retention and progression of both ethnic minority officers and staff. This is also a strategic priority for the Chief Constable.

Nottinghamshire's recruitment approach includes: Citizens in Policing, dealing with youth engagement including mini police, cadets, youth outreach, schools intervention officers, force careers advisor, the HR force positive action strategy, and learning and development that includes core and crime student training.

Even during the COVID-19 crisis, Nottinghamshire Police continued to engage potential applicants through a webinar series, allowing future officers to record fitness tests on video from home during lockdown, and social distancing officers in school classrooms to ensure education can go ahead.

Prior to Operation Uplift, Nottinghamshire Police had an ethnic minority officer representational figure of 3.8%. As of December 2020, this figure stood at 7.0%, representing huge organisational change, and the most representative force within the country, of any area with a significant ethnic minority population of over 10%.

In Nottinghamshire Police, each new cohort is averaging 25% ethnic minority recruits and 45% female (average cohort 24 officers). The Force moved from under 4% ethnic minority to 7.01% within 16 months (total officer workforce), and retention remains high with uplift years 1 and 2 already achieved.

Nottinghamshire is 63% representative of the diverse communities it serves, and has an ambition to achieve 11.18% as per the Census.

Police Now, an independent social enterprise, is an example of a successful national scheme that is helping to improve diversity and retention across several police services in England and Wales.

Case study: Police Now

Police Now runs 2-year graduate schemes that recruits and trains 'outstanding' graduates to be placed as neighbourhood police officers and trainee detectives across England and Wales.

Police Now has partnered with over 33 forces in England and Wales using their recruitment and training programmes to supply police forces with graduates. The programme includes a residential training academy, 2 years of in-force training, and continuous professional and personal development with an assigned Police Now Leadership Development Officer.

Police Now focus on attracting individuals who have not previously considered a policing career. To attract these individuals, the marketing focuses on community transformation and the leadership skills a policing career can provide. In 2020, Police Now attracted over 18,374 applications, and to date, Police Now has recruited over 1,800 police officers across England and Wales. [\[footnote 224\]](#)

Police Now also uses positive action initiatives in order to target and support underrepresented groups within policing.

Police Now's recruitment trends suggest that the graduate market has the potential to help address the under-representation of officers who are women and those from an ethnic minority group. In 2020, 17% of participants on the National Graduate Leadership Programme identified as from a Black, Asian or minority ethnic background, 54% identified as women, and 7% identified as women from a Black, Asian or minority ethnic background, with 35 unique languages spoken across the cohort. Of those who started the National Detective Programme in 2021, 24% identify as from a Black, Asian or minority ethnic background, 66% identify as women, and 16% identify as women from a Black, Asian or minority ethnic background, with 29 unique languages spoken across the cohort. [\[footnote 225\]](#)

Analysis indicates that there has been an increase in young people's confidence in the police, in the communities where Police Now participants have been deployed.

Independently peer-reviewed analysis suggests that the targeted problem-solving work of Police Now participants alongside their colleagues is translating into 'green shoots' of impact in relation to anti-social behaviour. This analysis shows an 11.7% reduction in anti-social behaviour in the communities where Police Now participants were posted, and a 7.2% reduction in communities without a Police Now participant. [\[footnote 226\]](#)

The work of Police Now participants and their colleagues aligns closely with the traditional aims of neighbourhood policing, namely for the police to work in partnership with the local community to solve problems and prevent crime.

Additionally, previous analysis comparing locations with a Police Now participant found significant improvements in young people's (16 to 24 year olds) confidence in police (up by 17%), exceeding improvements in comparison communities (up by 3%) over the same period. [\[footnote 227\]](#) [\[footnote 228\]](#)

Another measure that seems to have had a positive impact is a 'locals only' recruitment policy. In 2014, as Mayor of London, Boris Johnson announced a 'residence-based' approach for recruitment to the Metropolitan Police which would see Londoners only fill the ranks of new police constables. [\[footnote 229\]](#) The policy meant only those who had lived in London for 3 of the previous 6 years would be eligible to apply at entry level. After just one year, the new approach doubled the number of ethnic minority recruits to 26% of the total service and female recruits increased from a quarter to a third. [\[footnote 230\]](#)

At the time the Metropolitan Police described how a 'high rate of interest has also been matched by a high quality of candidates' with 40% of those expressing interest at the time having a first degree or higher qualification, for example.

Despite these encouraging examples progress remains frustratingly slow. The Commission's view is that the gap in achieving the right workforce mix has been driven by a lack of consistent political and policing leadership focus on these issues over the last 40 years. Strong measures are required to maintain a consistent focus on the workforce mix, and make a significant change quickly. Operation Uplift, which will see the unprecedented push to recruit 20,000 additional police officers across England and Wales over a 3-year period, provides a unique opportunity to drive that change.

We also consider that a focus solely on achieving a higher ethnic minority presence in Police Services will not solve the problem in a sustainable way if the new recruits do not have the competence and life skills needed to appropriately work and engage with the community they serve.

The Commission emphasises a need for a recruitment approach that includes recognition of the life skills that candidates can offer, such as a working knowledge of local issues, familiarity with the community languages in the areas covered, and an understanding of different religious and cultural sensitivities.

As such, the Commission makes 2 recommendations to achieve a more diverse police workforce and promote genuine, positive integration between communities and the police.

Recommendation 21: Achieve inclusivity - Create police workforces that represent the communities they serve

First, introduce a local residency requirement for recruitment to each police force area. The Metropolitan Police recently returned to the 'residency requirement', outlined previously in this chapter, to help them to achieve their target of 40% ethnic minority representation in the workforce. The Commission recommends that this policy to recruit locally is upscaled across all police force areas in England and Wales, with the College of Policing developing guidance for police services on the implementation of the residency requirement.

The Commission notes that the residency requirement will likely drive more significant change in specific services where both the workforces and the populations are larger. For example, in September 2020 the Metropolitan Police employed around 25% of all police officers (full time equivalent) in England and Wales, and around 15% of the population reside there (based on the 2011 Census). This compares to police service areas such as Warwickshire or Dyfed-Powys, who employed less than 1% of all police officers and have around 1% of the population of England and Wales living there.

Therefore, the guidance produced by the College will need to take into consideration the different nuances of each police service area, including circumstances where the prospective local candidates eligible to apply for a role in policing is reduced - for example, due to the age demographic of the area's population.

The Commission also suggests that police services address the pipeline of candidates applying for policing through extensive engagement and outreach with communities, for example through cadet programmes. Due consideration should also be given to incentivise new recruits to remain with their police service for a minimum period of time, to establish their careers.

The progress and efficacy of the residency requirements should be monitored and evaluated at a national level by the Home Office, working in partnership with the CoP, APCC and NPCC. There is also a need for reporting mechanisms to be incorporated within this process, with HMICFRS inspecting services on their progress in regular periods.

[footnote 231]

Recommendation 22: Achieve inclusivity - Equip the police service with skills to serve the needs of their communities

Second, the Commission recommends that the College of Policing (CoP) work with police services to design and evaluate recruitment pilots that match candidates' life skills with the needs of the communities they serve in their local areas.

By September 2021, the CoP working alongside services should identify a lead for the project, and outline timelines for the progression of these pilots. Following the evaluation of the pilot, the CoP should then introduce evidence-based guidance for police services about how to include questions about life skills and local understanding into the post-assessment centre recruitment process. This guidance should include the introduction of questions into the bank of post-assessment centre questions for each police force to adapt to local circumstances.

In an instance where, based on the evaluation results, the CoP is not able to progress with this recommendation, the College will be required to write to the Home Secretary and the Home Office to outline the reasons why the pilots cannot be upscaled.

- Kumar, S. et al., (2020), 'Racial Disparities in Homicide Victimisation Rates', Accessed January 2021. Available at: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41887-020-00055-y> ↗
- Ministry of Justice, (2020), 'Criminal justice system statistics quarterly: December 2019: prosecutions and convictions data tool'. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-system-statistics-quarterly-december-2019> ↗
- Race Disparity Unit, (2021), 'Stop and Search data and the effect of geographical differences'. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/stop-and-search-data-and-the-effect-of-geographical-differences> ↗
- Assaults without injury only. Assaults with injury began to be recorded separately in 2017. It is likely assaults against police officers are under-reported and caution should be exercised when comparing this figure (2019/20) with the estimates reported for 2015/16 and 2016/17, which were less complete data from a smaller number of forces.. Home Office, (2020), 'Statistics on the number of police officers assaulted in 2019/20, England and Wales'. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/904523/police-officers-assaulted-201920-england-wales.pdf ↗
- Police Federation of England and Wales, (2017), 'Police Assaults'. Available at: <https://www.polfed.org/campaigns/protect-the-protectors/police-assaults/> ↗
- Home Office, (2020), 'Statistics on the number of police officers assaulted in 2019/20, England and Wales'. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/904523/police-officers-assaulted-201920-england-wales.pdf ↗
- Francis, S., (2020), 'Met Police assaults: Attacks on officers up 40% during lockdown', BBC News. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-53812587> ↗
- Based on a 3 month period of 2020 when compared with the same 3 months in 2019 ↗
- Mayor of London, (2021), 'Racist assaults against Met police officers' [excel file 4747_Racist assaults against Met police officers]. Available at: <https://www.london.gov.uk/questions/2020/4747> ↗
- With the exception of Lincolnshire which was broadly representative. Based on full-time equivalent police officers and population figures from the Census 2011. Ethnicity Facts and Figures, (2021), 'Police Workforce'. Available at: <https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/workforce-and-business/workforce-diversity/police-workforce/latest#by-ethnicity-and-area-police-officers> ↗
- Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, (2018), 'Hate crime: what do victims tell us?'. Available at: <https://www.justiceinspectors.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/hate-crime-what-do-victims-tell-us.pdf> ↗
- Home Office, (2020), 'Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2019 to 2020' Table 2.1. Excluding figures for Greater Manchester. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/925257/hate-crime-1920-hosb2920-tables ods ↗
- The CSEW is a household population survey so the number of hate crimes in a single survey year is too small to report on. Therefore, 3 annual datasets have been combined in order to provide a larger sample which can be used to produce more robust estimates for hate crime and compare over time ↗
- Home Office, (2020), 'Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2019 to 2020 appendix tables', Appendix Table 7. CSEW measures 2009/10 to 2011/12 and 2017/18 to 2019/20. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/925258/hate-crime-1920-hosb2920-appendix-tables.xlsx ↗
- Home Office, (2020), 'Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2019 to 2020: data tables', Table 2.1 and Figure 2.5 in Data Tables. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2019-to-2020/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2019-to-2020> ↗
- Home Office, (2020), 'Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2019 to 2020: appendix tables', Appendix Table 11. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2019-to-2020> ↗
- Compared with Census 2011 population estimates ↗
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26. Office for National Statistics, (2021), 'Crime in England and Wales: Appendix Tables, year ending March 2020', -Table A1. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/crimeinenglandandwalesappendixtables> ↵
27. 2019 and 2020 estimates are not included in the chart because they are not directly comparable to previous years due to a change in data collection methods on the Crime Survey. ↵
28. Evidence submitted to the Commission on 07.01.2021: Ministry of Justice, (2020), 'Youth Justice Statistics: 2019 to 2020, Ch 2 - First time entrants to the Youth Justice System' Table 2.7. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/youth-justice-statistics-2019-to-2020> ↵
29. Percentages calculated by dividing the number of FTEs by the estimated number of 10 to 17 year olds in England and Wales by ethnic group at the 2011 Census, and multiplying by 100. Census estimates by ethnic and age group available at: <https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/uk-population-by-ethnicity/demographics/age-groups/latest#download-the-data> ↵
30. (excluding Greater Manchester because they were unable to supply data in the year ending March 2020). Ethnicity Facts and Figures, (2021), 'Stop and Search'. Available at: <https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/crime-justice-and-the-law/policing/stop-and-search/latest#by-ethnicity-and-area> ↵
31. The Lammy Review, (2017), 'Lammy Review: final report'. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/643001/lammy-review-final-report.pdf ↵
32. Office for National Statistics, (2020), 'Crime Survey for England and Wales year ending March 2020', Table D3. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/crimeinenglandandwalesannualtrendanddemographictables> ↵
33. With the exception of the Asian group who have lower violent crime victimisation rates than the White group. Office for National Statistics, (2020), 'The nature of violent crime: appendix tables'. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/thenatureofviolentcrimeappendixtables> ↵
34. Kumar, S. et al., (2020), 'Racial Disparities in Homicide Victimisation Rates'. Available at: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41887-020-00055-y> ↵
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36. Based on officer-identified ethnicity ↵
37. Office for National Statistics, (2021), 'Appendix tables: homicide in England and Wales', Table 5b. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/appendixtableshomicideinenglandandwales> ↵
38. Including all ages and those with unknown ethnicity. Office for National Statistics, (2021), 'Appendix tables: homicide in England and Wales', Table 4. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/appendixtableshomicideinenglandandwales> ↵
39. by a son or daughter, parent, other family member, partner or ex-partner - including adulterous relationship, boyfriend or girlfriend, common-law spouse or cohabiting partner, ex-spouse, ex-common-law spouse or ex-cohabiting partner, ex-boyfriend or ex-girlfriend, spouse (including civil partner) ↵
40. Office for National Statistics, (2021), 'Appendix tables: homicide in England and Wales', Table 12a and b. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/appendixtableshomicideinenglandandwales> ↵
41. Office for National Statistics, (2020), 'Domestic abuse prevalence and victim characteristics - Appendix tables' Table 22., Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/domesticabuseprevalenceandvictimcharacteristicsappendixtables> ↵
42. An example of an incident rather than a crime would be two family members having a loud argument, a third party calls the police and the police attend to calm the situation but no crime has taken place ↵
43. Excluding data from Greater Manchester police who were unable to provide data ↵
44. Office for National Statistics, (2020), 'Domestic abuse prevalence and victim characteristics - Appendix tables' Tables 9 and 10 combined. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/domesticabuseprevalenceandvictimcharacteristicsappendixtables> ↵
45. Office for National Statistics, (2020), 'Domestic abuse prevalence and victim characteristics - Appendix tables' Table 12. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/domesticabuseprevalenceandvictimcharacteristicsappendixtables> ↵
46. All domestic abuse is not limited to physical assault but includes stalking, sexual assault including rape and non-sexual abuse such as financial and emotional abuse or threats of violence ↵
47. Office for National Statistics, (2020), 'Domestic abuse prevalence and victim characteristics - Appendix tables' Table 1. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/domesticabuseprevalenceandvictimcharacteristicsappendixtables> ↵
48. Office for National Statistics, (2020), 'Domestic abuse prevalence and victim characteristics - Appendix tables' Table 6. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/domesticabuseprevalenceandvictimcharacteristicsappendixtables> ↵
49. 3 years of Crime Survey data was combined to increase sample sizes and provide more robust estimates for ethnic groups. Ethnicity facts and figures, (2021), 'Domestic abuse'. Available at: <https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/crime-justice-and-the-law/crime-and-reoffending/domestic-abuse/latest#by-ethnicity-and-sex> ↵
50. Home Office, (2020), 'Trends and drivers of homicide: Main findings'. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/trends-and-drivers-of-homicide-main-findings> ↵
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52. Home Office, (2020), 'Trends and drivers of homicide: Main findings'. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/trends-and-drivers-of-homicide-main-findings> ↵
53. Greater Manchester police (GMP) reviewed their recording of knife or sharp instrument offences in 2017 which revealed they were under-counting these offences. Following this review, there has been a sharp increase in the number of knife or sharp instrument offences recorded by GMP. Due to this, data from GMP have been excluded. ↵
54. Office for National Statistics, (2021), 'Crime in England and Wales: other related tables, Year ending September 2020' - Table F3a. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/crimeinenglandandwalesotherrelatedtables> ↵
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58. Office for National Statistics, (2020), 'Appendix tables: homicide in England and Wales', Table 7b. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/appendixtableshomicideinenglandandwales> ↵
59. Office for National Statistics, (2020), 'Appendix tables: homicide in England and Wales', Table 9. Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/datasets/appendixtableshomicideinenglandandwales> ↵
60. Ministry of Justice, (2019) 'Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 2018'. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/race-and-the-criminal-justice-system-statistics-2018> ↵
61. Home Office, (2020) 'Police Powers and Procedures, England and Wales, year ending 31 March 2020', Table A_04. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-powers-and-procedures-england-and-wales-year-ending-31-march-2020> ↵
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63. Ministry of Justice and HM Prison Service, (2020), 'Offender Management Statistics quarterly: January to March 2020' Table 1.4. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/offender-management-statistics-quarterly-january-to-march-2020-2> ↵

64. These are counts of prisoners and have not been adjusted for age and deprivation [↗](#)
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66. Ethnicity Facts and Figures, (2020), 'Population of England and Wales'. Available at: <https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/uk-population-by-ethnicity/national-and-regional-populations/population-of-england-and-wales/latest> [↗](#)
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Health Summary

Good health is necessary for all citizens to flourish. In the last year, the COVID-19 pandemic has reminded the UK public of the vital role of the health service, but it has also shone a light on disparities in the health and wellbeing of people in the UK.

In examining this theme, the Commission has carefully considered the available evidence, and engaged widely with relevant experts and frontline workers.

An analysis of available evidence into health disparities has shown again just how inappropriate it is to consider these issues under the term 'BAME' as there are such deep differences in the prevalence and outcome of some health conditions both between and within ethnic groups in the UK.

The Commission rejects the common view that ethnic minorities have universally worse health outcomes compared with White people, the picture is much more variable. From the evidence reviewed the following conclusions have been drawn:

- For many key health outcomes, including life expectancy, overall mortality and many of the leading causes of mortality in the UK, ethnic minority groups have better outcomes than the White population. This evidence clearly suggests that ethnicity is not the major driver of health inequalities in the UK but deprivation, geography and differential exposure to key risk factors.
- Given that most ethnic minorities have higher levels of deprivation, compared with the White majority population, these health outcomes clearly suggest that deprivation is not destiny. More needs to be done to investigate why some ethnic minority groups are doing better than others, exploring whether it is due to differences in important risk factors, family structures, better social networks, or health behaviours such as drinking alcohol and smoking
- For some health conditions there is variation within the broader ethnic group. For example, the risk for many cancers had significant differences for Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups.
- For COVID-19 and many other health conditions there is a complex interplay of socio-economic, behavioural, cultural and, in some cases, genetic risk factors, which lead to disparities.
- The Commission heard evidence which, in contrast to the narrative of other reports, suggests there is no overwhelming evidence of racism in the treatment and diagnosis of mental health conditions. In this area in particular, far more research is needed to understand the interplay of different causes, and to understand the impact of issues such as mistrust of the health services among some groups.

The Commission would like to see more in-depth research on the root causes of health disparities in physical and mental health, as well as a more systematic approach to how campaigns and communications are used in an ethnically diverse country.


Understanding disparities in health

The quality of data on health disparities is mixed and there are challenges in obtaining consistent ethnicity data across different health conditions. But the Commission was able to consider the evidence that does exist, looking at the 25 leading causes of premature mortality in the UK, as well as the key risk factors for these conditions, including obesity, smoking and alcohol use. The findings show significant variations between different ethnic minority groups, including between South Asian groups and between Black African and Black Caribbean people. In considering disparities in health, the analysis considered both ethnicity and deprivation because there are strong associations between them. A summary of the key findings is outlined below and the full analysis supplementary paper, with accompanying charts, is available in the supporting documents published alongside this report. [\[footnote 1\]](#)

Life expectancy and healthy life expectancy

Life expectancy reflects the impact of the key determinants of health (socio-economic, education, income, housing, employment) over the whole life course and so is the best measure of overall health. Deprivation is often considered to be the main factor associated with lower life expectancy however some ethnic minorities have longer life expectancies despite being poorer than White people (overall). Data for Scotland has shown that life expectancy is generally higher in the larger ethnic minority populations than the majority White Scottish group, particularly for people from Indian, Pakistani and Chinese ethnic groups. [\[footnote 2\]](#) This is despite higher levels of deprivation. A review of ethnicity and poverty by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation found that all ethnic minority groups in Scotland were disadvantaged on one or more poverty indicators, with Pakistani and Bangladeshi, and Black households experiencing higher rates of poverty than others. [\[footnote 3\]](#) Life expectancy data for England (where 97% of ethnic minorities in the UK lives) is not yet published, but overall age-standardised mortality rates - which are closely correlated with life expectancy - in 2019 were 26% lower in Black and South Asian people than for White people , again despite higher levels of deprivation. [\[footnote 4\]](#) The figures for White people overall also hide very significant 'intra-White' differences with those who live in the 10% most deprived areas of England (predominantly in the North and coastal towns) living on average 10 years less compared with the 10% least deprived (the gap between Blackpool and Westminster). [\[footnote 5\]](#) There is limited data on healthy life expectancy (the average number of years that an individual is expected to live in a state of self-assessed good or very good health) by ethnicity. One paper from Scotland using linked 2011 Census data showed that despite having longer life expectancy than White people, women in the Pakistani and Indian ethnic groups had shorter healthy life expectancy. [\[footnote 6\]](#) Of the 25 leading causes of premature mortality, as measured by years of life lost, people from South Asian and Chinese ethnic groups have better outcomes than White people in more than half of these. Black people have better outcomes than White people in over a third.

Figure 17: Causes of premature mortality measured by years of life lost (YLL), compared with the population average, by ethnicity and cause of death (England, 2016) [\[footnote 7\]](#)



Cancer

Cancer is the leading cause of death in the UK overall accounting for 28% of all deaths. [\[footnote 52\]](#) For all cancers, and 9 out of 11 leading causes of cancer death, it is the White population that have the highest incidence and, in some cases, poorer survival. [\[footnote 53\]](#) The breakdown of incidence and survival rates from different cancers is, by itself, enough evidence of why ethnic minority groups should be disaggregated in health data and research if health providers want to effectively target healthcare interventions. Compared with White ethnic groups, South Asian people have a much lower incidence of every one of the 11 leading causes of cancer deaths. [\[footnote 54\]](#) The Black population generally has a slightly lower incidence for all cancers and most of the leading cancers, but significantly increased risk of stomach and prostate cancer. [\[footnote 55\]](#) People from the Chinese ethnic group also generally have a slightly lower incidence for all of the leading cancers except stomach cancer. [\[footnote 56\]](#) Among South Asian people, there was a significant difference in risk for many cancers between the Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups, highlighting the importance of analysing them separately. [\[footnote 57\]](#) [\[footnote 58\]](#) For Black African and Black Caribbean people, this difference in risk was also apparent for some cancers. [\[footnote 59\]](#) [\[footnote 60\]](#) This is to be expected for the majority of cancers given the differences between diets, habits

and socio-cultural practices in the 3 main South Asian groups and between Black African and Black Caribbean people. For certain cancers, however, the incidence was unusually high or low in all 3 main South Asian groups or both Black groups which is suggestive of genetic predisposition (for example, prostate, myeloma, pituitary in Black people, gallbladder and thyroid in South Asian people) or protection (malignant melanoma in Black and South Asian people). [footnote 61][footnote 62][footnote 63] The lower incidence of many cancers in South Asian people, even when the majority have spent most of their lives in the UK or were born here, is striking. This contrasts with, for example, the experience of Japanese migrants to the USA who were found to have similar rates of a number of cancers (for example, colorectal) to White Americans within one generation. [footnote 64] This could be due to dietary factors, with most South Asian people still maintaining a fairly typical South Asian diet, or there may be genetic differences which provide some protection against certain cancers. There may be potential for cancer prevention here if, for example, aspects of the diet are found to be protective. [footnote 65] In general, cancer incidence in South Asian people tends to be closer to that of White people among those aged under 50 (50% of whom were born in the UK, with many more migrating as children) [footnote 66][footnote 67] [footnote 68] than among those older than 50 years (virtually all born outside the UK). [footnote 69] This is consistent with environmental exposures, particularly at younger ages, being important in the study of the causes of these cancers and it is unlikely that ethnicity itself (or genetic factors) are responsible for most of the observed differences in incidence with ethnicity instead acting as a proxy for environmental and lifestyle factors (including smoking, alcohol and diet). The pattern in Black people was more mixed which may reflect the different patterns of migration for Black African and Black Caribbean people, and so is harder to interpret. In general, as would be expected for most cancers (where the environment is the most important risk factor), the incidence of cancer in the immigrant population is related to the gradual adoption of Western habits and lifestyles. [footnote 70] However, there were some notable exceptions with the somewhat unusual finding that the incidence in an ethnic group was higher than both country (or region) of origin and than in White ethnic groups in the UK. For example, cancers of the thyroid, prostate, stomach, gallbladder, myeloma, non-Hodgkin lymphoma in Black people, and of the thyroid, liver, gallbladder and Hodgkin lymphoma in South Asian people. This is likely to be due to under-diagnosis or under-reporting in many of the countries of origin due to the limited access to healthcare facilities and lack of comprehensive cancer registration. [footnote 71] Also, there may be genetic predisposition to developing these conditions in these ethnic groups, which means they could still likely maintain high incidence after migration. For other cancers, mainly in South Asian people, incidence in the ethnic group was lower than both country or region of origin and White people (for example, stomach, cervix, malignant melanoma) reflecting a reduction in exposure to the harmful risk factor after migration (for example, reduced exposure to H. Pylori, HPV, ultraviolet B radiation). [footnote 72] For the cancers where data is available, survival is generally better or the same for lung, prostate and colorectal in ethnic minority (not including White minority) groups, with mixed evidence for breast cancer. [footnote 73] This may reflect decreased uptake of screening for breast cancer [footnote 74][footnote 75] where South Asian people and Black people generally have lower uptake of screening - which is also the case for colorectal [footnote 76] [footnote 77] and cervical cancer. [footnote 78]

Cardiometabolic diseases (CVD, stroke and diabetes)

Cardiovascular diseases (CVD) causes 27% of all deaths in the UK (in 2019). There is striking variation in CVD risk between South Asian and Black ethnic groups. [footnote 79] CVD prevalence is higher in South Asian people. For CVD incidence, the highest risk is in women from the Pakistani ethnic group and men from the Bangladeshi ethnic group. In contrast CVD prevalence and incidence are lower among Black African and Black Caribbean people. Men and women from the Chinese ethnic group also have lower CVD incidence than the White group. [footnote 80] South Asian people had more ischaemic heart disease (IHD - the commonest type of CVD), hypertension and diabetes, and the Black group had more hypertension and diabetes but lower IHD than the White group. [footnote 81] Stroke is more common in Black people, who are at 1.5 to 2.5 times greater risk of having a stroke than White people. South Asian people also have a risk for stroke about 1.5 times greater than White people, particularly in Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups. [footnote 82][footnote 83] In contrast, people from the Chinese ethnic group have a lower risk of stroke than the White population. [footnote 84] Data from the Stroke Register in London shows that while stroke incidence has decreased by 40% for White people in the past years, it has not decreased for Black people. [footnote 85] There are few studies that have investigated ethnic and social disparities for CVD procedures. Amid the limited evidence, there was none for systematic differences by ethnicity. The Whitehall Study on the relationship between health and social status found no evidence that a low social status or South Asian ethnicity was associated with lower use of cardiac procedures or drugs, independently of clinical need, and differences in medical care were unlikely to contribute to social or ethnic differences in coronary heart disease in this cohort. [footnote 86]

Type 2 diabetes

Compared with the majority White European UK population, the prevalence of type 2 diabetes is higher for ethnic minority groups. When diagnosed biochemically, type 2 diabetes prevalence is up to 3 to 6-fold higher in South Asian and Black ethnic groups compared with White people. Self-reported diabetes prevalence is 3 to 5-fold higher among Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Indian and Black Caribbean ethnic groups compared with the general population. [footnote 87] The higher diabetes risk among South Asian, Black African and Black Caribbean immigrants is shared by people in their countries of origin. [footnote 88] For ethnic minority groups, diabetes develops at a younger age and at lower body mass index (BMI) than in the White population. The mean average age of onset of type 2 diabetes is approximately 5 to 10 years younger in migrant South Asian than White European adults. This may be due to the younger age profile of these groups (the South Asian median age is 10 years less than the White population. Age specific incidence and prevalence rates would need to be calculated to see if there is a genuine difference by age). [footnote 89] There are also differences in complications of diabetes by ethnic group. The reasons for the high risk of type 2 diabetes, IHD and stroke in South Asian people, and of high diabetes and stroke risk (but not IHD) in Black groups are not completely clear, but may be explained in part by differences in risk factors. Age, sex, genetics and ethnicity are fixed factors, but potentially modifiable factors are critical to understand and manage. Socio-economic factors are also relevant.

Outcomes, risk factors and causes of the causes

The table below shows the relationships between risk factors and outcomes for the 5 main causes of death and disability in the UK, across one's life course. It shows how proximal and intermediate risk factors (which are often behavioural and in theory modifiable by individuals) are in turn affected by distal risk factors or the 'causes of the causes.' Some of these are fixed (for example, genetics) whereas others can be changed (for example, socio-economic factors) but often require government or societal action to facilitate that change. Although interventions can be implemented at all 'distances' of risk factors, the earlier they are applied in the life course, the greater the impact on prevention of the outcome.


Table: The relationship between the causes and outcomes of the five main causes of death and disability			
Distal risk factors ('Causes of the causes')	Intermediate risk factors (modifiable or behavioural)	Proximal risk factors (also outcomes)	Outcomes (5 main causes of death and disability)
Socio-economic factors	Tobacco	High blood pressure	Heart disease
Genetics	Alcohol	High cholesterol	Cancer
Epigenetics	Unhealthy diet	High glucose	Chronic lung diseases
Exposures in the womb and early life	Physical inactivity	Obesity	Diabetes
	Air pollution		Mental health disorders

Obesity

Black adults had consistently higher risk of obesity than White adults. Adults and children from the Chinese ethnic group had consistently lower risk of obesity than White people. There were no consistent patterns in South Asian adults or children relative to White people. [footnote 90]

There are significant limitations in the data on this topic. Few studies explore, and statistically adjust for, potential predictors of obesity among ethnic minority groups, particularly the known risk factors for obesity such as socio-economic status, maternal BMI, physical activity and diet. This makes it difficult to know why any ethnic differences arise. Use of aggregated ethnicity categories, such as South Asian, can mask important differences between smaller groups such as the Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups.

Figure 18: Percentage of children who were obese, by ethnicity and school year (reception year, and year 6) (England, April 2019 to March 2020)




Interventions to reduce obesity across the population may still need to be sensitive to ethnic, socio-economic and cultural factors that may make some interventions less likely to be engaged with by some population sub-groups.

Behavioural risk factors

Diet, physical activity, tobacco use and alcohol use are the key risk factors for cardiometabolic diseases and cancer. In 2019 13.9% of adults in England were current smokers. Prevalence of smoking was highest in individuals with Mixed ethnicity (19.5%) and lowest in people from the Chinese ethnic group (6.7%). Compared with the benchmark of 13.9% in the population as a whole, White and Mixed ethnicity adults have higher smoking rates. Asian, Black and Chinese adults have lower smoking rates. [\[footnote 91\]](#)

Figure 19: Percentage of adults who smoked cigarettes (England, 2019)




Ethnic differences in smoking in children are different from those in adults. Boys and girls of Black and Asian ethnicity were most likely to have never smoked. Whereas boys and girls in the White and Mixed ethnic groups are most likely to be regular smokers. This may indicate evolving changes in ethnic differences in smoking that will be reflected in adults in due course. [\[footnote 92\]](#) South Asian people are more likely to use non-cigarette forms of tobacco such as smokeless tobacco and shisha and this may mean that overall exposure to tobacco is underestimated in some ethnic groups in national surveys that focus exclusively on cigarette smoking. [\[footnote 93\]](#) Young South Asian people are least likely to have ever drunk alcohol and those of White ethnicity most likely to have drunk alcohol). The difference between groups is more than 5 times (10% and 52%). The prevalence of recent alcohol consumption is also highest in White young people and lowest in Asian young people . In this case the ratio is more than ten-fold (13% and 1%). [\[footnote 94\]](#)

Table. Percentage of boys and girls in years 7 to 11 who have ever drunk alcohol, by ethnicity, 2018

Ethnicity (aggregated) White Mixed Asian Black Other					
Ever drunk alcohol	%	%	%	%	%
Boys	51	36	10	21	30
Girls	52	43	10	24	17
Total	52	40	10	23	25

White British men and women are most likely to be drinking at hazardous, harmful or dependent levels, and Asian men and women least likely. White British men are more than 6 times as likely to be drinking at hazardous, harmful or dependent levels than Asian men (22.6% and 3.7%) and White British women are more than 5 times as likely to be drinking at this level than Asian women (14.8% and 2.6%). [\[footnote 95\]](#) The Active Lives Survey collects self-reported physical activity and has shown that White adults are most likely to be active, and people of Asian ethnicity are least likely to be active. Men are consistently as or more likely to be active than women in all ethnic groups. However, gender differences are more pronounced in some groups, for example in Black people (64.6% for men and 51.3% for women). [\[footnote 96\]](#)[\[footnote 97\]](#)

Figure 20: Percentage of people aged 16 and over who were physically active, by ethnicity (England, 2018 to 2019)



Possible reasons for the differences described in figure 20 have been explored. Two reviews focused on South Asian people found that this population group tend to understand the link between physical activity and chronic disease, but underestimate recommended levels of activity; perceive higher body weights to be healthier than people of White ethnicity; fear racial harassment when exercising; and lack culturally appropriate opportunities for group-based activities such as mixed-gender classes or classes delivered in English. [\[footnote 98\]](#)

Socio-economic disparities

The analysis of health disparities considered the interplay of socio-economic factors and ethnicity. The Commissioners considered the Marmot Review as part of their investigations into this area, as this report is a seminal examination of the so-called social gradient in health, which links levels of health to social class and status (originally in a Whitehall Study of civil servants). [\[footnote 99\]](#) The Marmot Review did find variations by ethnic minorities, however, it did not answer why the social determinants of health are unequally distributed between different racial and ethnic groups. This question was beyond the remit of the review but was also affected by the lack of consistent data collection on ethnicity in health.

There is a well-established link between socio-economic disparities and risk of obesity, type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease; many cancers and life expectancy. [\[footnote 100\]](#) Disentangling the effects of socio-economic status and ethnic background is complex. Within each ethnic group there is a social or deprivation gradient, but this may not explain the greater risk seen for some diseases in some ethnic groups (for example, diabetes in South Asian people). [\[footnote 101\]](#)

For example, in the Whitehall Study, there was a strong social gradient with 67% of Black Caribbean people, 50% of South Asian people and 19% of White European people in the lower end of the grade structure (clerical and support staff). After adjustment for socio-economic factors there remained, however, 2 to 4 times greater risk of type 2 diabetes and hypertension in both Black Caribbean and South Asian ethnic groups compared with White ethnic groups. [\[footnote 102\]](#) Those from Black ethnic groups had a more favourable lipid profile which may explain their lower risk of ischaemic heart disease, showing that differences in risk factors cannot be explained by socio-economic status alone.

Lower socio-economic status leads to some of the risk factors observed for overall mortality including obesity, diabetes and hypertension. People from South Asian groups have a greater prevalence of elevated blood pressure, blood sugar levels, obesity, and abnormal HDL-cholesterol. Together with insulin resistance these factors can increase the risks of diabetes, coronary heart disease and stroke. [\[footnote 103\]](#) People from Black ethnic groups have a lower risk for ischaemic heart disease but an increased risk for diabetes and stroke. [\[footnote 104\]](#)[\[footnote 105\]](#)

However, as has already been shown in this report, some ethnic minority groups have higher life expectancies and lower risks of many cancers than the White majority population, despite higher levels of deprivation. These factors are complex but this is no way an overall negative picture for ethnic minority groups, and the Commission believes that more should be done to learn from those ethnic minorities that have better health outcomes despite being more deprived to improve health for all ethnic groups, including White ethnic groups.

Role of genetics and epigenetics in explaining differences between ethnic groups

Ethnicity consists of a combination of genetic, cultural and geographical factors, and individuals' self-reported ethnicity is not necessarily consistent with their genetic ancestry. [\[footnote 106\]](#)[\[footnote 107\]](#) Furthermore, governmental Census categories may be combinations of races, ethnicities, national groupings and aggregations of smaller ethnic groups. [\[footnote 108\]](#) For example, the West African contribution to individual African-American ancestry averages about 80%, but ranges from approximately 20% to 100%. [\[footnote 109\]](#)

Approximately 85% of genetic variation between human beings exists within members of the same ethnic group [\[footnote 110\]](#) with only 10% to 15% being explained by differences between ethnic groups [\[footnote 111\]](#)[\[footnote 112\]](#) - that is, there is usually more genetic variation between members of the same group than between groups (especially for those of African origin).

There are some rare diseases which are markedly more common in certain ethnic groups. These are often related to selective advantages of such mutations or historical genetic bottlenecks within populations (when populations reduce in size and their genetic variation decreases). For example, the presence of sickle cell disease confers protection against malaria, making it more common in African populations where malaria is endemic. [\[footnote 113\]](#)

Non-disease related genetic variants have also been identified across ethnic groups. For example, East Asian populations are more likely to be alcohol intolerant than European populations due to an inactive variant of an alcohol processing gene [\[footnote 114\]](#), and European populations are more likely to be able to drink milk into adulthood due to the presence of a variant of the enzyme lactase. [\[footnote 115\]](#)

The contribution of genetics to common chronic diseases (such as cancer, diabetes and obesity) is modest. Although there are clear ethnic differences in risk for many of these disorders, genetic variation does not, in general, explain much of those differences. [\[footnote 116\]](#) There are, however, some exceptions - for example the higher incidence of prostate cancer in Black populations. [\[footnote 117\]](#)

Data on genetic variations in common disease across ethnic groups are limited. This may reflect a bias within current research, as genetic studies investigating the role of disease tend to predominantly use European or European origin cohorts. [\[footnote 118\]](#)

New drugs, vaccines and therapies undergo vigorous clinical trials to determine their efficacy and safety before being approved for use. Different sub-groups of patients may respond differently to different therapies depending on their age [\[footnote 119\]](#), gender [\[footnote 120\]](#) and ethnicity. [\[footnote 121\]](#) With advances in medical research, therapies are increasingly targeted making it crucial for clinical trials to recruit a diverse range of participants. Diversity of participants in clinical trials investigating standards of care is necessary to minimise disparities in outcomes and ensure equity in healthcare. [\[footnote 122\]](#) Historically, ethnic minorities have been under-represented in clinical trials [\[footnote 123\]](#) and this disparity has continued. The Commission heard evidence from academics leading a number of large cohort studies and research programmes that there remains a significant challenge in recruiting enough ethnic minority participants into these trials and studies. The Commission's view is that much more needs to be done in this area, both in terms of research into the barriers and causes of these low numbers of ethnic minority trial participants, and in campaigns and communications to improve these numbers.

Case study: Adolescent cohort study

UK Research and Innovation is developing plans for an Adolescent Health Study (AHS), a major new place-based longitudinal cohort and data platform that will follow more than 100,000 children at different ages through their adolescent years.

Participants will be recruited primarily from schools across the UK and the study will over-sample ethnic minorities and under-represented groups in order to be able to study the origins of health disparities in this formative period of life.

Information from the study will support analyses of the rapid developmental changes that happen during adolescence are affected by puberty in the context of the rapid and unique socio-economic transitions that society is currently undergoing. This means understanding the factors behind resilience and vulnerability to a wide range of conditions, the roots of which often lie in adolescence.

There is a gap in engagement and hence data in this age group which the AHS will overcome by forming partnerships with young people, their parents, local communities and schools, for example, by involving AHS in the curriculum. Adolescents will advise on the best means of data capture which will be as unobtrusive as possible, often in real time, and include measures such as mental wellbeing, hormones, inflammation, location, social mobility, retail habits, and diet. There has never been such a large study over this life period anywhere in the world.

The AHS will enable researchers to understand adolescent health and its wider impacts in a modern societal context. It is expected to boost research on this formative period and transform knowledge and policy to improve public health, taking a holistic approach that places health disparities at centre stage.

Maternal mortality

In 2018, the stillbirth rate in England reached its lowest level on record, at 4.0 stillbirths per 1,000 births, a decrease from 5.1 stillbirths in 2010. [\[footnote 124\]](#) In 2015 to 2017, 209 women died during or up to 6 weeks after pregnancy, from causes associated with their pregnancy. This was out of the 2,280,451 women giving birth in the UK during this period. 9.2 women per 100,000 died during pregnancy or up to 6 weeks after childbirth or the end of pregnancy. [\[footnote 125\]](#)

Maternal deaths are fortunately rare in the UK, although analysis of maternal deaths, stillbirths and neonatal deaths undertaken by 'Mothers and Babies: Reducing Risk through Audits and Confidential Enquiries across the UK' (MBRRACE-UK) shows that poor outcomes are higher for mothers and babies from Black and Asian ethnic groups, particularly those born in Asia or Africa, and for women living in the most deprived areas of the country. [\[footnote 126\]](#)

The emotions quite rightly attached to this topic means it is prominent in any conversation about health disparities. It was brought up as a key example of health disparities by a number of respondents in the Commission's call for evidence.

It is important that all involved in these conversations understand that highlighting this disparity without emphasising the low numbers overall, is unfair to expectant mothers everywhere. As the MBRRACE-UK states, "many women have found these figures very worrying and it is important always to qualify such stark statistics with absolute numbers - in 2016 to 2018 in the UK, 34 Black women died among every 100,000 giving birth, 15 Asian women died among every 100,000 giving birth, and 8 White women died among every 100,000 giving birth." [\[footnote 127\]](#)

Although incidence of maternal mortality is rare, the increased rates seen in ethnic minority groups need to be better understood and explained. The Commission is aware that work is being done in this area both in government and as part of the NHS Long Term Plan. [\[footnote 128\]](#) The Commissioners believe that more research into causes in the disparities of maternal mortality should be one of the highest priorities for the new Office for Health Disparities outlined in the recommendation below.

Access to healthcare and attitudes towards the NHS

The key health outcome inequalities addressed above, such as life expectancy differences, have arisen over decades and even centuries and are driven by an unequal distribution of the wider determinants of health, such as employment, income, housing, social networks, education and access to green space. [\[footnote 129\]](#)

However, health care inequalities (for example, different groups receiving differential access to services, diagnosis and treatment) [\[footnote 130\]](#) are also important and can contribute to differences in health outcomes although they have a minor role. [\[footnote 131\]](#)

There are differences in attitudes to different forms of healthcare across ethnic groups. South Asian groups in Scotland had higher avoidable hospital admissions than the White Scottish group, with the highest rate in Pakistani men and women. There may be issues of access to and quality of primary care to prevent avoidable hospital admissions, especially for South Asian people. There was little variation between ethnic groups in hospital length of stay or unplanned readmission. [\[footnote 132\]](#)

There is little difference in measures of patient satisfaction with received hospital care, among ethnic groups. For example, in 2018-2019, the average satisfaction score (out of 100) for Black African people is 76.9, compared to patients from Bangladeshi (69.2), Pakistani (72.6), and White British (76.1) ethnic groups. [\[footnote 133\]](#)

Satisfaction with GP services presents a more nuanced picture. While there are few differences between White British, Black African and Black Caribbean patients, the percentage of Asian patients reporting positive experiences tends to be lower - for example, 85.5% of White British patients, compared with 86.3% of Black African patients and 72.6% of those from the Bangladeshi ethnic group. [\[footnote 134\]](#) Such a pattern is repeated with satisfaction with access to out of hours GP services. For example, 69.7% of White British patients report positive experiences compared with 70.1% of Black Caribbean patients and 59.1% of those from the Bangladeshi ethnic group. [\[footnote 135\]](#)

It is important to note that majorities of all groups report positive experiences and that while the relative lack of satisfaction with GP services among some British Asian people is of concern, the overall picture suggests that racism and discrimination are not widespread in the health system, as is sometimes claimed, as Black groups are more or less equal in their satisfaction to White groups.

COVID-19


In light of the events of 2020, the Commission also analysed the emerging data relating to COVID-19, and has met with experts and frontline staff to discuss the pandemic. Due to the extensive work being carried out elsewhere, including the quarterly reports published by the Minister for Equalities, the Commission has not focused in detail on COVID-19 in this report, but we have examined evidence on the rates and causes of the disparities in infection and deaths among ethnic minorities.

The evidence shows that the raw data on deaths reflects the ethnic balance of the country with the White British group accounting for 82% of deaths in hospitals in England up to 24 March 2021 (the White British population share was 80.5% of the population in 2011). [\[footnote 136\]](#) But once adjustment for the age profile of a group is made the numbers look very different and in the first wave Black African men were almost 3.4 times more likely to die than White British men, with Black Caribbean and South Asian people also being at higher risk of death. [\[footnote 137\]](#)

This is mainly due to increased risk of infection - for example, geographical factors such as living in a densely populated inner-city area, socio-demographic characteristics (deprivation and occupation) living in larger and multi-generational households. It is also partly due to poorer outcomes once infected due to comorbidities such as obesity, diabetes and chronic kidney disease. [\[footnote 138\]](#)

After adjustment for these risk factors, the difference with the White British death rate reduces significantly for all ethnic groups.

Figure 21: COVID-19 age-standardised mortality rates in the first and second waves of the pandemic, by ethnicity and gender



The second report of the COVID-19 review of disparities, looking at the disproportionate impact the pandemic has had on ethnic minorities, also describes how the impact on certain ethnic minority groups has changed between the first and second waves. It asserts that changes within this period suggest inequalities in outcomes for different ethnic groups are driven by risk of infection, as opposed to ethnicity alone being a risk factor. The report also highlights insights into some ethnic minority people's experiences of COVID-19; particularly that messaging was felt to be aimed at a single homogenous ethnic minority group who were vulnerable to COVID-19. Participants reported that they felt this was stigmatising. Participants also reported that they felt public health messages were sometimes difficult to apply to their everyday lives. [\[footnote 139\]](#) COVID-19 as an infectious disease is a specific case with risk factors operating differently to the other common causes of death. Indeed, some of the risk factors that would protect against other diseases (for example, living in a multi-generational household) have increased the risk of infection and death from COVID-19.

Continued data and evidence is needed in order to understand further the causes of the COVID-19 risk factor disparities, the relative importance of different factors to each other and their interactions, and the reasons why different people who are infected experience different outcomes. The government has given Professor Thomas Yates (University of Leicester) funding to examine whether the increased risk of developing severe COVID-19 in ethnic minority groups is explained by differences in underlying health status, lifestyle behaviours such as physical activity, and environmental factors including measures of social inequality.

The study will help to build a picture of how the increased risk in ethnic minority communities may be prevented or managed and help to tailor public health policy in the future.

During its engagements with stakeholders, the Commission heard a sense of frustration about the amount of time taken for these differing factors to be understood.

The Commission welcomes the recommendations made in the government's first 'Quarterly report on progress to address COVID-19 health inequalities', particularly "Continuing to improve our understanding of ethnic minority audiences and interests of each ethnic minority outlet to ensure messaging is targeted and nuanced, and build on the existing communications programme with respected third party voices to improve reach, understanding and positive health behaviours." [\[footnote 140\]](#) The key to reducing these disparities is reducing risk of infection and vaccination enables that. It is therefore essential to continue making every effort to increase vaccine confidence and uptake in ethnic minorities (particularly amongst the younger cohorts) to protect themselves, their elderly relatives, and the wider community.

Mental health

One area of particular interest for the Commission was mental health. There has been some significant work in this area recently, specifically the Wessely Review [\[footnote 141\]](#) and the 2020 government response to the review. The Wessely Review found Black people were 8 times more likely to be subjected to community treatment orders than White people, and 4 times more likely to be detained. Figures from the Race Disparity Unit show there were 306.8 detentions per 100,000 for Black people compared with 72.9 per 100,000 White people (not adjusted for age and deprivation). [\[footnote 142\]](#)

The disparity is most pronounced for the Black Other group (however, it should be noted that these rates are a potential overestimate, as the 'Other' categories may be used for people whose specific ethnicity isn't known, as also seen with the 'Any other' group). Rates are much lower for the Black African and Black Caribbean groups. Rates for Asian groups tend to be lower than for Black but higher than White groups, with the exception of the Indian and Chinese ethnic groups for whom there is near-parity.

Such disparity is often taken as evidence of racism. However, it must be benchmarked against disparity in the prevalence of mental illness. A meta-analysis conducted by Halvorsrud et al (2019) of 28 studies concluded there were significantly higher risks of diagnosed schizophrenia among ethnic minority groups, and that they were most pronounced among Black groups.

For instance, the relative risk for the Black African group was 5.72 (compared with White British), for Black Caribbean 5.2. Elevated risks were also found for South Asian (2.27), White Other (2.24) and Mixed (2.24) ethnic groups. [\[footnote 143\]](#)

Experts advise that mental ill health has little to do with genetic predisposition but rather is to do with adverse social circumstances, including racism and hardship. In 2018 the Synergi Collaborative Centre, a national initiative to consider ethnic inequality in mental health and deprivation led by Professor Kamaldeep Bhui from Queen Mary University of London, published a briefing on the relationship between racism and mental ill health suggesting that the fear of racism and racist attacks among people from ethnic minority groups can lead to chronic stress. [\[footnote 144\]](#) As well as being harmful in itself it can also weaken resilience and in parents can affect the mental health of their children. The authors conclude that "there is a growing and convincing body of evidence that psychosis and depression, substance misuse and anger are more likely in those exposed to racism". [\[footnote 145\]](#)

Minority and immigrant groups are more likely to experience mental health difficulties in many countries all over the world, including White minorities in majority White countries. For example in Northern Ireland the suicide rate among male Irish Travellers in 2010 was over 6.5 times greater than that for men in the general population. [\[footnote 146\]](#) Other studies have shown similar disparities for migrants to Denmark from Greenland [\[footnote 147\]](#) as well as White men from non-English speaking backgrounds emigrating to Australia. [\[footnote 148\]](#)

A number of interconnected factors are associated with the onset, progression and relapse of mental health problems. These are genetic and epigenetic, childhood environment (such as early family relationships, social learning and childhood experiences), and adolescent and adult environment (such as stressful life events including divorce, unemployment and poor living conditions). [\[footnote 149\]](#) The Commission notes that many ethnic minority individuals will be more exposed to these factors, contributing to their elevated risk.

Also there is evidence that Black and Asian people with mental health needs are less likely to be receiving treatment. A study by Cooper et al (2012) concluded Black people were less likely to be taking antidepressants (odds ratio 0.4) after controlling for symptom severity. [\[footnote 150\]](#)

The same paper found Black groups (odds ratio 0.7) and South Asian (0.5) groups were less likely to have contacted a GP about their mental health within the last year, after controlling for socio-economic status and symptom severity.

Ethnicity facts and figures shows that Black people were just 1.3 times more likely than White British people to be receiving mental health care, with the Black African group actually less likely (0.9 times). [\[footnote 151\]](#)

The Commission is concerned that a lack of uptake of treatment may stem from fears that mental health provision is discriminatory, manifesting itself in people of an ethnic minority seeking help elsewhere, or putting off getting help, so that the problem manifests itself later, in some cases, in the criminal justice system. There is evidence to suggest that Black Caribbean and Black African patients have been found to be more likely to come into contact with mental health services through more negative routes (such as referral by a criminal justice agency) than White British patients. [\[footnote 152\]](#)

In the Commission's call for evidence, this view was apparent with individuals and organisations referencing mistrust with the mental health system as a barrier and cause of disparity among ethnic minority groups: "We're also reluctant to admit mental health issues, because we lack confidence in the system, which can lead to incarceration instead of mental healthcare, or being classed and treated on the basis of a stereotype."

The Commission does not believe that the evidence it reviewed offers support to claims of discrimination within psychiatry. The Commission views the challenge therefore as being partly one of convincing vulnerable people in ethnic minorities that mental healthcare provision is neither a threat nor a punishment, but something genuinely helpful to people in real need.

Targeted public awareness programmes aimed at ethnic minority communities, with models of collaboration between NHS, voluntary sector and faith organisations can reduce stigma, facilitate early and appropriate access to care, and reduce the risk of coercive entry into services (for example, detention under the Mental Health Act). Evidence from Norway shows that an early detection programme with targeted educational packages reduces treatment delays both in the short and long term. [\[footnote 153\]](#)

The Joint Commissioning Panel for Mental Health is a collaboration co-chaired by the Royal College of General Practitioners and the Royal College of Psychiatrists, which brings together organisations with an interest in commissioning mental health services. They have produced a guide which describes what 'good' mental health services for people from ethnic minority groups look like. Among its 10 key messages for commissioners are: commissioners should identify and address any ethnic inequalities, and services should be "culturally capable" and meet the needs of a multicultural population through effective interventions. [\[footnote 154\]](#) The government has published its Mental Health White Paper which takes forward recommendations from the Wessely Review, including reform of the Mental Health Act to enable greater patient choice and support in the care system, and supporting community-based mental health support that can prevent avoidable detentions. [\[footnote 155\]](#) This should help towards reducing high detention rates and building trust amongst all patients, and particularly those from Black ethnic minority groups.

Improving the data

There are numerous places where limitations in the available data need to be addressed. Future research needs to see the investigation of differences between risk in ethnic groups as central to the research and not a spin-off. The UK is very well placed for this type of research given the strength of its health data and cohort studies such as the UK Biobank, which contains in-depth genetic and health information from half a million UK participants. However, the low representation of ethnic groups in these studies [\[footnote 156\]](#) means it is challenging to run analysis into sub-group differences and particularly the interaction between genetics and environment in causation of disease.

The Commission has had conversations with the leaders of 2 very large-scale research programmes, due to start in the coming years - the Adolescent Cohort study which plans to recruit 100,000 adolescents and the 'Our Future Health' study of 5 million adults. There was agreement with both about the need to ensure that ethnic minorities are recruited in proportion to their future share of the population reflecting demographic changes, and so allow for more in-depth studies in these areas. Other generally under-represented groups (based on geography and deprivation) will also be oversampled so as to better understand the underlying drivers of poorer health in these groups. One of the challenges raised in these conversations was that of recruiting people from ethnic minorities for genetic studies (and clinical research in general). There was a question of whether this was due to mistrust of biomedical research in minority communities due to historical abuses in other countries, logistical barriers to recruitment, and a lack of diversity in researchers designing and leading these studies.

Case study: Our Future Health

Our Future Health will be the UK's largest ever health research programme, designed to help people live healthier lives for longer through the discovery and testing of more effective approaches to prevention, earlier detection and improved treatment of diseases such as dementia, cancer, diabetes, heart disease and stroke.

It will collect and link multiple sources of health and health-relevant information, including genetic data, across a diverse and inclusive cohort of 5 million people that reflects the UK population.

Our Future Health is committed to building a resource that truly reflects the UK population, so it can identify differences in how diseases begin and progress in men and women from different backgrounds.

It is vital that a diverse range of people join the study so discoveries that are made benefit everyone. In the past, some groups have not had enough representation in health research. This includes people from Black communities, Asian communities and people from other minority ethnic groups. It also includes people living in less wealthy parts of the country. This means that the medical advances made from past research may not benefit everyone equally.

This would be the most diverse cohort ever recruited in the UK with up to 1 million participants from ethnic minorities and the largest such multi-ethnic cohort in the world. Our Future Health plans to focus particular effort on recruiting and retaining 3 key groups: South Asian people, Black people and people of low socio-economic status and high deprivation.

Recognising the challenges faced by research studies in recruiting participants from these groups, additional efforts are being made to ensure good representation of these groups that have previously been under-served or under-represented in health research. [\[footnote 157\]](#)

To that end, there is a comprehensive and lasting programme of public engagement and involvement with numerous focus groups, meetings and interviews already having been held with the public and relevant stakeholders to inform the development of the protocol and participant materials.

The UK is uniquely well-placed to deliver this project with an exceptional track record in population research; a diverse (ethnically and socio-economically) population willing to take part in research and a government that is committed to levelling up the major inequalities in health outcomes seen across the population.

Targeting campaigns

The Commission heard from representatives from frontline services, health sector charities, local authority health departments and regional representatives of Public Health England on the topic of best practice providing health care support and messages to different groups. Some of these organisations provided examples of health campaigns and programmes they run which target specific ethnicities or specific postcodes or socially deprived areas. Representatives also expressed frustration that lessons learnt from such campaigns weren't being effectively shared across different locations or organisations and more coordination was required. One contributor articulated the "need for one place to go and find out how other organisations or initiatives had successfully landed health messages to enable scaling up and spending funding properly."

Case study: Sussex Health and Care Partnership

The project took the form of a locally commissioned service to primary care, whereby GPs were empowered to support patients in at-risk groups for COVID-19. All practices in Sussex were offered access to the locally commissioned service.

95% to 98% of GP practices took up the service. The local authority public health team complemented this work by producing benchmarking for practices to highlight their population demographics. GPs identified the patients they needed to target - those from areas of high deprivation and people from high-risk ethnicities. They were also asked to focus on equity of access.

There were 2 components to the locally commissioned service - parts A and B.

Part A had 3 proactive elements:

1. Messaging around risk to ethnic minority groups - 37 languages translated available to GP for their use - centrally designed and then GPs could add nuances - also highlighted proactive measures such as usefulness of vitamin D, shielding advice and 'hand, face and space', re-enforcing public health messaging on how to stay safe.
2. Holistic reviews for ethnic minority patients who have additional modifiable risk factors - one-to-one telephone appointments - to offer support in tackling smoking, obesity, CVD, diabetes, respiratory illness, mental health and social needs.
3. Encourage practices to reflect on equality of access - including ethnicity recording, and representation of ethnic minority patients on patient participation groups.

Part B focused on acute and reactive care in at-risk patients diagnosed with COVID-19:

- Once patients had a positive COVID-19 diagnosis, additional remote monitoring of their condition was offered based on their clinical risk profile. For example, patients living in areas of highest deprivation, patients from ethnic minority (not including White minority) backgrounds and patients with comorbidities, irrespective of ethnicity or deprivation.
- Pulse oximetry and regular welfare calls were offered at home to such patients. If suitable for home monitoring, patients are offered a pulse oximeter with instructions, a remote COVID-19 monitoring diary and regular welfare checks.

In addition to the above, community champions were deployed, to talk to GPs about what they could offer to support local communities including forums and training sessions with GPs.

The clinical commissioning group developed a detailed locally commissioned service specification, protocols for managing patients based on NHSE guidance and online resources to support practices in this work.

The main intended benefits include:

- enhancing relations between practices and communities by creating a lasting legacy of improved engagement
- populations having access to the information they need, in languages of their choice - over 27,679 letters in 36 languages sent out
- culturally appropriate monitoring of patients - over 1,750 holistic reviews and over 170 saturation probes have been provided by pulse oximetry at home, and expected outcomes will include whether this approach reduced hospital admissions and whether there was a reduction in severe illness and deaths
- positive qualitative feedback was received from both practitioners and the community.

Creating agency

Although previous research has shown that policies or interventions in the UK to reduce obesity by focussing on changing individual's behaviour (for example, diet and physical activity), have not always been successful,^[footnote 158] it is also true that interventions to reduce diabetes^[footnote 159] and cardiovascular diseases^[footnote 160] have been shown to be effective internationally. Limited research has been conducted in ethnic minorities in the UK to assess the effectiveness of such interventions to date - partly due to the low numbers of ethnic minority participants in trials. Novel interventions using smartphones and AI could be developed as well as culturally tailored interventions (for example, extended family-based interventions^[footnote 161]).

The Commission's view is that individuals and communities of all ethnicities should be encouraged to take control of their own health. This would be both in relation to changing their own behaviours and in taking part in research studies to see what is effective. Communities can take steps to improve their own health outcomes - and be helped to do so - particularly where they are more susceptible to certain health conditions (for example, diabetes in South Asian groups, High blood pressure in Black groups and many cancers in White groups) - all of which have modifiable risk factors (for example, diet, physical inactivity, tobacco and alcohol).

The COVID-19 pandemic has also provided a stark reminder that many of these risk factors (for example, diabetes, obesity) also increased the risk of death from COVID-19 and showed the critical role that clinical research plays in providing treatments and vaccines. It is hoped this will encourage people to change their behaviour and to participate in research studies.

Case study: Office for Minority Health, USA

The Office of Minority Health is a federal agency set up in 1986 at the Department of Health and Human Services.

Their mission is to improve the health of racial and ethnic minority populations through the development of health policies and programs that will help eliminate health disparities.

The Institute has a \$281 million budget to conduct and support research, training, research capacity and infrastructure development, public education, and information dissemination programs to improve minority health and reduce health disparities.

Focus areas:

- Prevention (physical activity and nutrition).
- Clinical conditions, such as substance use disorder, hypertension, HIV, maternal health, sickle cell disease and trait, diabetes (including prevention of peripheral artery and kidney disease, lupus, Alzheimer's, and cancer prevention (for example, stomach, liver and cervical cancer).
- Individual social needs and social determinants of health.

Programme priorities for 2020 to 2021:

- Supporting states, territories and tribes in identifying and sustaining health equity-promoting policies, programs and practices.
- Expanding the use of community health workers to address health and social service needs within ethnic minority communities.
- Strengthening cultural competence among healthcare providers throughout the country.

Recommendation 11: Promote fairness - Establish the Office for Health Disparities

This Commission recommends that the government establish a new office to properly target health disparities in the UK: The Office for Health Disparities

This Office would be an independent body which would work alongside the NHS, as part of, or in place of, the redesigned Public Health England, to improve healthy life expectancy across the UK and in all groups and reduce inequalities. As most of the causes of health inequalities (deprivation, tobacco, alcohol, unhealthy diet and physical inactivity) are not due to differences in healthcare, addressing them will involve multiple government departments and so the office would need to be cross-cutting across government.

a) Increasing programmes aimed at levelling up health care and health outcomes.

Use existing data and evidence to target those communities with the worst health outcomes (due to deprivation or ethnicity) for tailored health interventions, health education and communications. This function would work alongside existing local health workers and would utilise best practice examples from Local Authorities and Public Health regional offices/charities.

b) Improving the data, guidance and expertise in the causes and solutions for health disparities for specific groups.

This would include:

- Funding further research into health conditions which adversely impact specific groups.

This would include a large focus on research into health disparities affecting more deprived communities and different ethnic groups, including White people where they have worse outcomes, considering genetic and biological differences, cultural practices and socio economic drivers.

- Providing best practice for the inclusion of known health disparities, including those experienced by more deprived communities and different ethnic groups, including White, in clinical care guidelines. Work closely with the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, and other bodies, to ensure all guidance includes information on disparities as standard.
- Providing expertise in how the health of different ethnic groups including White are affected by underlying conditions, cultural and linguistic practices, geography, and occupation. This expertise would be disaggregated to avoid unhelpful grouping of different ethnicity and to ensure proper tailoring of health services.

The first priorities for the new OHD should include:

Research:

- Mental health: Commissioning new research into the causes and mental health conditions and the reasons for disparities in levels and outcomes. Focused research into the most effective upstream interventions and best ways to improve access to these services.
- Clinical conditions: Commissioning further research into the causes of the disparities in life limiting health conditions identified above, including those conditions where White ethnic groups perform badly in comparison to ethnic minorities.
- Prevention: Commissioning further research into the most effective preventative approaches that can be fully tailored to different groups.
- Investigating barriers to increasing diversity of participants into clinical research studies including clinical trials and genetic studies and identifying solutions

Health education and communications:

- Improving health literacy in those with poorer health outcomes including those from more deprived backgrounds and some ethnic groups.
- Targeted campaigns to tackle the stigma associated with the mental care system in different groups.
- Campaigns to improve the participation in clinical trials, cohort studies under-represented groups including ethnic minority groups and more deprived populations.
- Campaigns to improve uptake of interventions to prevent diseases including screening and vaccination

Expertise:

- Establish a team of experts with cultural understanding of different communities, including White groups, to provide nationwide advice to health care providers. These should include community liaison contacts who have an in-depth knowledge of the communities that they work with as well as an in-depth knowledge of services available. These contacts aim to act as a conduit directing community members to the services that are most culturally appropriate to their needs. To work closely with existing third and public sector groups in this space.

Professor Sir John Bell FRS, Regius Professor of Medicine at Oxford University, has given his support for this recommendation, saying:

I fully endorse the Commission's recommendation that the government launch a new Office for Health Disparities. This will help us to understand the key drivers of health disparities in the UK - particularly in relation to supporting research investigating the relative importance of genes, lifestyle and environment in different groups' health outcomes. The soon to be launched 'Our Future Health' study of 5 million UK adults will be the largest such research study in the world and has been designed to ensure that it fully represents both ethnic minorities and deprived communities who have been under-represented in the past and we would welcome a strong focus from the government in this area to help achieve that objective.

Professor Nick Wareham (FMedSci), Director of the Medical Research Council Epidemiology Unit at the University of Cambridge, and of the The Centre for Diet and Activity Research, also supports the creation of the OHD, stating:

There is a need for a greater research focus on the causes for health disparities in this country and most importantly, on the development and evaluation of possible solutions. By establishing a home for the evidence, communications and expertise into one space, the Office for Health Disparities will ensure we can move forward in tackling these disparities. The recommendation to co-ordinate and enhance efforts to increase participation by people from ethnic minorities in observational and interventional studies trials would be of vital help to researchers, and we look forward to working alongside the Office.

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Conclusion

We have tried in this report to present a new race agenda for the country, relevant to people from all backgrounds.

Rather than just highlighting minority disparities and demanding the government takes action, we have tried to understand why they exist in the first place.

That has meant some challenging conversations about today's complex reality of ethnic advantage and disadvantage, a reality no longer captured by the old idea of BAME versus White Britain.

We have focused not just on persistent race-based discrimination but on the role of cultural traditions, including family, within different minority groups, the overlap between ethnic and socio-economic disadvantage, and the agency we have as individuals and groups.

And we believe that perhaps more than previous reports on these issues a degree of optimism is justified. Our agenda is rooted in the significant progress we have made as well as the challenges that remain.

We were established as a response to the upsurge of concern about race issues instigated by the BLM movement. And we owe the mainly young people behind that movement a debt of gratitude for focusing our attention once again on these issues.

But most of us come from an older generation whose views were formed by growing up in the 1970s and 1980s. And our experience has taught us that you do not pass on the baton of progress by cleaving to a fatalistic account that insists nothing has changed.

And nor do you move forward by importing bleak new theories about race that insist on accentuating our differences. It is closer contact, mutual understanding across ethnic groups and a shared commitment to equal opportunities that has contributed to the progress we have made.

Too many people in the progressive and anti-racism movements seem reluctant to acknowledge their own past achievements, and they offer solutions based on the binary divides of the past which often misses the point of today's world.

We have paid close attention to the data and tried to avoid sweeping statements or over-ambitious targets and recommendations. Instead, our recommendations have tried to account for the messy reality of life and have been aimed, where possible, at everyone who is disadvantaged, not just those from specific ethnic groups.

Many of our recommendations, on Class B drugs or extending school hours for example, are aimed especially at the COVID-blighted generation of young people. Others focus on better use of data and the development of digital tools to promote fairness at work or for keeping young people out of trouble.

We have also acknowledged where we do not know enough and called for further research on what works in promoting fairness at work, and the role of the family and the reasons behind the success of those minority groups that have been surging forward into the middle class and the elite.

We focused our recommendations on the 4 broad categories of change that the Commission wishes to affect - build trust, promote fairness, create agency, and achieve inclusivity - and never assumed that minorities are inert victims of circumstance. As mentioned in the foreword the fact that most of us are successful minority professionals has no doubt shaped this thinking.

And our experience of ethnic minority Britain from the inside makes it obvious to us that different groups are distinguished in part by their different cultural patterns and expectations, after all that is what multiculturalism was supposed to be about. It is hardly shocking to suggest that some of those traditions can help individuals succeed more than others.

Beneath the headlines that often show egregious acts of discrimination, the Windrush scandal most recently, incremental progress is being made as our report has shown beyond doubt. Through focusing on what matters now, rather than refighting the battles of the past, we want to build on that progress.

Finally, a thanks to all those individuals and organisations from across the country who gave us their time to to share their perspectives and evidence, and explain how their inspiring projects are helping to build a fairer Britain.

The year 2022 promises to be a special one: a new energy as we are fully released from COVID captivity, The Queen's 70th Jubilee and the Commonwealth Games in Birmingham. And we hope it will be infused with the spirit of British optimism, fairness and national purpose that was captured by that 2012 Olympic opening ceremony, and has animated this report.

Appendix A: Abbreviations and glossary

Acronyms and abbreviations

- AHS: adolescent health study
- AI: artificial intelligence
- APCC: Association of Police and Crime Commissioners
- APP: authorised professional practice
- ASB: anti-social behaviour
- BAME: Black, Asian and minority ethnic - this report has also considered Gypsy, Roma and Travellers (GRT)
- BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation
- BEIS: Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy
- BLM: Black Lives Matter
- BME: Black and minority ethnic
- BMI: body mass index
- BSA: British Social Attitudes
- BSc: Bachelor of Science degree
- BTEC: Business and Technology Education Council
- CBE: Commander of the Order of the British Empire
- CBS: Confederation of British Industry
- CCTV: closed-circuit television
- CDEI: Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation
- CEA: Clinical Excellence Award
- CEDAR: The Centre for Diet and Activity Research
- CEO: chief executive officer
- CHD: coronary heart disease
- CIMM: Cultural Inclusion Maturity Model
- CIRV: Community Initiative to Reduce Violence
- CoP: College of Policing
- COVID-19: Coronavirus disease 2019
- CQC: Care Quality Commission
- CRED: Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities
- CRS: Contextual Recruitment System
- CSEW: Crime Survey of England and Wales
- CSJ: Centre for Social Justice
- CV: curriculum vitae
- CVD: cardiovascular diseases
- DCMS: Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
- DfE: Department for Education
- DHSC: Department of Health and Social Care
- DNA: deoxyribonucleic acid
- DWP: Department for Work and Pensions
- EBacc: English Baccalaureate
- EHRC: Equality and Human Rights Commission
- ELA: Employers Lawyers Association
- EMBES: Ethnic Minority British Election Study
- EPI: Education Policy Institute
- EU: European Union
- FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
- FE: further education
- FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, usually known in English as the Fundamental Rights Agency

- FSM: free school meals
- FTSE 100: Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index
- FTSE 250: The FTSE 250 Index is a capitalisation-weighted index consisting of the 101st to the 350th largest companies listed on the London Stock Exchange
- FTSE 350: The FTSE 350 Index is a market capitalisation weighted stock market index made up of the constituents of the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 index
- GCSE: General Certificate of Secondary Education
- GMP: Greater Manchester Police
- GP: General Practitioner
- GRT: Gypsy, Roma and Travellers
- H. pylori: helicobacter pylori
- HDL cholesterol: high-density lipoprotein cholesterol
- HEI: higher education institutions
- HHS: Department of Health and Human Services (USA)
- HIV: human immunodeficiency virus
- HMICFRS: Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services
- HMT: Her Majesty's Treasury
- HO: Home Office
- HPV: human papillomavirus
- HQ: headquarters
- HR: human resources
- IBID: Latin ibidem - meaning in the same place and used in footnotes to refer to the source cited in the preceding note
- ICAEW: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales
- IFS: Institute for Fiscal Studies
- IGCP: Institute for Global City Policing
- IHD: ischaemic heart disease
- IPSO: Independent Press Standards Organisation
- LEAN: London Enterprise Adviser Network
- LGBT: lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
- LPA: local policing area
- LRTI: lower respiratory tract infection
- LSYPE2: Commission of Second Longitudinal Study of Young People In England
- MBA: Master of Business Administration
- MBRRACE-UK: Mothers and Babies: Reducing Risk through Audits and Confidential Enquiries across the UK
- MHCLG: Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
- MOD: Ministry of Defence
- MoJ: Ministry of Justice
- MOPAC: Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime
- MP: Member of Parliament
- MPS: Metropolitan Police Service
- MRC: Medical Research Council
- MRG: Minority Rights Group International
- NAEP: National Assessment of Educational Progress
- NatCen: National Centre for Social Research
- NCA: National Crime Agency
- NCS: National Citizen Service
- NFF: national funding formula
- NGA: National Governance Association
- NHS: National Health Service
- NICE: National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
- NIHP: National Institute for Health Protection
- NMDC: National Museum Directors Council
- NPCC: National Police Chiefs' Council
- NSPCC: National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
- NYJB: National Youth Justice Board
- OfS: Office for Students
- Ofsted: Office for Standards In Education, Children's Services and Skills
- OHD: Office for Health Disparities
- OMH: Office of Minority Health
- ONS: Office for National Statistics
- OOCd: Out of Court Disposals
- OSR: Office for Statistics Regulation
- PA: programmes activities
- PACE: Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 - Code A
- PCC: Police and Crime Commissioner
- PHE: Public Health England
- PI: Performance Index
- Project ADDER: Addiction, Diversion, Disruption, Enforcement and Recovery
- PRSR: Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011
- PSD: Professional Standards Department
- PSNI: Police Service Northern Ireland
- PwC: PricewaterhouseCoopers

- QC: Queen's Counsel
- RCGP: Royal College of General Practitioners
- RCPsych: Royal College of Psychiatrists
- RDU: Race Disparity Unit
- SEN: special educational needs
- SEND: special educational needs and disability
- SES: socio-economic status
- SMC: Social Mobility Commission
- SME: small and medium-sized enterprises or small and medium-sized businesses
- STEM: science, technology, engineering and maths
- SVRU: Scottish Violence Reduction Unit
- Trusts: NHS Foundation Trusts
- TVP: Thames Valley Police
- UCAS: Universities and Colleges Admissions Service
- UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- VRU: Violence Reduction Unit
- WMP: West Midlands police
- WRES: Workforce Race Equality Standard
- YFF: Youth Futures Foundation
- YJB: Youth Justice Board
- YJS: Youth Justice Service
- YLL: years of life lost

Terms and definitions

- A level: GCE Advanced Level
- affinity bias (also known as similarity bias): occurs when we treat people more favourably, simply because they are like us or others we like - similarities can include any shared commonality, including everything, from likes, dislikes or appearance, to schooling or career history
- agency: the capacity of individuals or groups to act independently and to make their own choices
- Brexit: British exit - the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community
- chatbot: a computer program designed to simulate conversation with human users, especially over the internet
- class A drugs: crack cocaine, cocaine, ecstasy (MDMA), heroin, LSD, magic mushrooms, methadone, methamphetamine (crystal meth)
- class B drugs: amphetamines, barbiturates, cannabis, codeine, ketamine, methylphenidate (Ritalin), synthetic cannabinoids, synthetic cathinones (for example mephedrone, methoxetamine)
- cultural capital: the social assets of a person (including education, intellect, style of speech, style of dress) that promote social mobility in a stratified society
- English Baccalaureate: in England, the English Baccalaureate is a school performance indicator linked to the General Certificate of Secondary Education results
- family strain: the negative impact of economic and social pressure on households
- hate crime: prejudice-motivated crime which occurs when a perpetrator targets a victim because of their membership (or perceived membership) of a certain social group or race
- identity politics: political approach wherein people of a particular religion, race, social background, class or other identifying factor develop political agendas and organise based upon the interlocking systems of oppression that affect their lives and come from their various identities
- immigrant optimism: the higher levels of aspirations among students with migrant background
- institutional racism: applicable to an institution that is racist or to the discriminatory processes, policies, attitudes or behaviours in a single institution
- microaggression: brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioural or environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative attitudes toward stigmatised or culturally marginalised groups
- newcomer optimism: defined by the Commission as how long since establishment in the UK
- postcode lottery: someone's access to health services or medical treatment is determined by the area of the country in which they live
- post-racial society: a theoretical environment in which the UK is free from racial preference, discrimination, and prejudice
- residency requirement: police constables need to have lived in London for a minimum of 3 years, within the last 6 years
- selective assimilation theory: characterise the children of immigrants with better resources and socio-economic prospects - their parents' generally higher levels of education foster more opportunistic than oppositional orientations toward economic incorporation
- structural racism: describes a legacy of historic racist or discriminatory processes, policies, attitudes or behaviours that continue to shape organisations and societies today
- systematic racism: applies to interconnected organisations, or wider society, which exhibit racist or discriminatory processes, policies, attitudes or behaviours
- T levels: an alternative to A levels, apprenticeships and other 16 to 19 courses - equivalent to 3 A levels, a T level focuses on vocational skills and can help students into skilled employment, higher study or apprenticeships
- trolling - intentionally leaving hurtful or offensive comments with an aim to cause upset or irritation
- unconscious bias - social stereotypes about certain groups of people that individuals form outside their own conscious awareness
- V-shaped: steep decline, quick recovery
- White privilege: the idea that there is societal privilege that benefits White people over other ethnic groups in some societies, particularly if they are otherwise under the same social, political, or economic circumstances

Appendix B: Call for evidence

The call for evidence consultation ran from 26 October 2020 to 30 November 2020. Responses were invited from the public and local communities, public private and third sector organisations, researchers and academics and others who wished to share their views.

To understand why such disparities exist, and what works and what does not, submissions of evidence were requested to provide answers to 10 questions which focused on education, health, crime and policing, and employment and enterprise.

There were 2,329 responses submitted in total from 325 organisations and 2,004 individuals, including academics. Responses were received from the following organisations:

0 to 9

- 21K Digital Media Social Enterprise

- 4in10: London's Child Poverty Network

A

- ACLC Women Committee
- Action for Diversity and Development
- Adanna Women's Support Group
- African and Caribbean Support Organisation of Northern Ireland (ACSONI)
- African and Caribbean Women's Association Scotland (ACWA)
- African Caribbean Education Network
- African Women's Group Scotland
- Against Institutional Racism UK (AIR UK)
- The Anti-Racist Alliance Trust (ARATRUST)
- Age UK
- Agenda: The Alliance for Women and Girls At Risk
- Anti-Caste Discrimination Alliance
- Anti-Tribalism Movement
- APNA NHS: South Asian NHS Leaders Network
- Archives West Midlands
- Ark and Ark Schools
- Art History in Schools
- Asian Fire Service Association (AFSA)
- Association for Citizenship Teaching (ACT)
- Association of Accounting Technicians(AAT)
- Association of Educational Psychologists (AEP)
- Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC)
- Association of South Asian Midwives (ASAM) CIC
- Aweo Group (with The Black Card Talks)

B

- BAME Health Collaborative
- BAME Senior Civil Servants
- Barnardo's
- Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council
- Black Activists Rising Against Cuts(BARAC)
- Black Success Initiative (BSI)
- Bewnans Kernow
- Better Health for Africa (BH4A)
- Birmingham City Council Corporate Black Workers Group
- Black Educators East London (BEEL)
- Black Learning Achievement and Mental Health UK
- British Medical Association(BMA)
- Black Minority Ethnic Strategic Advisory Group
- Black Protest Legal Support
- Black South West Network
- Brent Council
- Brick by Brick Communities
- Bristol City Council
- BritBanglaCovid
- British Film Institute (BFI)
- British International Doctors Association (BIDA)
- British Psychological Society's Division of Educational and Child Psychologists
- Brook
- Building Communities Resource Centre (BCRC)
- Business Action Momentum Enterprise
- Business in the Community (BITC)

C

- Campaign for Common Sense
- Care for Someone
- Caribbean and African Health Network (CAHN)
- Central Association of Nigerians in the United Kingdom

- Centre for Ageing Better
- Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE)
- Centre for Mental Health
- Chanon Consulting
- Chartered Institution of Civil Engineering Surveyors
- Chartered Management Institute (CMI)
- Cheshire East Council
- Chief Nursing Officer's for England Black Minority Ethnic Strategic Advisory Group
- Children's Services, Hampshire County Council, including Youth Offending Team, Social Care and Education Teams
- Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD)
- Chinese Liberal Democrats
- Citizen UK
- Clerkenwell and Shoreditch County Court
- Cleveland Police
- Coalition of Black and Black Ethnic Groups
- Coalition of Race Equality Organisations (CORE)
- Cognition HR and Finance Solutions Ltd
- College of Policing
- Community Union
- Confederation of School Trusts
- Co-op Group
- Coventry Black Community Covid-19 Taskforce
- COVID-19 Anti-Racism Group (CARG)
- CX-squared

D

- Decolonising The Curriculum For Educators UK
- Department of Health and Social Care
- Diaspora Voice
- Directors UK
- Don't Divide Us
- Doncaster African Caribbean Support Group

E

- East of England BAME Network
- Eastern Region Black Educators
- Early Education
- Education and Employers Charity
- Elite Group Consultants Ltd
- Employment Lawyers Association (ELA)
- Enterprise Adviser Network in Sheffield (part of Sheffield City Council and funded by Careers and Enterprise Company)
- EQUAL Independent Advisory Group
- Equality and Human Rights Commission
- Equality 4 Black Nurses
- Essex Ghanaians Welfare Association
- Europeans Welfare Association (EWA CIC)
- Everyone Matters
- Everything Human Rights Community Group
- Excellence in Education (EIE)
- Experian UK&I
- Extend Ventures

F

- Fatherland Group
- Feed Me Good
- Fletcher's Business Solutions Limited
- Five X More
- Former BAME Senior Civil Servants
- Friends, Families and Travellers
- Future Visions Ltd

G

- Getting It Right CIC
- Global African Congress UK (GACuk) - Reparatory Justice Community Organisation
- Goldsmiths, University of London
- Greater London Authority (GLA)
- Greater Manchester BAME Women's Third Sector Network
- Greater Manchester Combined Authority
- Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service
- Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership
- Greater Manchester Police
- Guy's and St Thomas' Charity

H

- Haringey Education Partnership and Haringey Council
- Healthwatch Birmingham
- Herts Community NHS Trust
- Herts Equality Council
- Hibiscus Initiatives
- Hindu Forum of Britain
- Home for Good
- Hope Bereavement Support CIC
- HOPE not hate
- Howard League for Penal Reform
- Hull Afro Caribbean Association (HACA)
- Hull Black History Partnership (HBHP)
- Hull University Teaching Hospitals (HUTH) NHS Trust
- Humber, Coast and Vale Health and Care Partnership

I

- iAssist-Ni
- IDPAD Coalition UK
- Imani Housing Co-operative Ltd
- Imkaan
- Institute of Commonwealth Studies
- INQUEST
- Iraqi Welfare Association
- iSEA and The UK Federation of Chinese Professionals (UKFCP)
- IVE

J

- Jamaica Diaspora National Board
- Jones Lang LaSalle Lt (JLL)
- Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants
- Just Fair
- Just for Kids Law, including Children's Rights Alliance for England
- JUSTICE
- Justice 4 You

K

- Kenya Nottingham Welfare Association
- Khidmat Centres
- Kidney Research UK
- Kirklees Council
- Kyloe Secure Children's Home

L

- Latin American Women's Rights Service (LAWRS)
- Leicester African Caribbean Citizens Forum
- Liverpool City Region Combined Authority
- Lloyds Banking Group
- London Borough of Brent
- London Borough of Hackney
- London Borough of Havering
- London Borough of Hounslow
- London Borough of Lambeth
- London Borough of Lewisham
- London Councils
- Luton Council
- Lydiard Group

M

- Manchester City Council
- Mantecore Enterprise
- Maslaha
- Mendü
- Metropolitan Police
- Metropolitan Thames Valley Housing (MTVH)
- Middlesex University
- Migrant and Minority Ethnic Council
- MigrationUK
- Migrants' Rights Network
- Milton Keynes College (MK College)
- Milton Keynes Islamic Arts and Culture Organisation (MKIAC)
- Ministry of Justice (MoJ)
- Mix and Match
- Mothers 4 Justice Ubuntu
- Movement for Justice and Reconciliation
- Mr and Miss Black and Beautiful
- MTC Group
- Museum Detox

N

- National Association of Head Teachers (NAHT)
- National Association of Schoolmasters Union of Women Teachers (NASUWT)
- National AIDS Trust
- National Education Union (NEU)
- National Governance Association
- National Union of Students (NUS)
- National Youth Agency
- Newcastle University: Applied Educational Psychology Doctor of (DAppEdPsy) teaching staff and students
- NHS BME Network
- NHS Calderdale and Huddersfield Foundation Trust
- NHS Birmingham and Solihull CCG
- No More Exclusions
- North East North Cumbria Integrated Care System (NENC ICS)
- North Staffordshire Combined Healthcare NHS Trust
- not named - 100 signatories
- Nottinghamshire Police
- Nubian Sisters
- Nuffield Orthopaedic Centre in Oxford
- Nurses Associations of Jamaica (UK)
- Nurses of Colour Network

O

- Office for National Statistics (ONS)
- Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted)
- Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), on behalf of Embrace Network
- Office of the North Yorkshire Police, Fire and Crime Commissioner
- Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Northumbria
- Oldham Council
- Olive Tree CIC
- On Our Mind Ltd
- Open Minds Alliance
- Open Palm
- Optimal Success Limited

P

- Parents Action and Resource Centre (PARC)
- Police and Crime Commissioner for Wiltshire and Swindon
- Prison Reform Trust
- Probation Institute
- Protection Approaches

Q

- QED Foundation on behalf of Network for Pakistani Organisations (UK)
- Quakers in Britain
- Quantum Sugar: Self-empowerment Tools for Young People

R

- Race Equality First
- Race Equality Foundation
- Raleigh International
- Real Life Ministries
- Reform Pursuit
- Release
- RESCUE Project
- Resuscitation Council UK
- Rochdale Borough Council and NHS Heywood Middleton and Rochdale CCG
- Royal College of Nursing (RCN)
- Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists
- Royal College of Physicians
- Royal College of Psychiatrists
- Runnymede Trust

S

- Safety4Sisters
- Safeguarding Now Consultancy Limited
- Salesforce
- Salifu Dagarti Foundation
- SCiPE CIC
- Scottish Racism project
- Shabaka
- Shire Professional Chartered Psychologists
- Sikh Assembly
- Sikh Federation (UK)
- Simetrica-Jacobs
- Somerset African Caribbean Network (SACN)
- Southampton City Council
- St Christopher's Fellowship
- Stardust Arts
- Stonewall and UK Black Pride
- StopWatch
- Suffolk Black Community Forum

- Sunrise Diversity
- Sussex Racial Equality Action Project (REAP), Brighton and Hove Black Women's Group and 'Justice. African History'
- Sutton African and Caribbean Cultural Organisation
- Swadhinata Trust

T

- Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council
- The 100 Black Men of London
- The Anti-Racist Social Club
- The Ascension Seed
- The Black Child Agenda
- The British Medical Association (BMA)
- The British Psychological Society
- The City of Liverpool College
- The Collaboratory
- The Delicate Mind
- The Diana Award
- The Equality Trust, and Compassion in Politics
- The Feminist Therapy Centre
- The Governance Forum
- The International Community Organisation of Sunderland (ICOS)
- The Local Equality Commission
- The Locum Doctors Association
- The Lois Project: Health Education Network
- The Mumtaza Network
- The Myrtus Workshop
- The Open Minds Project
- The Race Equality Centre
- The Smart Kid Coach CIC
- The Social Innovation Partnership (TSIP)
- The Summers Trust Charity
- The Traveller Movement UK
- The Unity Project (TUP)
- The Validate AI CIC
- Themelacoach UK
- Trafford Council
- Transform Justice
- Transforming Lives for Good (TLG)
- Transition to Adulthood Alliance
- Tyburn and Wheelwright Residents Group

U

- UK Federation of Chinese Professionals
- UNISON
- Unite2Strive
- United Family and Friends Campaign
- University of Birmingham: Centre for Research in Race and Education (CRRE)
- University of Essex: ESRC Research Centre on Micro-Social Change (MiSoC)
- University of Exeter
- University of Manchester: The Centre on the Dynamics of Ethnicity (CoDE)
- University of Nottingham

V

- VotesforSchools
- Vitabonna Development

W

- Women Acting in Today's Society (WAITS) Charity

- Wales Centre for Public Policy
- Wandsworth Anti-Racism Education Campaign (WAREC)
- We and AI
- West Midlands Combined Authority
- West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner(WMPCC)
- West Yorkshire and Harrogate Health and Care Partnership
- West Yorkshire Police
- Wellbeing Connect Services
- Why me?
- Wigan Equality, Diversity and Inclusion Steering Group
- Willesden New Testament Church of God
- Women's Equality Party
- Women's Policy Group NI
- World Afro Day CIC

Y

- Youth Futures Foundation

Z

- Zahid Mubarek Trust
- Zurich Insurance

Appendix C: Commissioned research

The Commission requested new research from individuals and organisations to aid their work. Accordingly, it would like to thank the following:

- Dr Remi Adekoya, Department of Politics, University of York, UK
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- Adrian Crossley, The Centre for Social Justice, UK
- David G. Green, Civitas, UK
- Sunder Katwala, British Future, UK
- Professor Tom Kirchmaier and Dr Ria Ivandic, London School of Economics, UK
- Dr Richard Norrie and David Goodhart, Policy Exchange, UK
- The British Business Bank
- Natalie Perera and Jon Andrews, Education Policy Institute, UK
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- Veena Raleigh and Shilpa Ross, The King's Fund, UK
- Mr Kash Singh, One Nation One Britain, UK
- Amanda Spielman, Ofsted, UK
- Professor Clifford Stott, Dr Matthew Radburn, University of Keele, UK, Dr Arabella Kyprianides, University College London, UK and Dr Matthew Muscat, University of Cambridge, UK
- Professor Steve Strand, Department of Education, University of Oxford, UK
- Professor Yaojun Li, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, UK
- Professor Raghieb Ali, Dr Jean Adams, Dr Avirup Chowdhury, Professor Nita Forouhi, Professor Martin White, Professor Nick Wareham. MRC Epidemiology Unit, University of Cambridge.
- Professor Lawrence Sherman, Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, UK
- Dr Wanjiru Njoya, University of Exeter, UK

Appendix D: Stakeholders

The Commission heard evidence from many during the course of its work. It would like to thank the following for their participation:

NHS Trusts, professional bodies and frontline workers

- Anthony Nolan
- Blood Cancer UK
- British Associations of Physicians of Indian Origin
- British Heart Foundation (BHF)
- British Medical Association (BMA)
- Diabetes UK
- General Medical Council (GMC)
- Harvard School of Health

- NHS England
- NHS Foundation Trust, Ashford and St Peter's Hospital
- NHS Foundation Trust, Calderdale and Huddersfield Hospitals
- Greater Manchester Mental Health
- NHS Foundation Trust, Hertfordshire Partnership University
- NHS Foundation Trust, Kings Hospital
- NHS Foundation Trust, Ormskirk Hospital
- Royal Bolton Hospital
- NHS Foundation Trust, The Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals
- NHS Foundation Trust, Wrightington, Wigan and Leigh Teaching Hospitals
- North Staffordshire G. P. Federation (NSGPF)
- Nurses, East of England
- Nurses, London
- Nurses, Midlands
- Nurses, National
- Nurses, North West
- Nurses, South East
- Paramedics, East of England
- Paramedics, London
- Paramedics, Midlands
- Paramedics, North East and Yorkshire
- Paramedics, North West
- Public Health England
- Public Health England, East Midlands
- Public Health England, South East
- Public Health England, North West
- Royal College of Nursing
- Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh
- The Clementine Churchill Hospital
- The College of Paramedics

Police forces, federations and frontline officers

- Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC)
- Black and Asian Police Association, West Midlands Police
- Black Police Association
- College of Policing
- Dorset Police
- Ethnic minority frontline officers, Metropolitan Police
- Former police officers
- Greater Manchester Police
- Gypsy Roma Traveller Police Association
- Merseyside Police
- Metropolitan Police Service
- National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC)
- National Sikh Police Association
- North Wales Police
- North Yorkshire Police
- Nottinghamshire Police
- Police Federation of England and Wales
- Police Now
- Police Service of Northern Ireland
- Police Superintendent Association
- West Midlands Police

Devolved administrations

- Senedd Cymru
- Scottish Parliament

Charities, not-for-profit organisations

- Anne Frank Trust
- Anne Frank Trust Youth Ambassadors

- British Red Cross
- British Science Association
- Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
- Coram Children's Charity
- 'Is This Ok?' Project
- One Britain, One Nation
- Policy Exchange think tank
- Race Council Cymru, National BAME Youth Forum Wales
- Revolving Doors
- Social Mobility Foundation
- UK Youth
- West of Scotland Regional Equality Council (WSREC)
- Youth Endowment Fund (YEF)
- Youth Employment UK
- Youth Futures Foundation (YFF)

Academics and individuals

- Dr Raghib Ali
- Sir John Bell, Regius Professor of Medicine
- Allan Bernard
- Stephen Bourne
- Dr Ben Bradford
- Duwayne Brooks, OBE
- Steeve Buckridge
- Professor Anthony Clayton
- Professor Sir Kevan Collins
- Helen Costa
- Claire Dove CBE
- Tim Godwin OBE QPM
- David Goodhart
- Dr David Green
- Helen Costa
- Lord Bernard Hogan-Howe Kt QPM
- Bishop Rose Hudson-Wilkin, Bishop of Dover
- Professor Nick Jennings, CB, FREng
- Professor Tom Kirchmaier
- S.I Martin
- Lord Neil Mendoza
- Dr Richard Norrie
- Trevor Phillips
- Dr Samir Puri
- Tom Richmond Professor Mike Roberts
- Levi Roots
- Sara Rowbotham
- Professor Lawrence Sherman
- Professor Swaran Singh
- Sir Simon Stevens
- Professor Clifford Stott
- Gerry Wareham
- Professor Nick Wareham
- Bishop Derek Webley DL MBE
- Professor David R Williams
- Lord Simon Woolley

Private sector

- @YourCareerSite
- Accelerate
- Amazon
- Applied
- BAE Systems
- Baringa Partners
- Black Young Professionals (BYP) Network
- Boeing
- Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Ltd (Deloitte)

- Epiphannie
- Ernst & Young
- Everywoman
- Google LLC
- Green Park Recruitment
- Group GTI
- GlaxoSmithKline
- HSBC UK Bank plc
- In Diverse Company
- Korn Ferry
- LinkedIn
- Lloyds Banking Group
- Microsoft
- Mind Gym
- Modern Hire
- PricewaterhouseCoopers UK (PwC)
- Pymetrics
- Rare Recruitment
- Reckitt Benckiser Group plc
- Reed Recruitment
- Rolls-Royce
- Sainsbury's
- Skanska UK plc
- Sky UK Ltd
- The Careers and Enterprise Company
- Young Gifted and STEM
- ZynaSearch

Leads of current and previously commissioned government reviews

- Rt Hon Dame Elish Angiolini DBE PC QC FRSA FRSE
- Professor Dame Carol Black DBE FRCP BSD
- Rt Hon Andrea Leadsom MP
- Rt Hon David Lammy MP PC FRSA
- Sir Michael Marmot FBA FMedSci FRCP
- Baroness Ruby McGregor-Smith CBE
- Sir John Parker GBE, FREng HonFIES HonFIET
- Edward Timpson CBE MP
- David Tyler
- Professor Sir Simon Wessely FMedSci
- Social Mobility Commission

Academic institutions and bodies and schools

- Ark Schools
- Association for Black and Minority Ethnic Engineers (AFBE)
- Batley Girls High School
- Black Asian Minority Ethnic (BAME) Staff Network
- British Youth Council
- Behavioural Insights Team
- Centre for Caribbean Studies
- Children and Family Court Advisory Support Service (Cafcass)
- Confederation of Schools Trust
- Education Policy Institute (EPI)
- Equality and Human Rights Commission
- Evelyn Grace Academy
- Harris Federation
- Henry Jackson Society
- Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
- Institute of Physics (IoP)
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
- Kensington Primary School
- King's College London, Department of Political Economy (DPE)
- The Kings Fund
- London School of Economics (LSE)
- National Foundation for Educational Research
- National Governance Association

- Newstead Wood School
- Oak Academy
- Sheffield Hallam Institute of Education
- The Equiano Project
- The Worshipful Company of Fuellers
- University, Bristol
- University, Cambridge
- University, College London
- University, Imperial College London
- University, Keele
- University, Leicester
- University, Liverpool
- University, Oxford
- University, Warwick
- Ventures Trust
- Windrush Cross-Government Working Group

Councils

- Bristol City Council
- Cambridgeshire and Peterborough Combined Authority
- Greater London Authority
- London Borough of Lewisham
- Liverpool City Council
- Middlesbrough Council
- London Borough of Tower Hamlets
- Watford Borough Council
- West of England Combined Authority
- West Midlands Combined Authority

Government departments, agencies and public bodies

- British Business Bank
- Cabinet Office
- Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI)
- Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)
- Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS)
- Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS)
- Department for Education (DfE)
- Department for Education (DfE), Office for Students
- Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), Care Quality Commission
- Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)
- Government Equalities Office (part of the Equality Hub)
- Home Office (HO)
- Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS)
- Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Probation (HMIP)
- Her Majesty's Treasury (HMT)
- Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC)
- Joint Committee on Human Rights
- Ministry of Defence (MoD)
- Ministry of Justice (MoJ)
- Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted)
- Social Mobility Commission (SMC)
- Youth Justice Board (YJB)

Government ministers

- Kemi Badenoch MP, Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury and Minister for Equalities
- Baroness Barran MBE, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Civil Society
- Alex Chalk MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice
- Thérèse Coffey MP, Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
- Caroline Dinenage MP, Minister of State for Digital and Culture
- Nadine Dorries MP, Minister for Mental Health, Suicide Prevention and Patient Safety
- Nick Gibb MP, Minister of State at the Department for Education
- Gillian Keegan MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Apprenticeships and Skills

- Kwasi Kwarteng MP, Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
- Kit Malthouse MP, Minister of State for Crime and Policing,
- Paul Scully MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Minister of State, London

Members of Parliament

- Ben Bradley MP (Mansfield, Nottinghamshire)
- Marsha de Cordova MP (Battersea)
- Robert Halfon MP (Harlow), Chair of Education Select Committee
- Rt Hon Harriet Harman QC MP (Camberwell and Peckham)
- Danny Kruger MP (Devizes, Wiltshire)

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- Peter Schofield, Permanent Secretary at the Department for Work and Pensions
- Dame Rachel de Souza, Children's Commissioner

Appendix E: Additional acknowledgements

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- Keith Fraser
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- Mercy Muroki
- Martyn Oliver
- Dr Samir Shah CBE
- Kunle Olulode
- Blondel Cluff CBE

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- Summer Nisar

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- the Government Equality Office, in particular officials from the communications team
- the Private Office for the Minister for Equalities
- the Cabinet Office's corporate support functions, particularly those in the Arms Length Body, Public Appointments, and Propriety and Ethics Teams
- MOJ, DWP, DfE, DCMS, Home Office, BEIS and DHSC



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